THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

A Reunionist Crusader

Considerable publicity has been given to Dr. C. J. Wright's recent admission into the Church of England by the Bishop of Manchester. This is due, no doubt, to the influential position which Dr. Wright has occupied for some years past in Free Church circles; but it is also due to the energetic part he has played in his efforts to promote Christian Reunion in this country, which have brought him into close contact with the leaders of the Church of England. These twofold activities have given him unusual opportunities of understanding not only the problems which the Reunion Crusade has to face, but also the temper of mind and the methods of those who are endeavouring to solve these problems. The failure to achieve Christian Reunion in this country after so many years of endeavour, with the ensuing realization that new methods of Reunion are needed, has, we believe, played no inconsiderable part in inducing Dr. Wright to enter the Church of England.

We wish to stress the phrase 'entering the Church of England.' Some would describe Dr. Wright's action as 'leaving Methodism.' This Dr. Wright has not done; nor does he wish to do it. He is an intense Methodist. All he desires for Methodism is to bring it within the orbit of the National Church; for within that Church Methodism will be able to accomplish a spiritual and moral work for the nation which it cannot now accomplish if it continues to remain a denomination outside the National Church. Dr. Wright would desire a similar translation of all other Christian denominations in this land; that they should work inside the National Church, not outside it. If they would but come in and work as denominations within the National Church, how greatly would they strengthen and vitalize not only the Church of Eng-

land but, what is much more important, the moral and spiritual life of the English people which that Church has been ordained and established to serve.

Dr. Wright's experiences in his varied and energetic Reunion efforts have led him to realize that it is the *denominationalist mentality* of those who are striving as representatives of the various denominations to achieve Christian Reunion in this country which is the root cause of their failure to secure success. Dr. Wright possesses an *interdenominationalist mentality*. He sees the many as all parts of the one; and because he desires to enter into the fulness of the life of the one, he desires to share in the life of each of the many who constitute it. Hence in becoming a member of the Church of England, he desires at the same time to retain his full Methodist membership. He is convinced, moreover, that until this interdenominational spirit dominates the Reunion Movement in this country, we may have endless Reunion Conferences but shall never achieve Christian Reunion. At the present time the representatives of each denomination really value that denomination and its sectional interests above the interest of the whole Church which they believe themselves to be seeking to reunite.

Another hampering hindrance to the securing of Christian Reunion in this country is the method which insists on going abroad to secure better relations with Christian denominations overseas as a needful preliminary to achieving Christian Reunion at home. Dr. Wright is quite in favour of securing better relations with all the Churches overseas; but he is opposed to making Reunion at home dependent upon and compelled to wait upon success in these extra-national spheres. He believes that growing intimacy with Continental systems of doctrine, Continental methods of Christian worship, Continental ecclesiastical organization and procedure have a separatist rather than a unifying influence upon the mentality of our English ecclesiastics. We have no desire to make overseas Christians think and worship and organize after our English models; and for the purposes of English Reunion there is not the slightest need that we should think or worship or organize in accordance with Continental ideals. All these ecumenical endeavours seem not only to hinder success at home, but also to blind the eyes of those English representatives engaged in them to the steps they ought to be taking here and now in England to accomplish National Christian Reunion.

Last, but not least, Dr. Wright has come to the conclusion that action demands more moral courage and resolution on the part of the representatives of the denominations than they have hitherto shown, if National Christian Reunion is to be secured. There

must be a spirit of adventure which will dare to *act*, and in the first instance to *act alone* if needs be. Dr. Wright has arrived at the conviction that the historic episcopate as we have it in the Church of England is of the *bene esse* of the Christian Church, and that for that reason alone all Christian denominations which really desire Christian Reunion ought to be ready to accept the historic episcopate as the form of government of the reunited Church in this land. It is the *fact* of episcopacy, not any particular *theory* of it, which Dr. Wright himself has accepted and which he believes is needful for all our Christian Reunionists at the present time to accept in the interests of that Reunion of Christendom which is the greatest need of the Christian Religion to-day.

Dr. Wright does not believe in an ultimate Church unity which aims at securing a Universal Church subdivided into provinces all ruled and regulated from one earthly centre under one head — the papal ideal of Church unity. Neither does Dr. Wright believe in a Church Reunion which consists in nothing more than cordial co-operative relations between a vast number of different and differing Christian denominations. Dr. Wright is no more a denominationalist than he is a papist. Dr. Wright, loyal to the great ideal of our sixteenth century Reformation, believes that the Divine unity which the Christian Church ought to achieve is a federation in the form of intercommunion between national Churches. As a consequence he believes that the right method of procedure for securing universal Christian unity must begin by achieving as far as it possibly can Christian unity within each nation. It is this experience and these ideals which have led Dr. Wright to enter this National Church and ours while at the same time remaining a loyal Methodist. May his tribe increase: but above all may his ideals and methods become those of our English Reunionists.

Problems of Clerical Shortage

Dr. Kirk, Bishop of Oxford, addressing the Diocesan Conference in the Sheldonian Theatre on Nov. 8, stated that

> 'owing to wastage by death and retirement, the cutting off of the immediate supply of ordination candidates and the loss of men to the chaplaincy services, the parochial work of the Church, which before the war required 17,000 clergy, would have to be carried on by 12,000 clergy at most after the war.' (*Oxford Mail*, Nov. 9.)

The Bishop made the four following suggestions by way of remedy:

(1) *The Union of Parishes.*

> 'In this Diocese,' said the Bishop, 'they had roughly 600 parishes to-day, and they must reduce that number by means of unions to about 450. Even so, the Diocese would have to be worked with greatly reduced man-power. . . . Parishes and congregations would have to content themselves with drastic rationing of Sunday services.'

The union of parishes, provided it be a temporary union, particularly in country places, would constitute a sound solution in our present crisis. It would be a mistake, however, that such parochial amalgamations should be permanent and that in consequence a large number of ancient English parishes should be obliterated. Dr. Watson, the late Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, in his reliable and readable book, *The Church of England* (published in the Home University Library), maintains that for the right understanding of the Church of England it must be regarded as an aggregate of parishes. The parish is the unit of the Church of England, not the diocese, and our would-be reformers who are organizing to-day to make the diocese, and not the parish, the Church unit are pursuing a policy which, though it may promise immediate relief, must in the end prove detrimental to our Church's vitality and its influence on our national life. A few leading clergymen and laymen in every diocese may come to regard the diocese as the Church unit, but the rank and file of the English laity — and we believe also of the English clergy — will never do this. If a layman does not think first and foremost of his own parish, he will give little thought to the Church at large.

What we write here refers primarily to our country parishes. There are a number of small parishes in our cities and towns which are new creations, and these might with advantage be made chapels-of-ease in a larger unit. To-day we are looking forward to a more prosperous rural life, and to a considerable increase in our rural population. If these hopes be realised, it would have proved a great mistake to have weakened the parochial piety which in the country has its centre in its ancient parish church. A reduction in the number of services in our parish churches would be no great loss from the point of view of parochial piety. The attendance at many of these services in the parish churches is most meagre, nor do the services seem to produce any adequate moral and spiritual return for the pastoral energy bestowed on them. It is a fact which deserves serious consideration to-day that in many parishes where the number of services of Holy Communion has been greatly increased over what they were fifty years ago, there has been no increase in the number of communicants in the parish. This is also true of attendance at other services. Indeed, at our Sunday services the 'oncers' greatly exceed the 'twicers,' and the 'twicers' greatly exceed the 'thricers.' Moreover our B.B.C. religious services are supplementing our church services, especially our daily services (with the exception of the Holy Communion), in a very helpful manner. Therefore a reduction in the number of services in our parish churches would be no real loss to the religion of the parish.

(2) *Much Larger Use of whole-time Women Workers.* Dr. Kirk's second remedy is

> 'the employment of trained and educated women workers. There is no doubt we ought to be training and employing such workers in far larger numbers than at present. There is much important work in the parish they can do—primarily, of course, among women, girls and children, and in the clubs and Sunday schools.'

These stipendiary women workers would, in the majority of cases, be members of Sisterhoods and Religious Orders—perhaps deaconesses. This experiment might be well worth making, provided the women-workers have been thoroughly trained for their work, and provided also that they represent our English Church on non-party lines, and are not simply members of Anglo-Catholic organizations bent on Anglo-Catholic propaganda. At the present time there are more women in Religious Orders in the Church of England than there were before the Reformation. This suggests that there must be a large number of devout English women who would be willing to serve voluntarily in our parochial organizations.

(3) *Whole-time Stipendiary Lay Evangelists.* The Bishop's third remedy is to make larger use of lay Evangelism, such, for instance, as is provided by the Church Army and paid lay workers. He asked:

> 'Can we find an opening for whole-time trained men lay workers in the economy of the Church of England, and if we can find or make such an opening, will it attract men in sufficient quantities to alleviate our troubles substantially? The Church Army had shown that there were many men eminently fitted for the career, but not necessarily called to ordination.'

We confess to feeling grave doubt as to the soundness of this method of relief. Stipendiary laymen working as itinerant evangelists are for the most part happy and contented men: but when located in a parish, under a local incumbent, they lose much of their usefulness because they have lost their freedom and opportunities of initiative. Moreover, although the Diocesan Bishop and the parish priest may judge that such lay stipendiary workers are not 'called to ordination,' the lay workers often judge otherwise and in consequence experience a sense of frustration which is fatal to happy and useful work. These stipendiary lay workers feel that they are as useful as the parson, or even more useful than he is, and that they ought in justice to be ordained and receive the parson's status and stipend. We are not concerned to blame them for this, but we are concerned to point out to our bishops that a Church policy which produces these results is a bad policy. We are altogether in favour of the Church securing the honorary services of good laymen. What they can do in a parish to develop and strengthen its life does not seem to be realized in England to anything like the same extent that it it is in our Dominions. We venture to cite from our own pastoral experience.

> The writer of these paragraphs was a New Zealand Vicar of a parish of over 1,000 square miles, with a population of about 3,000 comprising some half-dozen denominations. There were no motor-cars and motor roads: there were ten centres in which regular Sunday services were arranged. The staff consisted of the Vicar (a curate was out of the question and the Vicar took only one Sunday off in the year to attend the Diocesan Synod) and eight honorary lay readers. These were all educated men of good standing whose services were gratefully valued. Of the eight lay readers, three were the headmasters of Government schools in the parish; two were solicitors and barristers, one being Mayor of the chief township; three were farmers (one an Old Etonian belonging to a well-known English family, one the brother of a Devonshire Rector, and one a Member of the House of Representatives — later, its Speaker). All the Vicar did for these lay helpers was to lend them a spare horse when they needed one and books of suitable sermons for reading to their congregations. The services were held in three wooden churches, five school-houses, and two country inns. Of course the Vicar conducted services also in various private houses. Some of the most helpful services we have ever attended (they entailed a ride of fourteen miles) were conducted by the local brewer, a venerable man, who read reverently the prayers and brief, well-selected sermons in a little wooden church, where his widowed daughter played the tiny harmonium.

We have ventured on this personal experience not only as illustrating what English laymen can do to help the work of the Church, but also as an expression of gratitude for devoted and unpretentious Church service. Had any idea of payment come into the matter, or stipendiary lay helpers been used in the diocese, this whole system of voluntary and honorary lay work would have collapsed. The two cannot be mixed. In our English country parishes to-day where there is a clergy shortage, similar methods could be used and the laity would be grateful for them.

(4) *The Need for Thousands of Honorary Lay Workers, Men and Women.* Dr. Kirk concluded with an ardent appeal for lay help:

> 'At this momentous time only the laity can save the Church from the most serious loss. May we not trust them to come forward in their thousands and give their services to the full?'

The response to this appeal must depend in every parish on the estimation in which the incumbent is held and whether he is prepared to welcome helpers as friends in need and fellow-workers in Christ who must be granted a large measure of freedom and confidence. Just as a successful Sunday school demands regular training of the teachers by the parochial clergyman, so the successful organization of lay workers in a parish demands carefully planned and regular conferences with the incumbent for mutual help and parochial development. Where, however, as in an increasing number of English parishes, the teaching and worship are neither loyal to the spirit of the Prayer Book nor attractive to the parishioners, appeals to the parochial laity to 'maintain' the Church will be made in vain.

The Menace of Pro-Papalism

The October number of *Religions* publishes an important article by Dr. R. Ll. Langford-James — a leading, energetic, and intimately informed Anglo-Catholic — dealing with the aims and achievements of Anglo-Catholicism since the rise of the Oxford Movement. 'This authoritative article by an eminent theological scholar is published,' so the Editor of *Religions* states, 'in response to requests for an exposition of Anglo-Catholicism.'

The Oxford Movement, according to Dr. Langford-James, began by being an *educational* movement. Its most effective agents at this stage were the *Tracts for the Times*. This educational movement was primarily directed to securing the illumination and conversion of the *clergy*. Tract XC, its most daring exposition of Tractarian doctrine, being violently attacked by the authorities of the Church of England, drove its author, J. H. Newman, and many of his followers into the Church of Rome.

Dr. Langford-James notes that the second stage in the Oxford Movement was the *ceremonial* stage. Notwithstanding the ribald rhyme composed in Oxford,

> 'Pusey, Pusey,
> When shall we lose ye?
> How does your Altar grow?
> Painted bricks and candle-sticks
> And flower-pots all in a row,'

the ceremonial changes which sprang from the Tractarian Movement originated not with Oxford but with Cambridge. We remember, when preaching in Oriel College Chapel, as late as the year 1919, that the sanctuary of the Chapel was in its furnishing as bare and plain as it had been a century earlier when Whately and Arnold were Fellows of Oriel. The Cambridge ceremonial movement was initiated by that excellent translator of Greek and Latin hymns into English, Dr. J. M. Neale, who enunciated the axiom that people are led more by the eye than by the ear — (probably they are most frequently led by the nose). As a consequence, the Ornaments Rubric was interpreted by the Tractarians as authorizing 'Mass vestments, the censer, and the tabernacle or hanging pyx for the Reservation of the Most Holy Sacrament.'

The Tractarian movement next became dominantly *parochial* in its activity. Spreading from the Universities to the parishes, it developed what was popularly styled 'The London, Brighton and South Coast Religion.' The promoters of the movement who had formerly been called Puseyites were now called Ritualists. The Ritualists at first had to face bitter opposition; but by their unflagging persistence and indifference to preferment they either wore out or won over their opponents. Dr. Langford-James writes:

> 'Their influence has been really immense and very widely spread. Even

> quite Moderate Bishops of the Establishment are now commonly clad — and photographed — in copes and mitres. The Mass vestments are worn in many cathedrals; incense is offered in some; reservation of the Blessed Sacrament is to be found also in some. This is merely to take into account the British Isles, with the exclusion of Ireland. In the daughter churches, such as S. Africa and Australia, and in the missions, such as the Universities Mission to Central Africa — one of the most flourishing we have—Catholic usage is either universal or very common.'

In 1889 appeared *Lux Mundi*, the greatest book of the Tractarian Movement. Charles Gore, Head of Pusey House, who was responsible for it, created a new era in the scholarship and thought of the Tractarian Movement. *Lux Mundi*, by boldly accepting the principles of Biblical Higher Criticism expounded by Bishop Colenso and Dr. Jowett, and by adopting the Christian Socialist ideals of F. D. Maurice and his followers, stole the thunder of the Liberals, and enabled the Tractarian Movement to use these Liberal forces in conjunction with its own devotional and ecclesiastical practice to enter upon a period of increasing influence and popularity. Under the leadership of Charles Gore, Oxford Tractarianism and Cambridge Ritualism became Liberal Catholicism. While Catholic in its theology, worship and organization, the *Lux Mundi* school was anti-Papal in its theology and church order. In short, it was Catholic but not Papal. It stood for a purer and more open-minded Catholicism. Moreover it was essentially Protestant in its fundamental practice of the right of private judgment. Dr. Langford-James states this clearly:

> 'It may, indeed (as Gore did), accept the Catholic Faith. But it does so on the principle of private judgment. The more traditional Catholic position — that of the majority of the Movement — is to accept the Faith on the authority of an infallible Church, the place for the intellect lying not in discovery of new truth but in better understanding of the articles of Faith accepted in obedience to authority.'

Would that the Tractarian Movement had been satisfied to apply and develop the principles and ideals of the great *Lux Mundi* school, which was essentially loyal to the Church of England! But, alas, this was not to be. Other influences, definitely un-English, reactionary and pro-Papal, began to dominate the Movement, which from being Liberal Catholic now became Anglo-Catholic, even before the death of the great *Lux Mundi* leaders—Gore, Talbot, Illingworth and Aubrey Moore.

As a consequence the dominant aim of Anglo-Catholicism now became reunion with Rome, and every change it has since made and demanded can rightly be interpreted as a step towards achieving this objective. The supreme obstacle to reunion with Rome is the Establishment of the Church of England. As a consequence the Anglo-Catholic Movement finds it necessary to do everything it possibly can at the present time to achieve the Disestablishment

of the Church of England. Could the Church of England be disestablished, the Protestant Succession of our Sovereign would be lost as a matter of course.

So subtle and many-sided is the campaign to accomplish reunion with Rome that even efforts to secure increasingly friendly relations with the Eastern Orthodox Churches are now ultimately intended to secure this end—so Dr. Langford-James reveals:

> 'Yet another very essential claim is to have done something to rescue *Ecclesia Anglicana* from an isolation imposed upon it in the first place not by the free choice of the people but by the over-powering and arbitrary hand of the State. Gairdner has shown quite clearly in his *Lollardy and the Reformation* that the breach with Rome was contrary to the popular will. . . . In the way of ending our isolation much has been done already in regard to contact with the Eastern Orthodox. But perhaps the most important work that lies ahead of us may be, as a Roman Catholic priest once suggested to the writer, aid in healing the disastrous schism between Rome and the East, which dates finally from the 11th century. For, valuable as our contacts are with the Easterns, it yet remains that, belonging as we do to the Western Patriarchate, our ties with Rome are stronger and more natural. Two books, among other things, have had a great influence in this connection, Spencer Jones's *England and the Holy See*, and Dr. Drane-Scott's *The Eastern Churches and the Papacy*, accepted as his thesis for the Doctorate of Philosophy at Oxford, in which he explodes the notion that from the start Constantinople had had no use for the Papal Claims. An important series of twelve Tractates published by the Society for the Promotion of Catholic Union and written by experts, which show the continuity in Anglicanism of some acceptance of the Papal Claims, has also had its effect.
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> The chequered fortunes of *Ecclesia Anglicana* since the State-engineered breaches with Rome by Henry VIII and Elisabeth have not encouraged a liking for our present isolation, and the inveterate practice of Anglican dignitaries of treating *Ecclesia Anglicana* as though it were the whole Catholic Church, instead of only a very small part of it (about a tenth the size of the Roman Communion, for example), and the consequent flouting of Catholic tradition in favour of chauvinistic vagaries, has helped to a rather deep feeling of nostalgia to a return to the rock from which we were hewn by St. Gregory and St. Augustine of Canterbury. . . . So we Anglo-Catholics work and pray for reunion of the Catholic Church. There could be no greater task.'

The practical question is, 'What is to be done about it?' Are Englishmen prepared to allow the Church of England, increasingly enfeebled and enslaved by its pro-Papal aspirations, to enter the Roman obedience by the road of Disestablishment? The Establishment of the Church of England has many enemies besides the Anglo-Catholics: there are the Free Churches and the Secularists. All are united in their opposition to Establishment, and all are attacking it from different points of view. They can make out a strong case against Establishment from every point of view except that of the welfare and unity of our national life.

If the Church of England is not going to be true to itself and to the great ideals which, as Bishop Creighton pointed out, are the 'true marks' of our Church, then no doubt the Church had

better be disestablished and disendowed and her great cathedrals and churches handed over to the civil authorities to be used as public centres of Divine worship, national education and culture; but we would plead (like the gardener in the Parable of the Barren Fig-Tree) that our Church authorities should be given another chance to recover the situation before the Church of England be disestablished, disendowed, denationalized and destroyed. Our National Church possesses immense moral and spiritual potentialities for our English civilization. Would that she also possessed leaders capable of saving her.

We admit that to-day the saving of the Church of England is no easy task. The Anglo-Catholics have grasped most of the machinery: their underground propaganda in alliance with Rome is becoming increasingly influential: the majority of the English clergy would seem to be conscious or unconscious supporters of its insidious influence: many of the Anglo-Catholic Theological Colleges are annually training recruits destined to serve in this pro-Papal campaign — we believe that they constitute the majority of our ordinands. Some of our Church's leaders are only too well aware of our Church's danger. They desire with all their hearts to save her; but there is little evidence that they possess either the statesmanship, administrative ability, unflinching resolution, or above all, the co-ordinated policy needful for success.

Is it not possible for the bishops to secure the support of the large majority of disgruntled, disheartened and—we fear we must add — despairing and non-practising laity to help to recover the situation? Ultimately the salvation of the Church of England depends upon a sound educational policy by which the nation shall be taught, in the light of its history and of our modern needs, what the Church of England ought to stand for and what she can to-day contribute in the sphere of national conversion, culture and civilization.

This is our Church's true task. Her most urgent duty is to train teachers to accomplish it; but it is the training of these teachers which ought to come first in her reformation programme. No repetition of socialist shibboleths, no demands for the reduction of bishops' salaries, no policies for the bureaucratic centralization of all Church property, no abolition of the parson's freehold — which constitute what is popularly know to-day in Church circles as *Putting our House in Order* — can effectively take the place of that educational Church reform which first and foremost must be based upon the recovery of sound principles of moral and spiritual education. Such progress and reform must be fearlessly honest and prepared to make the fullest use of modern knowledge and modern experience in order that it may develop for the sake of mankind the rich quality of our national Christian heritage.

IN MEMORIAM—WILLIAM TEMPLE

ON October 26, the *ecclesia gentis Anglorum* lost from its earthly ministry the commanding and attractive personality of William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury. He was a great-hearted, large-minded Christian man. He possessed many gifts. His administrative ability, his fine voice and disciplined eloquence, his diplomatic skill, his many-sided experience, the wide range of his friendships, his gift of humour, his flawless simplicity of manner and life enabled him to hold with general approbation the great position he had attained.

His culture was wide, especially in the spheres of philosophy, literature, sociology and politics. Except in the departments of metaphysics and ethics, he was not in the academic sense a scholar: modern science was outside his range, and we should imagine had no attraction for him. Although he wrote many religious books and booklets, including a devotional commentary on the Fourth Gospel, he could not be regarded as an authority in any department of Biblical scholarship. Considering that Sanday, Streeter, and Rashdall were among his friends, it is surprising that he was so little influenced by historical, literary and textual criticism of the Scriptures in his presentation of Christian doctrine.

He saw large things in a large way. This made him tolerant of convictions which were not his own, when held by men whose intellectual power, scholastic qualifications and Christian character he was compelled to respect. His was not the scientific mind which looks for God through the chinks in His universe and realizes that important aspects of truth lie hid in *les nuances*. In this respect his type of mind was that of the last generation rather than that of modern educated youth. Yet there was not a Church leader who was more popular with young men and young women in our ancient universities than was William Temple. His practical interest in all modern problems, religious, political, social, economic, and his influential leadership in public life, combined with his wonderful personal charm, gave him an unrivalled attraction for young people such as no other contemporary prelate possessed.

William Temple had two sides. In politics he was a democrat: but his conception of Church Order was non-democratic. Although in many great Christian Conferences summoned to advance world-wide Christian reunion and intercommunion among all Christian denominations (except that of Rome, which refused to touch them) William Temple's voice was the voice of Jacob, yet at the critical moment when crucial issues were to be decided, his hands were the hands of Esau. As he remarked on one occasion to an ardent Liberal Church leader, 'As William Temple I am with you in spirit, but as Archbishop I cannot share in your non-episcopal

Communion Service.'

We see this side of the Archbishop in his able introduction to the *Doctrinal Report*. It is manifest in the following citation:

> 'In view of my own responsibility in the Church I think it right here to affirm that I whole-heartedly accept as historical facts the Birth of our Lord from a Virgin Mother and the Resurrection of His physical body from death and the tomb. And I anticipate, though with less assurance, that these events will appear to be intrinsically bound up with His Deity when the relations between the spiritual and physical elements in our nature are more completely understood. But I fully recognize the position of those who sincerely affirm the reality of our Lord's Incarnation without accepting one or both of these two events as actual historical occurrences, regarding the records rather as parables than as history, a presentation of spiritual truth in narrative form' (*Doctrine in the Church of England*, p. 12).

He could tolerate and even sympathize with liberal and modern views; but as a strong traditionalist he was himself unable to affirm them. Fundamentally in his ecclesiastical policy William Temple was not as Liberal as the two Primates who preceded him in the chair of Augustine. He was definitely an Anglo-Catholic in his convictions.

Of course, in politics and economics he was a strong socialist approaching in some cases to State Communism; but he had a happy, courteous way of presenting his views which to some extent disarmed his stronger opponents and even won over the weaker of them. We imagine there could have been no public man with fewer personal enemies, and we doubt if his stoutest public opponents ever bore him a grudge. His sweet reasonableness precluded his carrying affairs of controversy *à l'outrance*, and he was far too fine a sportsman to hit below the belt.

To the clergy he was a true Father in God; and to the young and erring he was ever ready to give a second chance. The term 'a great Christian gentleman' is often overdone, but to none could it be more fittingly ascribed than to our late Primate. Save for his physical sufferings, which at times were acute, his life was an ideally happy one. His domestic felicity, the wealth of his friendships, the nobleness of his ideals, the variety of his interests, his keen appreciation of the beauty of Nature, his serene faith, all contributed to this happiness. *The Times* concludes its obituary of the Archbishop with a charming picture of this aspect of his life:

> 'In his home he could throw off the weight of office and laugh with, and louder than, any of his friends. And some of their happiest memories are of William Temple in his lighter moods and moments — joining with vigour in house-singing at Repton; playing lawn tennis almost fiercely in the Abbey garden at Westminster; walking among his beloved Lakes; watching the quiet Ouse, in the warm peace of a summer evening, slip past the flagged terrace at Bishopthorpe; or passing, with unstudied simplicity, from grave to gay in quiet talks with friends and colleagues, in his small war-time study at Lambeth Palace.'

H.D.A.M.

WILLIAM TEMPLE AS ECCLESIASTICAL STATESMAN*

By the Right Rev. Bishop Henson, D.D., LL.D.

I.

As the end of the war comes within sight, men's minds are everywhere exercised by speculations as to the problems which will confront the Allies when at length the order to 'Cease fire' sounds over the stricken world, and Victory has brought Peace. In every nation these problems, vast and complicated beyond precedent, will demand solution. Five years of 'total war' have disrupted the traditional civilization throughout Europe, severely in England, though perhaps (it is too soon to say) less severely than elsewhere, yet even in England, on the most optimistic reckoning, so severely that no part of the national system—political, economic, social, ecclesiastical—can remain unaffected. 'Planning' is now the 'blessed word' which passes on men's lips. They will anticipate the crisis, which victory will precipitate, by arming themselves with projects which have been carefully thought out in advance, and may be adopted with little friction and no delay. Thus, it is fondly hoped, the shock of inevitable change will be lessened and the dreaded prospect of violent 'revolution' may be avoided. Perhaps, indeed, it may be fairly maintained that the problems of reconstruction are hardest to solve when they emerge within the sphere of religion, because there they challenge the principles of human intercourse, and penetrate to the ultimate roots of faith and morals. Generally, throughout the English-speaking world, the war against Hitlerite Germany has been pictured as a Crusade, that is a Holy War, waged in defence of those values and ideals which have given distinctive character to Western civilization and were demonstrably rooted in the Christian Religion. These were seen to be directly challenged by the racial arrogance, the anti-Christian Erastianism, the cynical policy and barbarous military methods of Adolph Hitler; therefore the issue was rightly judged to be nothing less than the survival of the Christian tradition itself.

So great has been the extent of Hitler's victories, so vast the cost at which they have been gained, that Hitler's defeat will con-

* I was engaged in writing a careful review of Dr. Temple's little book, when the lamentable tidings of his death arrested my pen. This fragment, which had been already written, may perhaps suffice to indicate both the high regard in which I hold him, and my regrettable inability to accord wholly with his politics.

front his conquerors with the necessity of rebuilding *e fundamentis* the entire fabric of civilized order, national and international. What will the place of Christianity be in the new world which must finally emerge from the ashes of the old? What function, if any, will be left to the Christian Churches in the post-war systems of government? These questions cannot be avoided by any considering Christian, whatever his ecclesiastical description may be, but they will present themselves variously to the various sections of the historic Christian family, organized in the varying systems which the history of nineteen centuries has deposited on the scene of present experience. Here we must limit ourselves to the case of Anglican Christianity, and more specifically to that of the Church of England.

It needs no arguing that the process of post-war reconstruction cannot leave the Church of England unaffected since that Church as now constituted is an integral part of the national State system; and, as such, must come within the ambit of the State's action, and accept such changes as the State may itself approve. If the Church were nothing more than an integral part of the State system, such an acceptance might be taken for granted; but the Church of England has a greater character, being essentially a living branch of the spiritual Society of Christ's disciples, and therefore the notion of a reconstruction of its system by the secular power is repulsive to the Christian conscience and could only be accepted by an act of spiritual treason. In these circumstances it might appear evident that a first step in post-war ecclesiastical reconstruction ought to be the ending of the legal establishment. As a free Church in a free State, possessed of so much of the legal endowments as the equity of the State would leave the disestablished Church, English Churchmen might proceed to recast their system of discipline, and allocate their resources, as in their judgment would best serve the interests of Christ's religion. Until the future relations of Church and State have been determined it is hard to see how any essays in reconstruction made by the Church itself can be other than provisional and precarious.

At this juncture and in these circumstances the late Archbishop issued a small volume which will command an eager welcome. Both the official position and the personal authority of the Head of the Hierarchy give an especial significance to his words. The title of this little book, *The Church Looks Forward*, might be fairly paraphrased as 'The Archbishop of Canterbury indicates the direction in which he thinks the Church of England ought to move.' In this little book we have both 'a speech from the throne' and 'a programme' of ecclesiastical policy.

II.

The primacy of William Temple has coincided with an episode of crisis in the history of the Church of England, and for good or for ill marked out the lines on which the Anglican Communion will develop. The failure of the Prayer Book Revision, although at the time widely acclaimed as a triumph of Protestantism, will perhaps be seen to have finally discredited the Establishment and definitely assured the defeat of Protestantism within the Church of England, which had for three centuries been regarded generally at home, and universally abroad, as (to borrow the phrase of the University of Cambridge in the seventeenth century) the 'glory and crown of the Reformation.' It is a curious question whether in any future coronation of a British Sovereign it will be judged fitting that he should pledge himself to maintain 'the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by law.' How soon the discredit of Establishment will necessitate Disestablishment, and how soon the repudiation of Protestantism will lead to disruption, time alone can tell. At present it must suffice to point out the facts and indicate their probable consequences.

Thirty-two Archbishops have reigned at Lambeth since Warham induced the reluctant Convocation of Canterbury to acknowledge the Royal Supremacy. The mediaeval Church in England, subject to the Pope of Rome, became the Church of England, subject, so far as that could rightly be, to the King of England. One of the thirty-two, Cardinal Pole, may be left out of reckoning since he refused acceptance of the new situation. The remaining thirty-one exhibited a considerable variety of type, quality and influence. Perhaps as many as nine had no other claim to prominence than that which the favour of their sovereign, and the fame of their great office, could provide; but others had better titles to offer. Some were venerated as martyrs (Cranmer and Laud), and confessors (Juxon and Sancroft), and statesmen (Parker, Sheldon, Tait, Davidson and Lang), and orators in and out of the pulpit (Tillotson and Lang), and scholars, as well as students and authors (Wake, Potter, Secker and Benson); some were famous in more ways than one; three, not the least illustrious, were Scots (Tait, Davidson and Lang), and of these two had the singular and rather enigmatic distinction of being 'elevated' to secular baronies after resigning their primacies.

Dr. William Temple was, perhaps, more variously distinguished than any of his predecessors. He was the only Archbishop of Canterbury since the Reformation who combined the characters of a philosopher, a preacher, a politician, a popular orator, and a literary man and was eminent in every one of them. His industry was astonishing; the range of his sympathies not less so; and he

possessed an attractive personality and popular manners. He was born in the (ecclesiastical) purple, and was the second of his name to hold the Primacy of All England. Like his distinguished father, he was an ex-schoolmaster; and, like his immediate predecessor, he was translated from York. When his appointment to the Archbishopric was announced, it was generally agreed that the most variously distinguished of Anglican ecclesiastics had been placed at the head of the Anglican Hierarchy. The weight of his latest official pronouncements must needs be emphasized by the power of his personality.

It is not, perhaps, generally realized how considerably the importance of the See of Canterbury has been increased during the last century. The reasons are not obscure, and for the most part they have little connection with the personal quality of the Archbishops. We may perhaps distinguish the rapid secularization of the State which has led successive Prime Ministers to consult the Primate's wishes in administering the Crown patronage; the centralization of ecclesiastical activities of all kinds which has greatly diminished the importance of the multiplying diocesans, while at the same time notably increasing that of the Head of the Hierarchy; the multiplication of bishops in the country has lowered their prestige, and exalted that of the Primate, who lives in London; the expansion of the Anglican Communion, disclosed and emphasized by the rapidly increasing number of bishops who attend the decennial conferences at Lambeth, exhibits the Archbishop as President in a *plusquam*-Patriarchal character with a jurisdiction, vague indeed but unquestioned, and tending to increase, which is cosmic rather than provincial or national — all have contributed to the aggrandizement of Canterbury. Lambeth seems to rank with Moscow, Constantinople, and even Rome itself as the symbol of an ecclesiastical system which is distinctive and Catholic, neither Papist, nor 'Orthodox,' nor defintely Protestant, but something peculiar and spiritually self-sufficing. That the chair of St. Augustine should have been filled by so energetic and personally considerable an Archbishop as William Temple must needs make everything that has issued therefrom extremely important.

III.

At this juncture, then, an authoritative expression of the late Primate's views will be generally welcome and anxiously studied. Such an expression is provided in the little book, *The Church Looks Forward*, which has just appeared. In a short Preface his Grace has stated the 'two main reasons which have led him to publish in book-form some of the chief sermons which he delivered

during the first eighteen months after entering on his present work' :

> 'One is the hope that they may thus help more effectively the formation of a public opinion ready for action when the opportunity comes; the other is a desire to set those which have already received a good deal of publicity in the context of others which attracted less attention. It is natural that any observation about politics and economics should get a good press; but what I have said on these topics is incidental to, and illustrative of, an exposition of principles which, as I think, should guide our thoughts in relation to all the great problems of our time.'

The Archbishop was a great popular orator, and he did not escape the disadvantages inherent in that character. Thus he gravely underrated the danger of inevitable misunderstanding, and easily exaggerated the significance of his success. He was not, indeed, wholly unconscious of the first, but he hardly seemed to be conscious of the last. No one who knew the Archbishop will be disposed to dissent from the sentiment which inspired Canon Mozley's sympathetic and admirable review in the *Spectator*, significantly headed 'Gospel or Politics': 'All admiration and criticism of the Archbishop which sees in him a prophet of well-being to which he adjusts the Christian Gospel, is greatly in error.' Nevertheless, however clear the truth may have been in the Archbishop's mind and intentions, it is certain that the sense which his words will convey to large assemblies of eager and enthusiastic partizans will be only so much as conforms to their hopes and expectations. A price had to be paid for the alluring popular description of the Primate of All England as the 'Red Archbishop.' Moreover, the popular orator invariably overestimates the extent of his own success. Thus the Archbishop refers with almost pathetic confidence to the successful meetings which he had addressed and appears to regard them as greatly more significant than they really were. Two examples will suffice, both bearing on the Archbishop's undoubted zeal in promoting the cause of Christian unity. After stating the self-evident proposition that 'there is a readiness in the public to pay attention to the Christian message when Christians of all communions are united in proclaiming it entirely beyond any that can be commanded when we deliver it in separation from one another,' he proceeds to refer to 'the two great meetings in the Stoll Picture House presided over, the one by Cardinal Hinsley and the other by the ex-Archbishop, Lord Lang.' Crowded meetings reflect skilful organization or general curiosity rather than serious public opinion. The association of the Roman Cardinal and the Anglican ex-Archbishop of Canterbury was, not so much an evidence of the united religious testimony of the Roman and Anglican Churches, as a careful and calculated assertion that it was precisely not religious but social and economic issues that could secure the common action of

Roman Catholics and other Christians. There is nothing surprising, certainly nothing novel, in co-operation of Christians of many denominations in advocating good causes which are not directly connected with the Christian profession. The abolition of slavery, the advocacy of temperance, purity crusades and the like have commanded the support of good citizens as such whatever their denominational description. But such co-operation, so far from mitigating, may even emphasize what the Archbishop himself has described as 'the fundamental anomaly,' namely, 'that any two disciples of our Lord should not be in communion with one another.'

There is general agreement that the power of Christianity is lamentably weakened by ecclesiastical divisions, and there is a very widely extended desire to create an effective union of the Churches. When, however, an attempt is made to achieve such union, it at once becomes apparent that negotiations can only hopefully, and indeed reasonably, be undertaken on the basis of frank equality between the Churches. The Church of Rome cannot negotiate with any other Church, for it claims to be itself the only Church which Christ founded through His Apostles. It is not less certain that similar claims on the part of an Episcopal or any other Church will be an insurmountable obstacle to negotiation for Reunion.

Archbishop Temple overflowed with fraternal sentiment, but he laboured under some disadvantages when he discussed the question of Reunion. It will suffice to mention three. (1) He saw the problem against a 'background' which was inadequately related to the actual situation. (2) He assumed that 'Apostolic succession' is a 'principle' to which Anglicans, as such, are committed, an assumption which the formularies and history of the Church of England disallow. (3) He assumed that co-operation in the enterprises of good civic fellowship can take the place of intercommunion as the public expression of Christian discipleship.

The welcome which the Lambeth Appeal received among non-Episcopalians was based upon the mistaken assumption that it implied a frank recognition of their Churches — so much was plainly stated by the Primitive Methodists when acknowledging the receipt of the Appeal. 'The significance of the Appeal,' they said, 'lies in the recognition that the Episcopate is but one method, though a fine and venerable one, in the government of the Church,' but they cautiously add 'a further ordination cannot be conceded by our Church.' There were acute students of the Appeal who perceived a certain perilous ambiguity in its terms, and attention was justly fastened on the implications of the insistence on Episcopacy as the only possible organization of the united Church.

HOLY ROME

By the Rev. John Todd, M.A., F.S.A., Rector of Waterstock, Oxford.

WITH the single exception of Jerusalem, no city has cast a greater spell over the minds of men than the city of Rome.

'Thou hast made of diverse realms one fatherland;
Thou hast made a city of what was once a world,'[1]

wrote Rutilius Namatianus in his address to Rome. Once mistress of a world-wide empire, she became, soon after the conversion of Constantine, mistress of a world-wide Church, and from her Seven Hills exercised, at any rate over the North and the West, a sway greater than any she had attained in her pre-Christian days. The city, made holy by the graves of numberless martyrs, sanctified by the presence of a thousand relics of Christ and His saints, became the goal of innumerable pilgrimages throughout the Middle Ages. Of all the places of pilgrimage within the Holy City none exceeded in importance the tombs of the blessed apostles, S. Peter and S. Paul. Indeed, it was the possession of those two tombs which, more than anything else, made Rome the Holy City.

'O happy Rome, made holy now
By these two martyrs' glorious blood;
Earth's best and fairest cities bow
By thy superior claims subdued.'[2]

To these tombs flocked pilgrims from all parts, each bringing his gift, each seeking absolution from sin, each acquiring merit for the hazardous journey they had undertaken. Truly Rome became the desire of nations. Her foundations were upon the holy hills, and into her did the glory and honour of the nations come.

Such is the picture which the words 'Holy Rome' call up. When Martin Luther, whilst still an enthusiastic young monk, visited Rome, and for the first time caught sight of the walls of the city, he threw up his hands in ecstasy and cried out: 'I greet thee, thou Holy Rome!' But when he had made a closer acquaintance with the city, Luther found that Holy Rome was a sink of iniquity. Luther's experience was not exceptional. Has any city in any part of the world exhibited more unholiness than Holy Rome?

[1] *Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam;*
Urbem fecisti, quod prius orbis erat.

[2] *'O Roma felix, quae duorum Principum*
Es consecrata glorioso sanguine:
Horum cruore purpurata, ceteras
Excellis orbis una pulchritudines.'

From *Decora lux*, the hymn in the Roman Office for the Festival of SS. Peter and Paul.

No sooner had Christianity become the established religion of the Roman Empire than Rome became the scene of an unholy strife between the rival claimants to the papal chair. In 366 A.D. died Liberius (a pope who signed a heretical creed and thus provides a stumbling-block for those who would believe in the infallibility of the popes); and one party of papal electors put forward Damasus as a candidate for the papacy whilst another party supported Ursinus. The strife which followed was fierce. The partisans of Ursinus barricaded themselves in the Church of S. Maria Maggiore, but the supporters of Damasus stormed the building, set fire to it, and from the roof threw down tiles on the Ursinians. After a hundred and sixty of the latter lay dead upon the floor of the church, Damasus was victorious and his rival was driven into exile. This was the first, but by no means the last, time that the Papacy was attained by bloodshed, and the contemporary pagan historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, remarks that it was

> 'no wonder that for so magnificent a prize as the bishopric of Rome men should fight with the utmost eagerness and obstinacy.'

Damasus tried to convert the pagan magistrate Praetextatus to the Christian faith, but the reply of the latter showed that even in those early days men did not regard holiness as the chief attribute of the Papacy. 'Make me bishop of Rome,' laughed Praetextatus, 'and I will become a Christian.'

At the end of the sixth century Rome was presided over by Gregory the Great, a pope who must be accounted, in every way, one of the best and greatest of those who have occupied the Chair of S. Peter; and at first sight the city might seem to have acquired some right to the title 'Holy.' 'Rome,' writes Gregorovius,

> 'suffered a metamorphosis and became transformed into a city of cloisters. The metropolis of the universe was converted into a spiritual city in which priests and monks bore entire sway and built churches and convents with untiring zeal.'[3]

But a closer view reveals a wretched scene. The miserable city, suffering from plague and from the inundation of the Tiber, reached, at the end of the sixth century, the extremity of its misfortunes. The once mighty city whose twelve miles of walls had enclosed a wealth of public buildings such as no city of the past or the present has equalled, had degenerated into a desolate area of which only a fraction was inhabited, whilst the remainder had gradually become a mouldering ruin, half hidden under the growth of nature. During the long and devastating sieges by the Goths.

[3] *Rome in the Middle Ages*, Vol. II, p. 3. Gregorovius (1821-1891) is the greatest authority for the history of Rome in the Middle Ages. His truly monumental work, translated by A. Hamilton in eleven volumes, is indispensable to any student of mediaeval Rome.

the groves and orchards of the surrounding country had been felled to supply wood for fuel or material for engines of war. The cutting of aqueducts, whose escaping waters had saturated a thin layer of soil but could not penetrate the underlying lava, had rapidly turned a region, which the wealth and pride of senatorial families had covered with luxurious villas, into an unproductive and malarial wilderness. Ignorant and fanatical monks took possession of many of the monuments of antiquity, whose mutilation they welcomed as a symbol of the triumph of the Church. Pope Gregory, although neither ignorant nor uncultured himself, was certainly hostile to humane studies, and although large-minded enough to protect the Jews from the persecutions of fanatical bishops, shared in the superstitions of his age, particularly in the crude belief in the efficacy of relics. Indeed, the chief trade of the Holy City was the sale of relics, especially pieces of cloth, *brandea*, which having been placed in contact with the tombs of the saints, acquired holiness and magical virtues. These pieces of cloth, together with bones of the blessed martyrs, the supply of which seemed inexhaustible, were exported from Rome, and the Holy City became a great 'rag and bone shop.'

It was at the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century that Mariolatry, the prevailing worship in Italy and Greece to-day, began to assume great prominence in Rome, and it is not without significance that when Pope Gregory organized processions and prayer during the plague of 590 A.D., the goal to which those processions made their way was the church of S. Maria Maggiore, the chief church in Rome dedicated to the Virgin Mary. The worship of the saints, too, began to take a greater place in religious devotion. Italy has never been really monotheistic, and it was at this time that the gap caused by the disappearance of the old gods and goddesses of pagan mythology began to be filled by the cult of saints and martyrs. It is true that Rome was not, at this period, disgraced by the wickedness which so often characterized it in later years, but it is equally true that the chief characteristic of the city at that time was not holiness but superstition.[4]

But nothing reveals the terrible condition of Rome in the Middle Ages better than the notorious Synod of the Dead in 869 A.D. Italy was then distracted by two rival claimants to the Empire, Berenger of Friuli and Guido of Spoleto. On the death of the latter, Pope Formosus invited the German Arnaulf to assume the crown. The Spoletans thereupon threw the Pope into prison,

[4] Gregory the Great must bear no small part of the blame for this increase in superstition. His *Dialogues*, a work in four volumes, is full of ridiculous stories of marvels and miracles, and this book, translated into various languages, had a wide influence in the Middle Ages.

from which he was not released until the Germans had captured the suburb of S. Peter's. Formosus survived his release only a few weeks and was followed by Benedictus VI, who died of gout a fortnight later, and was succeeded in 896 A.D. by Stephen VI. Then took place in the Church of the Lateran what is surely the most *macabre* scene in history. Formosus, who had been dead nearly nine months, was summoned by Pope Stephen to appear in person before an ecclesiastical synod. The grave was opened, the decomposing corpse of the late pope pulled out by the feet, arrayed in his pontifical robes and propped up on a throne.

> 'They set it, that dead body of a Pope,
> Clothed in pontific vesture now again,
> Upright on Peter's chair as if alive.' [5]

Stephen demanded of the mouldering thing why, when it was Bishop of Portus, it had usurped the Apostolic See, and as, naturally, no answer was forthcoming, the corpse was deposed. The fingers were cut off,

> 'Those same three fingers which he blessed withal,'

and the hideous thing, stripped of its vestments, was dragged through the streets and flung into the Tiber. Not long did Pope Stephen survive his ghastly triumph, for in a revolution which followed shortly afterwards, he was thrown into prison and strangled.

But these horrible events are merely introductory to the most shameful period in the history of Christian Rome, the period which Cardinal Baronius, the Roman Catholic historian, has called the Pornocracy or Rule of the Harlots, for in the first half of the tenth century Holy Rome was fascinated and dominated by two notorious women, Theodora and her daughter Marozia. Theodora numbered amongst her lovers the Archbishop of Ravenna, whom she was instrumental in placing in the papal chair as John X. Marozia, who inherited the fatal beauty of her mother as well as her vicious character, was credited with having been the mistress of his predecessor, Pope Sergius III. She bore him a son, whom later she succeeded in placing upon the papal throne as John XI. Octavius, a grandson of this notorious woman, became Pope when a youth of eighteen, and took the name of John XII, being the first pope to change his name on his elevation to the papacy. A mere lad at the time of his accession, he proved a worthy scion of his wicked house, and soon showed that he had inherited all the licentious temperament of his grandmother. It was of this boy-pope that the Emperor Otto remarked, with well-merited contempt, 'He is a boy, the example of good men may reform him.' This pope died in 964 A.D. as he had lived. He was killed in the act of

[5] Browning's *The Ring and the Book*, x. *The Pope*.

adultery, his contemporaries said from a blow struck by the devil.[6] Doubtless in this case the devil was represented by the outraged husband!

For the next forty years the Popes were the creatures of the Emperor, elected or deposed at his will. Their usual fate was to be thrown by some insurgent faction into the Castle of S. Angelo, and there either strangled or starved to death, unless released by some counter-revolution. Boniface VII literally stepped to the papal throne over the body of his strangled predecessor. His rule was a reign of terror, and it is mentioned quite casually that he caused the eyes of Cardinal John to be torn out. This pope, overthrown by a revolution in 985 A.D., suffered a violent death, and his corpse, dragged through the streets of Rome, was thrown under the statue of Marcus Aurelius. Pope John XVI had his nose, ears and tongue cut off and his eyes put out, and, dragged back to Rome from which he had fled, was thrown into prison and disappeared. In 991 A.D. was held the Synod of Rheims and it was suggested that the particular matter under discussion should be referred to the Pope. This called forth the bitter invective of the Bishop of Orleans:

> 'O unfortunate Rome! In the silence of the past thou didst give to our ancestors the light of the Fathers of the Church; but our own times hast thou darkened with a night so terrible that it will make this age notorious in the future.'

In his invective, this tenth century bishop refers to the Pope as *Antichrist*, *Man of Sin* and the *Mystery of Iniquity*.[7] It is evident that the Bishop of Orleans did not associate tenth century Rome with holiness.

During the first half of the eleventh century the Papacy became practically the hereditary possession of the Counts of Tusculum. In 1012 they seized the Lateran and appointed one of their company pope as Benedict VIII. Twelve years later his brother succeeded him as John XIX, and after him in 1033 succeeded his nephew Theophylact, who became Pope Benedict IX at the age of twelve! With this boy-pope the Papacy reached the depth of moral degradation. He lived

> 'the unchecked life of a Turkish sultan in the palace of the Lateran. He and his family filled Rome with robbery and murder, all lawful conditions had ceased. It seemed as if a demon from hell, in the disguise of a priest, occupied the chair of S. Peter and profaned the sacred mysteries of religion by his insolent courses.'

[6] '*In temporibus adeo a diabolo est percussus ut infra dierum octo spacium eodem sit vulnere mortuus.*'

[7] *Nimirum si caritate destituitur, solaque scientia inflatur et extollitur, Antichristus est, in templo Dei sedens.* *Cf.* Milman, Vol. III, p. 339, and Gregorovius, Vol. III, p. 406.

In 1045 the infuriated populace of Rome rose, drove him out, and elected in his place Sylvester III. In seven weeks Benedict had forced his way back again, and then, wearying of the Papacy, sold it for cash to John Gratianus, who thereupon became Pope Gregory VI. The holiest office in Christendom sold for cash! Yet such was the moral condition of Holy Rome that the scandal did not strike anyone as particularly heinous. There were now three popes in Rome at the same time; one occupied the Lateran, a second the Vatican and a third S. Maria Maggiore.

> 'A hundred vassals of the Pope stood ready to fall upon Rome; every road was infested with robbers; every pilgrim was robbed; within the city the churches lay in ruins whilst the priests caroused. Daily assassinations made the streets insecure. Roman nobles, sword in hand, forced their way into St. Peter's itself to snatch the gifts which pious hands still placed upon the altar.'

Such was the condition of Holy Rome in the eleventh century.

Some thirty years later saw the pontificate of the great Hildebrand, Gregory VII (1073-1085). Here was a pope unlike most of his predecessors, moral, upright and selflessly devoted to the good of the Church over which he presided. And yet the most grievous blow which the city of Rome ever suffered (with the exception of the horrible sack in 1527) was due to this pope. In 1084 Gregory, in his quarrel with the Emperor Henry IV, found himself a prisoner in Rome. He summoned to his aid Robert Guiscard, the Norman Duke of Apulia. The Duke came with a mixed army of Normans and Saracens, captured Rome, set the Pope free and then proceeded to loot and destroy the city. The Holy City became the scene of horrors compared to which the sack by the Vandals was merciful.

> 'When both flames and tumult of battle had subsided,' writes Gregorovius, 'Rome lay a heap of smoking ashes before Gregory's eyes. Burnt churches, streets in ruins, the dead bodies of Romans formed a thousand accusers against him. The Pope must have averted his eyes as the Romans, bound with cords, were led in troops into the camp by the Saracens. Noble women, men calling themselves senators, children and youths were openly sold like cattle into slavery.'

What the reputation of Holy Rome was in the twelfth century may be judged from the attitude of our own king, Richard Coeur de Lion. Roger of Wendover relates that King Richard on his way to Palestine landed at Ostia in 1190, and the Pope sent a Cardinal to invite the king to visit Rome. Apparently the city had too bad a reputation for Richard, for the king not only refused the invitation but contemptuously informed the Cardinal that nothing was to be found at the Papal Court but avarice and vice.

In the next century we find Matthew Paris quoting the epigram:

> 'The whole world for Rome's greed can not suffice,
> Nor the world's harlots for its lecheries.'

The fact is that where the Court of the Vicar of Christ was, there also vice abounded. In 1251 the Papal Court, which had been settled for a few years in Lyons, left that city, and Cardinal Hugo, in a farewell address to the citizens of Lyons, cynically remarked:

> 'When first we came hither we found three or four brothels. Now when we depart, we leave only one, but that one stretches from the east gate of the city to the west.'[8]

So also at Avignon. During the seventy years' residence of the Papacy in that city (1309-1377), Avignon became an equally notorious centre of vice and corruption. Petrarch, who lived in Avignon, has left us a description of the wickedness of the city, much of which cannot be printed. Dean Milman, after quoting (in Latin) part of Petrarch's account of the morals of the city, adds: 'I must pause. I dare not quote even in Latin.'[9]

What Englishmen thought of Papal Avignon may be gathered from petitions presented by the Commons in 1376 to Edward III, for in those petitions it is spoken of as 'the sinful city of Avignon.'[10] For once, Rome had found a city which successfully rivalled her in vice.

This discreditable triumph of Avignon did not last long, for with the return of the Papal Court to Rome, that city soon recovered its lead in unholiness. With the accession in 1410 of Pope John XXIII (later deposed by the Council of Constance on charges of piracy, murder, rape, sodomy, incest) the Holy City sank into even lower depths of vice and misery. Martin V, John XXIII's successor, when he entered Rome in 1420, beheld a miserable sight. The Holy City with its decayed churches, its crumbling houses, its filthy streets, its gangs of robbers, had well-nigh ceased to retain the aspect of a city. Well might a contemporary English chronicler, who was living there at the time, exclaim as he heard the wolves fighting with the dogs under the very walls of S. Peter's:

> 'O God, how lamentable is the state of Rome! Once it was filled by great lords and palaces; now it is full of huts, thieves, wolves and vermin, whilst the Romans tear each other to pieces.'

There is little need to describe the morals of Holy Rome on the eve of the Reformation. Sixtus IV, who became pope in 1471, improved the streets of Rome, but not what went on in those

[8] *Quando enim primo huc venimus, tria vel quattuor prostibula invenimus. Sed nunc recedentes unum solum relinquimus; verum ipsum durat continuatum ab orientali porta civitatis usque ad occidentalem.'*

[9] *History of Latin Christianity*, Vol. III, p. 453. These nine volumes are still the standard work on the subject.

[10] *La peccherouse cité d'Avenon.* Parl. Rolls, Vol. III, bottom of p. 337. Englishmen of that day were accustomed to sing: *'If the Pope is French, Christ is English.'*

streets, and when the year of Jubilee came round in 1475, few pilgrims, says Creighton, visited the Holy City, for there was, indeed, little to be found there to attract a pious soul. Innocent VIII (surely *nomen per contraria*) was the first pope to acknowledge his offspring as his own children, and a satirist accordingly congratulated the city because, after being depopulated by the wars of Pope Sixtus, it was now to have a Pope who was truly the *father* of his people. Justice was shamelessly sold by the Pope's family, and the Papal Vice-Chancellor, when asked why the malefactors were not punished, answered with a smile:

> 'God desireth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he may *pay* for his wickedness and live.'

Rome, however, had not yet reached the lowest depths of its infamy; that was reserved for the reign of the next pope, Alexander VI and his infamous son Cesare Borgia, for whom poison and the dagger were but commonplace. It was then that Savonarola, from his pulpit in Florence, pleaded passionately for the reform of Rome, prophesying the doom that would fall upon the unholy city if it did not repent. The Pope's answer was to send Savonarola to the stake. Savonarola's prophecy was terribly fulfilled thirty years later, when Rome was sacked in 1527 by a Lutheran army, reinforced by ruffians from Spain. For nine months the city was abandoned to the lust, rapacity and cruelty of 30,000 brigands, and it was then discovered to what lengths the bestiality and barbarism of Germans could be carried. In his prophecy Savonarola had said:

> 'Rome, thy churches will be made stables for the horses which they will place therein.'

Guicciardini, an eye-witness of the sack of Rome, says:

> 'You might see the sumptuous palaces of the cardinals, the sacred churches of S. Peter and S. Paul, and the other holy places . . . now reduced to stables of horses, and instead of hypocritical ceremonies and wanton music, you might hear in them the pawing and neighing of horses.'

This is a remarkable instance of the literal fulfilment of a prophecy, *vaticinium ante eventum*.

Julius II, in whose pontificate the foundation of the new S. Peter's was laid, and for the building of which *Indulgences* were sold by the pope's agents throughout the Catholic world, put on his armour at the age of eighty and led his soldiers to the storming of Mirandola; and so little did men associate holiness of life with the Papacy that few people thought any the worse of him for doing it. Every quality was represented in the popes, save that of religion, and whilst educated Italy was rapidly drifting into paganism and vice, whilst obscurantist monks in Germany were trying to

silence Reuchlin and Erasmus, whilst Western Christendom was being sharply divided into two camps of the old and the new learning, whilst anxious and perplexed souls looked across the Alps to Holy Rome for guidance, the only answer vouchsafed to their passionate questionings was the shout of triumph as the papal banners floated over captured Mirandola, and the chink of the money in the boxes of those who sold the papal indulgences for the building of S. Peter's.

This rapid survey of twelve centuries of the history of mediaeval Rome shows only too conclusively that never, throughout the Middle Ages, did the Holy City of Christendom deserve its title. Pre-eminently wicked it often was, but pre-eminently holy never.

Boccaccio, a contemporary of Petrarch and of Chaucer, tells the story of a merchant who wished to convert a Jew to Christianity. The Jew said that he must go to Rome and see things for himself. The Christian tried to persuade him not to go, knowing well what the Jew would see there; but the Jew insisted, and the Christian gave up all hope of his conversion. *Roma veduta, fede perduta.* On his return the Jew expressed his strong desire to become a Christian. 'But have you actually been to Rome?' asked the Christian. 'Yes,' said the Jew, 'and when I saw all the wickedness, and the Pope and his Cardinals doing all they could, by their lives, to destroy Christianity, and yet that religion survived, I concluded that it must be true: and therefore I am resolved to become a Christian.'

The moral of the story is plain. If the Christian Religion survives, it is due, not to the holiness of Rome, but to the Eternal Truth in the Christian Religion against which the gates of Hell shall not prevail.

THE MESSAGE OF MAZZINI

NOW that the Italian people are returning to democratic ideals, it is appropriate to recall the principles for which Giuseppe Mazzini, the great Italian democrat, strove a century ago. By these principles he hoped to lead the Italian people to national unity and freedom.

His first principle on which he considered the attempt to uplift the Social Order must rest, and apart from which he believed this uplift to be impossible, is the principle, not of social *rights*, but of something above rights. To preach rights alone must produce, not harmony, but strife in society:

'When the rights of one individual clash with another,' he says, 'how

can we hope to reconcile and harmonize them if we do not appeal to something which is above rights.'

He also insisted that the search for *happiness* is equally a false motive, and will not produce the good life or Social Order. He believed and taught that the principle of *duty* is the only one that could be effectively preached. How can this be done? His answer to that question was clear and positive. He said :

'We must convince men that they are all sons of one sole God, and bound to fulfil one sole law.'

Hence *Belief in God* lies at the root of a true Social Order. For, since God is one, the whole creation exists in God, and this life is a part of eternity, therefore to be prized and regarded as a *sacred trust*. His belief in God was no mere speculation or logical deduction, but a profound conviction, a vital part of his thoughts and work. When he was dying he roused himself and, as if in answer to an unspoken question, exclaimed : 'Believe in God? Yes, indeed, I do believe in God.' In one of his earlier articles he wrote :

'That which now destroys Humanity is the want of a common Faith, of a common Thought, attaching Earth to Heaven, the Universe of God.'

He realized that social fellowship and unity of mankind can find no permanent basis in a materialistic philosophy ; the mere fact of racial unity may produce rivalry and struggle. We have an object lesson in the aspirations of Germany to enforce the maxim, *Deutschland über Alles*. The spirit which seeks to realize this kind of unity is not from above but from below. This Mazzini clearly saw. He denounced with prophetic fire those who 'clothe themselves with the formulas of universal brotherhood but have no other objective' than racial advantages. Communism such as this, he says, will play an ephemeral and insignificant part in the evolution of mankind.

Out of this belief in God, as an integral part of it, sprang Mazzini's belief in the spiritual nature of man, and man's assured progress beyond the event of death. In a letter he wrote :

'I have reached a conviction, never more to be shaken, that there is no such thing as death . . . that indefinite progression is the law of life . . . that nothing except forms of being perish down here ; and that to think that we die because our form dies, is the same thing as to think that the worker is dead because his implements have been wearing out. . . . Before every grave I try to improve. . . . I keep faithful to the departed.'

It was beliefs such as these which inspired his fervent appeal to the men of Italy to claim their rights as citizens, that is to say, the right to do their duty and serve the community. These fundamental principles lie at the root of all that he taught, namely, One

God and Father of all, and one Humanity whose spiritual being is of God and in God and to God; whose history, past, present and future, is one of eternal progress towards the realization of the Divine Purpose. He recognized the immense importance of right thinking, right conceptions and right beliefs. He realized the practical value of thought, and did not hold that it does not matter what a man thinks provided he is willing to work for his fellows; work thus undirected may injure, and fail of its object.

'The world is governed by religion.' This statement by Mazzini can be found in Vol. IV, p. 236, of his published writings. Although all philosophical historians would not accept Mazzini's affirmation as demonstrable, there is yet much to be said in its support. A thoughtful reader of English history can, however, endorse the statement within narrower limits. It is not difficult to trace the influence which religion has had in the development of the social life of the British people, in the development of the constitution of the State, more particularly in the development of the democratic tendencies which took a new departure in the reign of Edward I.

Although the first representative Parliament was assembled in his reign, it is to Simon de Montfort that we owe this fresh step in the Government of the nation by elected representatives. It was Simon de Montfort who educated Edward before he came to the throne in this principle. It was worth while to remember that Simon had a Franciscan as his spiritual director. Hence we are justified in attributing to the Franciscan spirit of brotherhood Simon de Montfort's sense of the importance of representative government.

There are countless other instances in the case of our country. 'Political and social development has been governed by religion.' This does not imply that the influence of religion has invariably contributed to the welfare of mankind; that depends on the kind of religion which has been paramount. The prophet Micah recognized this when he wrote:

> 'Wherewith shall I come before the Lord and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression? He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God' (*Micah* vi, 6, 7, 8).

That terrible things have been done under the cloak of religion, and that many things have been taught which are contrary to the teaching of the greatest religious leaders of mankind, is surely undeniable, but this does not justify our overlooking or denying that religion has been an important factor in human evolution.

This brings us to another principle stressed by Mazzini. He believed that social progress must begin in character, must work from within outwards, and can only be effectual if it works thus. He says :

> 'A change of social organization is of little moment while you yourselves remain with your present passions and egotisms.'

This is what our present religious teachers also proclaim. Better laws or a new order will be of little avail when victory silences the clamour of war if egotism still remains as the main incentive. That is why Mazzini appealed to his countrymen not to claim their right to happiness but to claim such rights as would enable them to do their duty as free citizens in the State.

He had a profound reverence for the relations of life. He wrote :

> 'The family, the nation, humanity ; are they not the three steps of the ladder which reaches up from man to God? . . . a realization more and more complete of the providential plan that governs us? Either these things are all sacred or not one of them is sacred.'

His aim — not happiness, but service — was ploughed into his soul by suffering, not physical pain but mental and spiritual. There are some touching pages in his autobiography in which he relates how, in his lonely lodging in London, he was passing through a furnace of doubt and anguish when he overheard a casual remark made about himself by a man who said, 'Leave him alone; he is in his element, conspiring and happy.'

When he rebuked egotism he did not fail to search his own soul, and he accused himself (although many would hardly endorse this) of a subtle form of egotism. He wrote :

> 'I had been unable to realize the true ideal of love — love without earthly hope — and had unknowingly worshipped, not love itself, but the joys of love.'

This was the man who had been so superficially described as conspiring and happy. The lesson which his sufferings taught him was that

> 'life is a Mission, every other definition of life is false, and leads all who accept it astray.'

Will the nations who are now being tested in such a terrible ordeal learn the lesson that Mazzini proclaimed at so great a cost to himself?

HELEN ALEX. DALLAS.

DEMOCRACY, SCIENCE AND RELIGION

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

UNTIL quite recently it was regarded as axiomatic that democratic forms of government were an accompaniment and proof of human progress; and that, consequently, their future was assured. So much so that democracy was confidently expected to spread rapidly over the globe; and there was even a disposition to impose democratic forms of government upon peoples who were not used to them and quite unfitted to receive them.

This point of view has in the last ten or twenty years been rudely challenged, and the issue actually brought to the arbitrament of war. After coming far closer to disaster than was at all comfortable, the Powers representing democratic ideals seem about to emerge triumphant, and it may be thought that the old confidence will soon be re-established. But although victory in war may have been an indispensable condition of democracy's survival, that victory in itself cannot make democracy permanently secure, since it has other enemies besides the military might of some anti-democratic State. These foes 'of its own household' are not less, but perhaps even more, dangerous because they do not *appear*, and do not fight in the open. Among these enemies are political corruption, sectionalism (when different economic or social grades are at loggerheads), indifference and 'escapism' on the part of the public or of important elements in it, and so forth. Any one of these, and still more a combination of them, will bring democracy to grief without a shot being fired by any external enemy. It is no more fool-proof or knave-proof than any other form of government.

Another illusion has been dispelled in the last quarter of a century. It was formerly thought that Science and Secularism were essentially liberating agencies because they had to fight for their existence against ecclesiastical authority backed by reactionary social and political forces. Voltaire and the French Encyclopaedists were champions of liberty against the dead hand of the Church and the Court. But it is now realized that Science and Secularism can form integral parts of an oppressive political tyranny. Secularism opens the way to worship of the State, and the omnipotent State can use Science as an efficient coadjutor. Chemistry, physics, psychology, can all play their part in fortifying the grip of Leviathan.

All this is widely enough realized, since the logic of experience has driven the facts home. So much so that it is tempting to re-

pudiate democracy and science, and to regard secularism as their inevitable and sinister product. Indeed, not a few of our intellectuals have hastened to get away from what they felt to be a sinking ship, back into the ark of religious traditionalism.

In view of all this it is encouraging to receive from beyond the Atlantic a volume of essays by University teachers and others, which by no means breathes the spirit of surrender and escapism, but faces the problems with courage and hope. The papers included in the volume were prepared for the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, which was held at Columbia University in September, 1941.[1]

The task these thinkers have set themselves is that of developing a new philosophy of democracy, in which the precious and truly human goods of freedom, justice, co-operation, and active participation in the affairs of government can be solidly and rationally established. It may be objected that a satisfactory philosophy of democracy exists already, for example in the famous work of John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, or in the theories of Rousseau. But however satisfying in its day, no philosophy can dispense with revision and restatement, since conditions change and new problems continually arise.

With regard to Rousseau, the debt which current democratic theories owe to him can scarcely be exaggerated. It is his conception of freedom, his notion of equality, his theory of law, and above all his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, that have moulded our thinking about democracy and shaped our conceptions about that way of life. Yet the implications of the principles of democracy according to Rousseau have been startlingly noted by a recent writer.

> 'Democracy conceived in the manner of Rousseau,' he says, 'suppresses authority and preserves power. . . . To declare that authority resides in the whole multitude as in its proper subject and without being able to emerge from it and to exist in such and such responsible men — this is but a trick permitting irresponsible mechanisms to exercise power over men without having authority over them. . . . Democracies of the Rousseauist type not only grant the State all the usurpations of power, but they tend towards these very usurpations. . . . The ruin of authority and of the principle of authority — to the benefit of power without authority, without the foundations of justice and law and without the limit — is consummated in the totalitarian State.'[2]

[1] *Science, Philosophy and Religion* (Second Symposium). Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. 1942.

[2] Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 93-95. Quoted by Gerald B. Phelan in his paper 'Philosophical Implications of the Prevalent Conception of Democracy.'

The truth is that Rousseau's principle of the General Will of the sovereign people as a source of law and the norm of right and wrong, if incorporated, as Rousseau did *not* incorporate it, in an atheist, materialist philosophy, inevitably opens the door to a soulless tyranny.

> 'It is not a far cry,' writes G. B. Phelan in his paper, 'from this position to the conception of the common conscience of the people embodied in the people's party and eventually incarnated in the person of the leader of the people, the dictator. . . . He personifies the nation. His will, because it is the incarnation of the General Will, mystically conceived as the enlivening spirit of this "political pantheism," is the will of the people, the ultimate criterion of right and wrong, and the law expressing the highest destiny of the nation.'

The author of *The Confession of Faith of a Savoyard Pastor* was no atheist or materialist.

> 'Monseigneur,' he wrote to the Archbishop of Paris, 'I am a Christian, and a Christian at heart, according to the teaching of the Gospels. I am a Christian, not as a pupil of the priests, but as a pupil of Jesus Christ. My Master speculated very little concerning dogmas; He enjoined good works rather than many articles of faith; He demanded belief in that only which was necessary to make men good.'

But the trouble is that no one can guarantee that the type of inner personal feeling upon which Rousseau based his religious faith will be widely prevalent among a modern industrial proletariat. Modern 'megalopolitan man,' as Spengler calls him, seems by nature a secularist and immune to the type of Christian idealism which appealed so strongly to the author of *Emile* and the *Confessions*. So long as this is so, the General Will will be dangerous ground on which to base democratic theory.

Yet some spiritual basis it must have. As a group of eight writers, described as 'the Princeton Group,' declare:

> 'Democratic and cultural activities rest upon the assumption that man, while a part of nature, is a spiritual being and that his highest good should be defined in terms of spiritual values. The major problem which confronts us at this time, therefore, is not merely the defence of democracy and its culture, but a deeper understanding of and commitment to the spiritual conception of man upon which democracy is based.'

These Princeton writers hold that Naturalism or Secularism must be an inadequate foundation for democratic ideals, forasmuch as such a view

> 'denies both man's relation to an order of ultimate values and his dependence upon a cosmic spiritual Power. It thus divorces him from the moral and spiritual order to which he belongs and upon which he depends for spiritual direction. It encourages him to determine his ends for himself as a completely autonomous being, without any norm but his own interests and desires, individual and collective. . . . The individual, having nothing higher than himself to worship or serve, worships himself, his reason, his culture, or his race.'

Scholars and teachers must therefore endeavour to recover and reaffirm the spiritual conception of man and his good which we have derived from Greek and Hebraic-Christian sources.

> 'If they fail to do this, not only religious reverence and moral responsibility, but also the scholarly activities with which they are directly concerned, will be gravely endangered. Already, under totalitarian régimes, and to a lesser extent in democracies, these activities are being undermined.'

And yet, though it is clear that some spiritual conception of man is desirable, it is, as one of the contributors to this Symposium remarks, simply a fact that many, if not most, scientists are, in what may be called transcendental matters, agnostics. Their agnosticism is as deeply ingrained in them as is the religious faith of many of their friends. And it must be remembered that in modern society the scientist not only enjoys an immense prestige, but his ways of thinking are more and more permeating the various levels of the community. Modern secondary education, for example, is far less literary than it used to be, and leans far more towards the natural sciences. Unless the scientist endorses our spiritual values, they are not likely to be widely enough accepted to be effective.

> 'Scientists, like the rest of mankind' (writes Dr. Hudson Hoagland, of Clark University) 'are a product of a particular culture pattern that has in large measure made us what we are. A fundamental part of our discipline is in learning to say "We don't know." To say we don't know seldom means "We don't care." But if we care too much for our hypotheses we know that science will cease to exist. This view inevitably colours our thinking about religious matters. . . .
>
> 'To speak personally, science is to me merely the sum total of acceptable techniques for gaining evidence. These techniques preclude authoritarian dictates and ways of knowledge transcending comprehensible and sharable procedures. The procedures of science are very limited, but they seem to me the only ways to knowledge possessing a maximum of probability in reaching an approximation to truth. When important problems confront me and I am unable to give satisfactory explanations I must reply simply that I do not know the answers. I cannot take the step of putting faith into systems and views which seem to have no basis in reliable experiences.'

In view of such philosophic agnosticism, perhaps justified by the mysteries with which we are surrounded, the objective facts of history may serve as a source from which certain conclusions may be drawn.

> 'Empirically there is such a thing as the good life, and one need not justify it by supernatural sanctions. The lives of such men as Socrates, Christ and Lincoln, in contrast to Nero, Napoleon and Hitler, speak for themselves. Most agnostic scientists are as ready to fight for their ideals as they would be if they believed them to be sanctioned by God — or by science for that matter. I, for example, hate Nazism and all that it stands for, because it is a threat to human dignity and to the values and kindnesses which to me are the most important things in life. The history of man and his societies gives us grounds for value judgments as to what is good and bad. The degree of certainty as to the truth of these judg-

ments can never be as great as the relatively greater but never absolute certainty we can obtain from physical experiments, but it is adequate for action and we must act.'

Another contributor to this Symposium, Dr. Max Schoen, of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, defends his faith in democracy on strictly biological and psychological—*i.e.* on strictly scientific—grounds. His thesis is that the right of every man to his own life, on his own terms, is one that is deeply rooted in the very nature of animal existence in general and of human existence in particular. Thus democracy is the only mode of communal life in which there can be peace and which can have permanence, for whatever constitutes a threat to liberty also threatens life, and life will either destroy that which obstructs its normal course or be destroyed itself.

'That life is identical with liberty is implied by everything that the investigation of animate things reveals about the nature of an organism versus that of a mechanism. What the science of life tells us is that an animal organism is a self-acting, self-selecting, self-adjusting, self-developing and self-experiencing body.'

Furthermore, for man, because of his psychological status as a self-conscious creature, liberty is a necessity for the pursuit of happiness, the attainment of which, as Aristotle taught, is the final goal of all human enterprises. Taking only one of man's activities, namely, work, what are the conditions which must prevail if his work is to be a source of gratification to the worker? One requisite for happiness in work is security; another is individual recognition; a third is dignity and self-respect; and finally there is the factor of free opportunity, all impossible under a tyranny. Thus

'the nature of animal life in general, and the conditions of human happiness in particular, point to the fact that it is only in a democracy that the human being can function normally, because it is only a democracy which recognizes that laws and institutions exist to serve the individual, not the individual who exists to be used by those who make the laws and control the institutions, for their own arbitrary purposes. The history of the life of humanity, as pointed out by Croce, is in truth the story of liberty, which "operates in every epoch . . . just as breathing goes on as long as there is life."'

It is indeed important that men of science, *as scientists*, and on strictly scientific grounds, should be strong believers in democracy, for the truth is that they hold in their own hands the key to the situation. In these days no régime, whether totalitarian or democratic, can get along without the scientist and technician; if these should withhold their services social life in a modern community would come to a dead stop.

But the real weakness of the scientist's position is the too frequent narrowness of his mental outlook. In his own particular sphere of practice and inquiry he may be expert and efficient, but

outside it he may be poorly equipped with ideas. His education too often has drawn little from the rich cultural tradition which a more literary type of education opens up to the student. Moreover, the prestige of science, and the deference shown by the public to its votaries, which in many respects makes the scientist the equivalent of the mediaeval priest or the primitive medicine man, has not been too good for him. Thus Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, of Union College, in his paper on 'Democracy's Challenge to the Scientist,' is well justified in writing:

> 'The scientist of the future must be formally equipped with a far wider cultural background than falls to the lot of the average student of science to-day. The practical necessity of close specialization has robbed many workers of the opportunity of any general grasp of the structure into which their work must fit, and has impaired the directive efficiency of their efforts. . . . To be at once a really good specialist, and a profound, broad and deeply understanding generalist, is a formidable achievement, yet it is exactly what our leading scientists must become, if they are to take full advantage of their opportunities for service, and to discharge really usefully the obligations of their high calling.'

If men of science are to aspire to be leaders, and there seems every reason why they should, they will need a broad educational background in human affairs as well as in their scientific studies. An attitude of complete detachment from the affairs of the world must be reversed if men of science are not to be mere tools in the hands of political opportunists and plausible scoundrels.

> 'The young men who are entering scientific fields must come to feel that, until they possess as good an understanding of human society as have those less worthy humans who have used their work in the past, in addition to being competent scientific investigators, they have failed to comprehend the real magnitude of their potential position.'

A particularly valuable contribution to this Symposium is the paper by Dr. Albert C. Outler, of Duke University, on 'The Patristic Christian Ethos and Democracy.' This writer deals with a particular historical problem, namely, the relations of the early Christian Church to the omnipotent imperialist Pagan State, which is a topic very relevant to the present crisis of European civilization.

The history of the rise of the Christian Church is that of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. It emerged in that Empire at a time of fading hopes. The Augustan reconstruction had achieved much but promised more, and none of Augustus' immediate successors were equal to their legacy. Tacitus draws a sombre picture of disillusion and disgust. It was in the Antonine period (96-180), which Gibbon thought the hey-day of the Empire, but which really was its Indian summer, that the new movement began to gain self-confidence. But the gains of the first two centuries were dwarfed by the movement's expansion in the third century.

The Severine revolution (193-235) and the military anarchy which supervened, constituted an upheaval in which, as Rostovtzeff puts it,

> 'the army fought the privileged classes and did not cease fighting until these classes had lost all their social prestige and lay powerless and prostrate under the feet of the half-barbarian soldiery.'

The result was a barbarization of the secularist Empire and a great access of power of those who claimed to have acted in the name of the lower classes.

> 'Christianity was never confined to a class, but it had always its most natural and direct contact with the masses and it had found the solid bourgeois of the *municipia* relatively indifferent to its Gospel. With the liquidation of this group, it is easy to see how Christianity, although having no conscious stake in the conflict, should have undesignedly and accidentally profited by the turn of events. Rostovtzeff points out that "in the third century the Christian Church acquired enormous strength. As a state within a state, its organization steadily improved as that of the State deteriorated."'

On the whole the Romans had been extremely tolerant towards the Christians, though to the thoughtful Roman the Church constituted a vast secret society of intractable and alien spirits which contributed nothing to, even if it did not actually damage, the order and equilibrium of the Empire. For their part, the Christians of the pre-Constantine period thought of themselves as a federation or state within the Empire, and only casually related to it.[3] The root difference between the Church and the Empire was that while the latter was 'godless' the former was divinely governed and inspired.

> 'The foremost characteristic of the life of this Christian communal fellowship was that it was, avowedly, *theonomous* in principle, finding both the source and sanctions of its ethos in a transcendental reference to the will of God and the rule of God in the world.'[4]

What interests us to-day about this 'God-governed' community is the type of life which prevailed within it. This displayed what may be described most accurately as a 'family ethos.' Although the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man were not original with them, the Christians gave a new and realistic application of them to their communal life. God is father of all; Christians are brethren; the Church is God's family, gathered out of many races and peoples. Over against this is the dying secularist Empire, without hope and without God.

How far this type of belief and this type of ethos is now transferable to a modern industrial proletariat (the modern equivalent of the Severine masses) is just one of those crucial problems with

[3] 'Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world,' says the anonymous *Epistle to Diognetus* (170-190?).

[4] Such is the theme of Augustine's *City of God*.

which our generation is faced. Only the very wise or the very foolish would be ready with a definite answer. With regard to democracy and historical Christianity, Dr. Outler's own remarks seem very appropriate.

> 'Whatever be the diversities,' he writes, 'in premise and hope between the two, Christianity and democracy have some extremely significant affinities which can be seen in these days more clearly than ever before. In the first place they both have a common bench-mark in the principle of the objectivity of the truth and values they affirm. Men may discover, appropriate or serve this truth and these values, but they can never merely contrive or manipulate them. Secondly, in both systems there is the deliberate limitation of liberty in the interest of equality and the common good, and the limitation of equality in the interest of harmony and efficiency. Thirdly, both stand together, in theory at least, for the intransigent rejection of any fragmentation of human society (racism, statism, imperialism, provincialism, the inevitable class war). Even though there is a difference in the bases of their estimate of the worth of human personality, they nevertheless both agree that men should be treated as ends and never as means only, and that the destiny of every individual is a proper concern of the whole society. . . . Finally, in this present crisis, Christiantiy is as radically opposed to totalitarian ideology as democracy, and probably has a firmer basis of resistance to it.
>
> 'Christianity and democracy will remain separate: Christianity with its characteristic weakness in political action; democracy with its anthropocentric dilemma, tragically earth-bound. Christianity and democracy are congenial but not congenital. This is why Christianity has lived and can live within undemocratic political forms and why, in some circumstances (as, for example, in American public education), it finds democracy a rival faith. But they have a common stake in this present scene; they have much to offer each other. I do not see how a democratic order can be achieved or remain uncorrupted without a religious undergirding; I do not doubt that a democratic order is the best political means to the end of a religious community. The cross-fertilization which a vital Christianity and a genuine democracy could achieve would greatly aid the cause of humanity and serve the Kingdom of God in this generation.'

It would indeed appear that democracy is not despaired of in America, whether by scientists, historians, theologians, philosophers, or men of letters. Neither is it despaired of by the men of action, as events show. And it is widely realised that the surest basis for democracy is religious faith. Dr. Simon Greenberg, of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, appropriately quotes the Prophet Jeremiah, and with that noble utterance we may fittingly conclude.

> 'Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom,
> Neither let the mighty man glory in his might,
> Let not the rich man glory in his riches;
> But let him that glorieth, glory in this,
> That he understandeth and knoweth Me.
> That I am the Lord who exerciseth mercy,
> Justice and righteousness, in the earth.
> For in these things I delight,
> Saith the Lord.'

'THE PUBLIC HOUSE PARSON'

ON October 9, there departed this life a very remarkable clergyman, Hugh Legge. The following arresting appreciation by Bishop Michael Furse, who was Chaplain and Dean of Trinity College, Oxford, from 1895 to 1903, appeared in *The Times* of October 18:

During the last 55 years Trinity College, Oxford, has produced many distinguished men in most walks of life, but I doubt if it has ever had a more devoted son than 'Joe' Legge, or one of such a unique personality. He will be remembered not so much for what he did as for what he was. He got his Blue for rowing in 1893, the year that Oxford won the race in (then) record time. For many years, off and on, he coached his college boat, and lived to see it go head of the river. After a year at Wycliffe Hall he was ordained. I defy anyone to say what his ecclesiastical views were!

The two leaders in the Church to whom he was completely devoted were the late Bishop Chavasse, then Principal of Wycliffe Hall, and the late Bishop Gore, then Principal of Pusey House, with whom on most subjects he profoundly disagreed. He started his clerical career as domestic chaplain to his uncle, then Bishop of Lichfield, but though he counted several bishops among his greatest and oldest friends to the end of his life, he had the poorest possible opinion of bishops — *qua* bishops.

After two years or so at Lichfield, at the request of Henry Pelham, then President of Trinity, he started a laymen's house at the college mission at Stratford, E. For seven years he ran what was known as No. 60. It was like nothing on earth that had ever been produced in the way of a mission settlement. It was just Joe Legge and a bit of Trinity transferred to Stratford; but it did its job, finely, both for Stratford and the college. After the last war, till his death, he was rector of Newbold de Verdun, a coal-mining village in Leicestershire, and a Trinity living, which he loved and served with complete devotion — in his own way, which was quite unlike anyone else's. Any stranger hearing him discuss parochial methods might well have got the impression that the one thing which he hoped none of his people would do was to go to church! He had such a horror of anyone doing so on his account. But he knew everyone in the parish, young and old, including the miners. Every evening he met the latter in the village 'pub,' and there carried out the spirit of the injunction which he once said he would like to have printed in large type and put up over every pulpit in the country — 'Don't believe a word the parson says: but think, man, think.'

For some sixty years he kept a diary, which nobody else has ever seen; he told me he hoped to leave it to the Bodleian — not to be opened until fifty years after his death. It will be good reading. He was always a distinguished figure of a man. In early days he looked — as indeed he was — a red-haired bruiser. As a Haileybury boy he had won the heavy-weight public schools boxing championship; but like many other great fighters, he was the gentlest of men with the heart of a child. As he grew older, with his fine figure still erect and his hair, his moustache, and small Imperial turned white, one felt it was a pity there wasn't a Velazquez to paint him. A great Englishman, a great gentleman, a great Christian, and a great friend.

It was as head of his Trinity College Mission in East London

that he was chosen to take part in the English Mission of Help to South Africa. His collected Mission Addresses, alluringly entitled *From Plunkett's Pavilion to Plettenberg Bay* (Skeffington, 1905), but known to their author as 'The Concertina' because for practical purposes they could be drawn out or contracted as occasion demanded, contain a body of fine, simple, practical Christian teaching. We cite two specimens selected by a friend :

> 'What *is* religion? And first of all what is it **not**? It is not a kind of goody-goody extra added to ordinary life by a certain number of women, a smaller number of not very manly men, *and* the parsons — a kind of third sex, who are paid for trying to add it on to the lives of the first two' (p. 3).
>
> 'Religion always has been, is, and always will be one thing, and one thing only.
> Religion is "man's dealings with God."
> It is therefore the most important thing in the world' (p. 4).

Hugh Legge was a member of the Modern Churchmen's Union for more than a quarter of a century. Three characteristic letters from him are preserved in the *Modern Churchman*. The first letter, April 1920 (Vol. X, p. 43), entitled 'The Religion of the Labouring Classes,' criticizes an article by Dr. Diggle, Bishop of Carlisle, in which the Bishop cites a declaration of a certain distinguished clergyman that

> 'the large bulk of the labouring classes "adore the Christ," yet they affirm that they have no use for the churches.'

Hugh Legge asks :

> 'I wonder who is the "distinguished clergyman." The Bishop of London used to make the statement quoted more than a quarter of a century ago — but he has always had a weakness for hasty generalisations of an optimistic character.
>
> What is the evidence on which this gigantic edifice of a Church-avoiding, Christ-adoring, labouring class is built? and in what circumstances was this evidence gathered?
>
> I lived for seventeen years in the East End of London, I have been for the greater part of my life a habitual frequenter of public houses, I have served in the ranks of the British Army, and I never wear clerical clothes. The evidence I have gathered in the course of my varying experiences is . .t the statement that the large bulk of the labouring classes "adore the Christ" is hopelessly at variance with the facts, and I am no more able to accept it as a true account of the situation we have to face than I could if it was made concerning the large bulk of any other class.'
>
> 'It strikes me very forcibly that "the large bulk of the labouring classes," far from adoring Christ, trouble their heads about Him even less than they do about "the churches," which at any rate provide them with an ever-present subject for hostile criticism.
>
> They use His name pretty freely for swearing purposes, in a way that is very disagreeable till you realise that it is perfectly meaningless. They identify religion with the parsons and church-going on the one hand, and dislike or fear it accordingly; and with morality on the other; and they take very good care not to incur binding obligations in respect of it, while regarding those who do so as mostly hopeless hypocrites who "do not

live up to their profession," "go to church for what they can get out of it," or "to better themselves in business," and so on and so forth.

They usually believe in a God, a dim and distant Being who has very little to do with mundane affairs, except that He has apparently given them to understand that He does not want them to attend public worship; and these mundane affairs are regarded very widely from the fatalistic point of view that "what will be, will be," etc.

Christ, if considered at all, was a good man of the "gentle Jesus" type, who lived a long time ago and taught that we ought to do many things which are beyond the powers of ordinary man, such as turning the other cheek when smitten . . . '

'There are of course many men in the labouring class of noble ideals, deep religious convictions, convinced Christians, but on the whole I should say that complacent self-satisfaction is as characteristic of the large bulk of the labouring class as it is of any other. It is vain to judge the multitude by the characters of exceptionally thoughtful men . . . '

'The great majority have their conventions sanctioned by fear of public opinion, and observe them as others do. As with others a man can "carry on" all right so long as he is not found out. But that their idea of life springs from love of the Christ whom they adore, and only needs developing by the Church is a delusion which will only do harm.

What the Church has to tackle is the problem of the self-satisfied man — the very problem Christ attacked with such inspiring vigour. The man who says "I am not religious, but I have never done anyone any harm," "I am as good a man as you who go to church," "I am no worse than anyone else," "I don't care what a man believes as long as he does right," "I make no professions, but I am always ready to help a mate when he is hard-up"— what volumes of discussion such question-buzzing phrases recall. Surely it is the same all through society. Men are governed by the man-and-woman-made conventions of their set. These are their law. They are justified by conforming to these conventional obligations — or rather by not being found out in the breaking of them. There may be — though somewhat hard to find — sections of society which adore the Christ and regard life as the resultant of their union with Him — which brings no self-satisfaction, but intense consciousness of the need for Him to enrich their poverty of spirit, a cause for mourning and meekness and being hungry and thirsty for righteousness, for a mercifulness in our dealings with others, a single-minded desire for the truth, and that others shall find peace likewise . . . '

'Deism and self-righteousness rather than adoration of the Christ are the religious and moral characteristics of the bulk of the labouring classes, and preaching the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man will not eradicate these. They want rather a dose of Bishop Butler and Whitfield! What men need is conversion — turning to Christ. They do *not* —the large bulk of the labouring or any other class—"adore the Christ," and they will not do so till they turn from themselves to Him. When they have done this they can respond to the appeal to them as children of God and brothers one of another . . .'

'This is the situation the Church has to face. It calls for a sustained attack on the foundations of popular religion and morality, followed by the presentation of Christianity in terms which will make it intelligible to people who live in the twentieth century.'

His second letter, July 1928 (Vol. XVIII, p. 28), deplores the increasing power of the Bishops and concludes with the prophetic utterance :

'the power of the Bishops "has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."'

His third letter, June 1935 (Vol. XXV, p. 164), dealing with the Communist-Fascist tug-of-war, we re-publish in full. The letter is headed 'First Things First in a Mining Village':

'Two happenings here show how oddly people of divergent views tend towards common ground.

Some time since our evening discussions in the village inn turned to Communism. We concluded that we did not know much about it and would be better if we did. So we asked the Leicester Communists to come and hold a meeting here. They did. I took the chair for them.

Their chief speaker was a nice little man who had been in the army. He successfully settled the fate of Communism in this village!

One thing he did struck some of us very forcibly.

Having informed us (after a lively attack on the churches and the clergy) that he thought it very unlikely that there ever was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, he proceeded to argue that Communism was really the carrying out of the great principles Jesus laid down. One of our colliers said to me afterwards, "They can't get away from Him."

Having sampled the Communists it was natural that the Fascists should have a turn. So we got them to hold a meeting and I took the chair as before.

I cannot say that we found their scheme for the salvation of England much more convincing than that of the Communists. However, they seemed very nice fellows, their chief speaker had been in the army and wore his ribbons on his black shirt, and again we were struck by their attitude towards Christianity. They were strongly in favour of Christianity and religious freedom and they claimed that Fascism was really the carrying into practice of the principles of Jesus of Nazareth.

We have one Communist in the village, and, I believe, one Fascist (though of this I am not quite sure). The Communist was in the Grenadiers in the war and has been out of work for a long time. He is an Atheist and I baptised his fourteenth a few months since. He asserts his principles by refusing to march to church with the British Legion, of which he is a member. This is a pity, as the Legion spends a good deal of its spare time marching to church and looks impressive headed by the smartest standard-bearer in Leicestershire.

However, conscience must be supreme and he told me he became a Communist because once when they were going over the top the Padre told them they must not pray to get a Blighty!

I am getting rather bewildered by the mental processes of these good people of the extreme Right and Left. They seem to point to the desirability of our laying more stress on matters of primary importance and less on secondaries.'

Hugh Legge was of much too rare a species for us to hope that his tribe will increase in the parsonic world. Nevertheless the record of his life, so absolutely fearless, clear eyed, disinterested, original, can serve as an inspiration to those who, faced with the difficulties and problems with which he was faced, are tempted to lapse into despair and the indolent escapism which it breeds.

H.D.A.M.

JOSEPH GLANVILL (1636–1680)

Author of *Scepsis Scientifica*

By Edward Carpenter, M.A., Ph.D., B.D.

THERE are names in the history of the English Church which have been rescued from a well-merited oblivion only by the accident of some historical event. We think in this context of Sacheverell, full of conceit and his own worthless rhetoric, or of the controversial and prosy Benjamin Hoadley. What chance gives unjustly to some, however, it more than atones for by withholding with equal injustice from others. There are not a few men in the long history of the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, who seem to have been unexpectedly forgotten and neglected; men of 'light and leading' for whom contemporaries would have safely wagered some niche in the Temple, if not of Fame at least of remembrance. Amongst these must be included Joseph Glanvill (1636-80), whose name is now known only to the curious, and whose memorial in the Abbey Church of Bath, recording that he devoted his life *in studio et contemplatione verbi et operum Dei*, evokes no responsive emotion in the observer. Yet this 'divine' occupies an important place in the history of philosophy in England (a fact of which the French scholar Rémusat and Lecky were aware), and his distinctive contribution is by no means without value in our own day; indeed, it would seem to have a special significance. Perhaps it was his early death at the age of forty-four, terminating an uneventful life, which allowed him so soon to be forgotten.

The meagre biographical details which remain of him may soon be disposed of, for it is the history of his mind which has value and interest. Joseph Glanvill was born at Plymouth in 1636 of Puritan parents, and his early years suffered as a result of their excessive and misdirected zeal. 'In my first education,' he complained later, 'I was continually instructed into a religious and fast adherence to everything I was taught and a dread of disputing in the least article.' In 1652 he went up to Oxford, a choice of University which he later regretted, since though Cambridge was at this time dominated by those remarkable personalities More and Cudworth, Oxford (too often the home of lost causes), was still devoted to a medieval Aristotle. Glanvill took his degree three years later, and already his interests may be detected in his cultivating the friendship of such men as Francis Roust, Provost of Eton, Baxter, Boyle and Meric Casaubon. The Restoration provided a welcome opportunity for Glanvill to emancipate himself finally from his Puritan connections, and he soon became Vicar

of Frome in Somerset, Rector of the Abbey Church of Bath in 1666, and a Prebendary of Worcester in 1678. He died of a fever in Bath in 1680.

If the external pattern of Glanvill's life is thus without incident, it is yet more than compensated for by his intellectual activity and the virility of his thought. His mind was a quick and subtle instrument, sensitive to the main currents of contemporary thought; clear and logical, though at times enlivened by what Wood somewhat sarcastically refers to as a 'quick, warm, spruce and gay fancy.' As Glanvill looked out upon the world of his own day, so did he see two clearly opposed tendencies. First there was a movement, represented by the Puritans and the numerous sects, the Aristotelian teaching at Oxford, and the extreme high Anglicans, which was dogmatic, obscurantist and retrogressive. Times of unsettlement (as we know to our cost!) usually lead to an undue emphasis on authority, and a consequent flight from reason.

Glanvill's first contact was with the Puritans, and he soon found them rigid in their theology, repressive in their education, and full of 'enthusiasm' or what Glanvill contemptuously describes as 'a false conceit of inspiration.' By 'crying up the excesses of the imagination' and 'disparaging sober reason,' these men, he complained, were often led into a condition which 'warms the Brain to a degree that makes it very active, and imaginative, full of odd thoughts and unexpected suggestions.'

Glanvill also regarded the devotion to Aristotle and the old scholastic ritual to which he had been subjected at Oxford as part of the same retrogressive movement. It is but fair to the memory of the great philosopher of Stagira to remember that the contemporary presentation was but a caricature of his essential thought, and it is this which does much to justify Glanvill's severe denunciations. To him Aristotle was 'that dictator of philosophy' and his system a 'verbal labarynth.' 'That the fire burns by a quality called heat leaves us still ignorant,' he remarks drily. With rare insight Glanvill realizes that a great deal of philosophical speculation leads nowhere because of the ambiguity of meaning in the words employed.

> 'In the Aristotelian philosophy,' he writes, 'words are carelessly and abusively admitted, and as inconstantly retained; it thus must needs come to pass, that they will be diversely apprehended by contenders, and so made the subject of Controversies that are endless both for use and number.'

This devotion to Aristotle (and, in theology, to the Fathers of the Church) Glanvill finds psychologically interesting as revealing a weakness almost inherent in the human mind, namely, its 'doting on antiquity.' Nor did Glanvill regard the high Anglican

chool of thought of the seventeenth century with much more avour. Many things which its adherents claimed to be of the *esse* f the Church, were to him matters of complete indifference, and e had a horror of making religion over-elaborate or dogmatic. 'The Principles which are necessary to Salvation,' he wrote, 'are ery few and very plain, and generally acknowledged among Christians'; and as to his own views he wrote rather finely:

> 'Contenting myself with a firm assent to the few Fundamentals of Faith, and having fixed that end of the compass, I desire to preserve my liberty as to the rest, holding the other in such a posture as may be ready to draw these lines, my judgment informed by the Holy Oracles, the Articles of our Church, the apprehensions of wise antiquity and my particular reason shall direct me to describe; and when I do that 'tis for myself and my own satisfaction. I am not concerned to impose my sentiments upon others, nor do I care to endeavour the change of their minds, though I judge them mistaken, as long as Virtue, the Interests of Religion, the Peace of the World, and their own, are not prejudiced by their errors.'

The second and opposed 'intellectual climate' of his day (this phrase is Glanvill's own), which was by no means so prominent as yet, owed its existence to the inductive and experimental approach laid down by Bacon, and the continental Humanism of such men s Descartes, Montaigne, Charron and Gassendi. Bacon had ffected a Copernican revolution in man's attitude to the universe when he pleaded for an abandonment of *a priori* speculations and he old 'forms,' and demanded of men the humility to examine the world and to learn from the facts as they were. Descartes by his famous 'method of doubt' (though he unfortunately introduced a disastrous dualism) added the weight of his name to the attack on ccepted authority.

Glanvill became thoroughly imbued with the spirit of both Bacon and Descartes, and recognized the contrast between their methods and much of the theological speculation of his day. He accepted gladly the inductive method as leading to 'useful knowledge' and opening up vast possibilities for humanity. Opposed to it he saw human pride dogmatizing, without evidence, on matters where no certainty was possible; vast logical systems of thought being erected on flimsy foundations; rival claims being made by opposed religious bodies to infallibility; men being excommunicated and damned for their opinions concerning the minutiae of theology. The problem, as Glanvill perceived it (and t is still with us), was to reduce religion to large and general principles so that it might direct and control the results of the nductive method.

Glanvill's approach to both science and religion begins by asserting an apparent paradox—a general disbelief in the reli-

ability of human judgments, and yet a passionate belief in reason as the best instrument we have. Our human faculties, he reiterates, are very fallible, and this is the constant burden of his first work, *The Vanity of Dogmatizing, or Confidence in Opinions, manifested in a Discourse of the Shortness and Uncertainty of our Knowledge*, which he later expanded into *Scepsis Scientifica, or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science*, published in 1666. In the spirit of Socrates, he here maintains that the gateway to knowledge lies along the road of a confession of ignorance.

> 'It is in the interests of Mankind,' he writes, 'in order to the advance of knowledge, to be sensible they have not yet attain'd: or at least but in poor and diminutive measures. . . . Whatever I look upon within the amplitude of Heaven and earth, is evidence of humane ignorance and all things are a great darkness to us, and we are so unto ourselves. The plainest things are as obscure, as the most confess'dly mysterious: and the Plants we tread on are as much above us as the stars of Heaven. The things that touch us are as distant from us, as the Pole; and we are as much strangers to ourselves as to the inhabitants of America.'

In fact, he goes on to argue, we are ignorant of what really happens when we move a finger; how it is that 'our minds are ruffled by the disorders of the body'; nor can we explain such a simple phenomenon as sleep. In an interesting essay 'Against Confidence in Philosophy,' Glanvill anticipates Hume when he writes:

> 'All knowledge of Causes is deductive: for we know none by simple Intuition; but through the radiation of their effects. So that we cannot conclude anything to be the cause of another, but from its continual accompanying, for the causality itself is insensible. But now to argue from a concomitancy to a causality is not infallibly conclusive: yea in this way lies notorious delusion. For suppose, for instance, we have never seen more sun than in a cloudy day; and that the lesser lights had n'er appeared: Let us suppose the day had alway broke with a wind, and had proportionately varied as that did: Had he not been a notorious Sceptick that should question the causality?'

Human knowledge, therefore, necessarily suffers from many limitations. 'The best Principles of natural knowledge in the world,' he affirms, 'are but Hypotheses which may be and may be otherwise'; nor can we 'properly and perfectly know anything in nature without knowledge of its first causes.'

> 'Everything in Nature hath relation to divers others; so that no one Being can be perfectly known without the knowledge of many more, . . . we cannot know the cause of any one motion in a watch unless we were acquainted with all its dependencies, and had a distinctive comprehension of the whole Mechanical Frame.'

But this does not exhaust the frailties of our understanding, for Glanvill goes on to give an acute analysis of those influences both without and within which mould our opinions. Custom and education, he stresses, are all-powerful, so much so that he pathetic-

lly concludes:

> 'Had Providence determin'd our nativities among the Enemies of the Cross, and theirs under a Christian Horoscope; in all likelyhood we should have exchang'd the Sense of our belief with that of our abode and breeding. There is nothing so absurd, to which education cannot form our ductile minority; it can lick us into shapes beyond the monstrosities of Africa.'

Then again we frequently make judgments because they conform o our 'natural constitutions'; that is, they result from 'bare emperamental Relish or Disgust.'

It is from the above premises (the fallibility of the human nind) that Glanvill elaborates his 'sceptical thesis,' which we can- ot do better than express in his own words:

> 'The True Philosophers are by others accounted Scepticks from their way of Enquiry: which is not to continue still poring upon the writings and opinions of Philosophers, but to seek Truth in the great Book of Nature, and in that search to proceed with wariness and circumspection without too much forwardness in establishing maxims and positive doctrines: To propose their opinions as Hypotheses that may probably be the true accounts, without peremptorily affirming that they are. This amongst others hath been the way of those great men, the Lord Bacon and Descartes, and is now the method of the Royal Society of London whose motto is *Nullius in Verba*. This is Scepticism with some, and if it be so indeed, 'tis such Scepticism as is the only way to sure and founded knowledge, to which confidence in uncertain opinions is the most fatal enemy.'

Glanvill, we must notice, does not deny the possibility of nowledge, though he counsels caution. In fact he constantly naintains the claims of the human reason, and asserts that 'no- hing has done more mischief to religion than the disparaging of eason.' The reason working upon experience can lay down cer- ain principles adequate for everyday life: but there can be no absolute infallibilitie,' and we can never affirm that ''tis impossible hings should be otherwise.'

From his estimate of the human mind, and his consequent sceptical thesis,' Glanvill works out his attitude to 'natural philosophy' (*i.e.* science) and religion. He espouses the Baconian method with real enthusiasm, and his prose takes on an almost yrical quality when he contemplates the achievements which future generations may witness. Many ecclesiastics, it must be remembered, feared the results of the inductive method, and even some, such as Spratt, a Fellow of the newly founded Royal Society of which Glanvill became an active member in 1664, hardly realised he adjustment which would become necessary between the traditional theology and the new science. Glanvill threw himself into he new spirit without fear, and in an address to the Royal Society ne looked forward (maybe with a somewhat naïve optimism) to the

time when gentlemen would abandon the chase for 'the pleasant spectacle of beholding the shifts, windings and unexpected Caprichios of distressed Nature when pursued by a close and well-managed Experiment'; and when nations would devote themselves to the pursuit of knowledge rather than 'to triumph at the head of victorious Troops over conquer'd Empires.' The possibilities of the new method were enormous, if men would but give up 'framing Scheames of things without consulting the Phenomena,' and would cease to dictate to Nature but patiently learn from her. 'There is an unknown America of secrets, and an unknown Peru of Nature,' and he felt that his age was on the fringe of great things, as the following prophetic passage shows:

> 'Methinks this Age seems resolved to bequeath posterity somewhat to remember it: The glorious Undertakers, wherewith Heaven hath blest our dayes, will leave the world better provided than they found it. Should those Heroes go on, as they have happily begun, they'll fill the world with wonders. And I doubt not but posterity will find many things, that are now but Rumors, verified into practical Realities. It may be some Ages hence, a voyage to the Southern unknown Tracts, yea possibly the Moon, will not be more strange than one to America. To them, that come after us, it may be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest Regions; as now a pair of Boots to ride a Journey. And to confer at the distance of the Indies by sympathetick conveyances, may be as usual in future times, as to us in a litterary correspondence. The restauration of gray hairs to Juvenility, and renewing the exhausted marrow, may at length be effected without a miracle: And the turning of the now comparative desert world into a Paradise, may not improbably be expected from late Agriculture.'

Thus mankind is to increase in knowledge by a frank acceptance of its own weakness, by patiently learning from the facts of experience, and remembering all the time that it has 'drawn but a Cockle shell of water from the Ocean.'

It is not surprising that Glanvill's insistence on humility, on the necessity for careful research and tentative hypotheses, should have led him to be very critical of the theology of his day. There were certain broad fundamentals of religion, he maintained, concerning which we could be certain, and it was these, and not the minutiae of theological controversy, which needed to be stressed.

> 'What a stir is there for Mint, Anise, and Cummin controversies,' he comments, 'while the great practical fundamentals are unstudyed, unobserved? What eagerness in the prosecution of disciplinarian uncertainties, when the love of God and of our neighbour, those Evangelical unquestionables, are neglected? 'Tis this hath consum'd the nutriment of the great and more necessary Verities, and bred differences that are past any accommodation, but that of the last dayes decisions. The sight of that day will resolve us, and make us asham'd of our petty quarrels. Thus opinions have rent the world asunder, and divided it almost into indivisibles. Had Heraclitus liv'd now, he had wept himself into marble, and Democritus would have broke his spleen. Who can speak of such fooleries without a Satyr, to see aged Infants so quarrel at putpin, and

the doating world grown child again. How fond are men of a bundle of opinions, which are no better than a bagge of Cherry stones?'

What the fundamentals of religion are Glanvill discusses at length in his two sermons on 'The Antiquity of the Faith' and 'The Service of Reason.' In brief, his theology is what he terms 'primitive and rational,' and like the great French teacher Pascal he makes his appeal to the personal teaching and character of Christ. He confesses to 'own no opinion in Divinity which cannot plead the prescription of above 1600,' and he continues:

> 'Though I confess that in Philosophy I'm a Seeker; yet I cannot believe that a Sceptick in Philosophy must be one in Divinity. Gospel-light began in its Zenith; and as some say of the sun was created in its Meridian strength and lustre. Divine Truths were most pure in their source; and Time could not perfect what Eternity began: our Divinity, like the Grand-father of Humanity, was born in the fulness of time, and in the strength of its manly vigour.'

It is this distinction between religion and science which controls Glanvill's thought concerning their relationship, a subject with which he deals in an essay on *The Usefulness of real Philosophy to Religion*. He sees more clearly (I believe) than any of his contemporaries that religion had gone outside its own province and had dogmatized in realms where the inductive method might well compel contrary conclusions. He admits frankly that 'the Scriptures do not concern themselves to Rectifie the Mistakes of the Vulgar in Philosophical [*i.e.* scientific] Theories, but complie with their Infirmities, and speak according as they understand. . . . The word of God determines nothing about them.'

Glanvill thus sees clearly the necessity of some separation of their spheres, though he repeatedly stresses that the religious ideal is needed to direct the employment of 'useful knowledge,' and he delights in reminding his readers that a patient examination of the world shows it to be an intelligent system, which helps us to praise God in his works.

> 'He that converseth with His works,' he writes, 'finds in all things the clear stamps of infinite Benignity and Wisdom; he perceives the Divine Art in all the turnings and Varieties of Nature and Divine Goodness in that. He observes God in the colour of every Flower, in every Fibre of a Plant, in every particle of an Insect, in every drop of Dew.'

Holding such views, it is not surprising that ecclesiastical allegiance sat very lightly upon him, and he was one of those who was not ashamed to confess himself a 'latitudinarian.' It was the comprehensiveness and sanity of the Church of England which made him forsake the Puritanism of his father, and the Calvinistic theology which he abominated. Thus he writes in the preface to his *Lux Orientalis*:

> 'It is none of the least commendable indulgences of our Church that she allows us a latitude of judging in points of speculation, and ties not

> up men's consciences to an implicit assenting to opinions not necessary or fundamental. . . . Nor is there less reason in this parental indulgence than there is of Christian charity and prudence; since to tie all others up to our opinions and to impose difficult and disputable matters under the notion of Confessions of Faith, and Fundamentals of Religion, is a most unchristian piece of tyranny, the foundation of persecution, and every root of Anti-christianism.'

It is easy for us now to detect certain weaknesses in Glanvill's thought. It is difficult, at times, to see how he reconciles his profound distrust of 'humane knowledge' with his great respect for human reason, or his optimism as he faces the future with his pessimism as he contemplates the present. Nor does he systematically relate the new inductive method to the study of religion, or justify his somewhat 'static' attitude to Christianity.

Yet in the main his contribution to the thought of his day was individual and of permanent value. In religion he recalled his generation to essentials and deplored the excessive preoccupation with the minutiae of theological controversy, which was the bane of seventeenth century England. By stressing the limitations of human knowledge and its inevitable incompleteness, he did much to encourage tolerance and a free expression of opinion. By supporting whole-heartedly the inductive method of Bacon, and in defending the work of the Royal Society against its critics, he helped forward the cause of dispassionate scientific research, and at the same time helped to rescue it from the charge of atheism.

It may therefore come as a surprise for the reader to learn that Joseph Glanvill, the great opponent of superstition, should appear before his contemporaries as the passionate defender of belief in witchcraft in a treatise *Sadducismus Triumphatus; or a Full and Plain Evidence concerning Witches and Apparitions*. The history of this superstition has been traced at length in Lecky's 'History of Rationalism': here it is enough to notice that soon after the Restoration in England, belief in its reality had begun to be quietly abandoned, though intellectuals such as More, Boyle and Meric Casaubon (to mention only a few) were convinced of its truth.

Glanvill set himself the task of enquiring into the origins of this contemporary disbelief, and he came to the conclusion that it was based on no clear idea, nor on any exhaustive examination of evidence, but arose as the result of an uncritical conviction that 'the belief is absurd and the thing impossible.' It was, in fact, an *a priori* judgment of a kind which Glanvill deplored in all realms of knowledge, and he consequently set himself the task of examining the evidence for witchcraft and convinced himself that it was overwhelming. In other words, whether witchcraft existed was for him merely a question of fact: 'we should judge the Action by the Evidence, and not the Evidence by our Fancies about the Action.'

It is perhaps disappointing in this respect to read Glanvill's scription of the Demon of Tedworth and other such absurdities; d yet even his *Sadducismus Triumphatus* has some value. Unubtedly these old stories of witches and apparitions, despite eir being 'worked over,' elaborated and distorted, do contain me kernel of fact: they do bear witness to phenomena, call it at we will, which even in our own day we do not understand. hat surprises us is that Glanvill failed to recognize that his own planation of the facts was itself equally arbitrary and was not lled forth by, but was imposed on, the evidence. Yet despite this, s real concern was to oppose a shallow and too simple materialn, after the pattern of Hobbes, which ignores what it does not sh to see, and refashions the world according to its own ideas. It the *a priori* all the time which Glanvill opposes — and to good fect.

If the waters of Bath could reanimate his dust under the north sle of the Abbey Church in the city, there would certainly be uch work for Joseph Glanvill to do to-day, if it were only to issue nother edition of his *Scepsis Scientifica*.

COMMEMORATION OF BENEFACTORS[1]

By the Reverend Arthur Tindal Hart, M.A., B.D.,
Vicar of Bordesley Green.

'Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?'
Matt. xx, 15.

YOU will remember, of course, the parable from which these words are taken: the story of the landowner who hired bourers to work in his vineyard, at the agreed price of a penny *enarius*[2]) a day. Some of these labourers, however, worked from rly morning until night, while others for but one hour in the vening. Nevertheless they were all paid exactly the same amount -one penny. Not unnaturally the labourers who had borne the eat and burden of the day grumbled and said it wasn't fair; they ight either to have been paid more, or the late-comers less. But eir employer retorted: 'Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not ou agree with me for a penny? Take up that which is thine and o thy way; it is my will to give unto this last, even as unto thee. s it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?'

[1] A sermon preached to the Master, Fellows and Scholars of Emmanuel ollege, Cambridge, on November 22nd, 1944.

[2] A silver coin, a little larger than a sixpence, with a purchasing power of out ten shillings in our present currency.

Throughout history, in most times and places, that last que tion could only have been answered in the affirmative; and becaus this was so, great religious and educational establishments lik our own College have been founded and flourish. Our Benefactor the majority of whom appear to have been clergymen of th Church of England, from an Archbishop of Canterbury dow wards, have, indeed, given freely of their material possessions i order to enrich our spiritual heritage; but this was only possibl because they claimed the right to do what they would with their own

To-day such a right is being subtly challenged. Individua bequests for specific purposes, it is said in some quarters, ar wasteful and even harmful, since they encourage parochialism an exalt the independence of the individual at the expense of th community. That is the opinion of many of our Church leaders who, adopting the present popular slogan in secular affairs tha private enterprise must give place to State ownership, are adapt ing it to meet the supposed needs of the Church. 'The Church ha the right to ask,' we are told, 'and Parliament has the power t sanction, the transference of parochial endowments to a Commo Fund.' This fund would, apparently, be administered in ever diocese by the bishop, archdeacons and their advisers, and out o it each priest would be paid a stipend in accordance with his needs abilities and sphere of work.

Along with such a pooling of the Church's resources, and as a necessary corollary to it, the 'parsons' freehold' must be destroyed in order that Ecclesiastical Authority may have undisputed contro over its own house, and be free to move, remove, and reprove it employees at will, in what it considers to be the best interests o Church and State. Nor do these proposed reforms end there 'parsonage houses and their gardens,' it is argued, 'should b vested in the Diocesan Board of Finance and be administered through the Dilapidations Board. . . . The incumbent, instead o being temporary owner, would become a quasi-tenant.' The rights of patronage are also assailed, and the suggestion put forward tha none but ecclesiastics should be permitted to appoint to livings.

Such proposals, if they were carried into effect, cannot fai to concern a College like our own, with its strong clerical tradi tions, considerable rights of ecclesiastical patronage, and deep interest in the whole question of benefaction and endowment.

At first sight many of these reforms appear attractive enough. Uniformity, it is urged, by cutting away all those ancient an glaring inequalities[3] of income and opportunity, which have bee

[3] Any student of the results achieved by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and Q.A.B. during the last hundred years will admire the judicious method by which these 'glaring inequalities' have been steadily remedied.—Ed., *M.C.*

vailed by clergymen for so long, would promote efficiency. But uld it? The accompanying loss in spiritual freedom could, I ie, e. be disastrous for the Church of the future. A good analogy o be found in agrarian history: large farms employing many dless labourers at fixed wages can, and do, produce more food n an equal acreage of agricultural land split up into tiny holdgs; but the disappearance of the small freeholder almost invarily impoverishes the nation's manhood.

There is also the problem of future benefactions. People will e generously to their own parish church or benefice, just as the g list of our College benefactions proves that they will give ually gladly to their other spiritual home, the University; but it extremely unlikely that they will evince any enthusiasm for a 'Common Fund.'

Then, where is the confiscation of endowments going to end? the Church can 'rightly' ask for, and Parliament 'rightly' give ay, money or land bequeathed to a particular parish by a parular person, what is there to prevent the President of the Board Education 'rightly' asking for, and Parliament 'rightly' peritting, College endowments to be swept into a general fund for omoting adult education? But it is the whole issue of the iritual freedom of the individual, which this flagrant attack on dowment and benefaction has opened up, that needs most careil consideration.

Christ Himself founded His Church in direct opposition to e Ecclesiastical Authority of His day, as represented by the wer of the Pharisees and the Sadducees; and since, alas, in this orld nothing seems to be able to continue to exist without some rt of financial backing, the Early Church in Jerusalem depended r its support upon the generous contributions of its members. arnabas, for example, having a field, sold it and brought the oney and laid it at the Apostles' feet. Doubtless there were many hers like him. Later, St. Paul started systematic collections mong the new churches that he had founded in the Near East. he Roman Empire might be a despotism, but it still permitted s subjects, rich and poor alike, even its slaves, to do what they ould with their own: and consequently the Christian Church rew and flourished in the first century A.D., the great outstanding xample in history of the revolt of the spirit of man, the spirit of ndividual man, against the gross dead weight of officialdom. I udder to think what would have happened to that Primitive hurch if it had had to depend upon a subsidy from the Temple reasury at Jerusalem.

Indeed, from the time of Constantine the Great onwards one spect of the Church's history has been the continual struggle of

her members to preserve their spiritual independence. The collaps of the Roman Empire, together with the failure of the Germa Emperors successfully to revive it, saved her from becoming mere department of state. While the Reformation vindicated th freedom against the autocracy of the Papacy. At first sight, hov ever, the Reformation itself, as carried through in England, ap peared merely to substitute the King for the Pope; but the revo of the individual which underlay that whole movement could n be indefinitely denied, and expressed itself in the Great Rebellio of 1641, and again in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 — where, is to be noted, one of our College's main benefactors, Archbisho Sancroft, played a worthy and courageous part as leader of th seven bishops who were sent to the Tower. More recently, the ris of Methodism, the Evangelical Revival, the Tractarian an Modernist Movements, all of which represented the protest of th individual against restrictions imposed on them by the Ecclesi astical Authority of the day, have renewed the pledge, first give in the Gospel, that the Kingdom of God was to be founded in th heart of the individual believer and not imposed upon him fro outside, however weighty that authority. Such 'freedoms' paro chial and collegiate endowments (whatever their risks) help t preserve and defend, since such endowments can alone provide a solid financial basis for the realization of such freedom.

Should, nevertheless, the principle once become established i the Church, and in the Colleges which have grown up in her shadow that the Community is everything and the Individual nothing, and that efficiency achieved through the mechanism of uniformity is what really matters — policies rapidly acquiring power and popu larity in the secular world outside — then, indeed, sound learning and true religion would lose not a little of their many-sided originality.

Man is a spirit. He would soar upwards, as God beckons him through the medium of the mind; but, constituted as the world is man is also dependent on material things, of which money is one Money he must have as a means, not an end; and thanks to ou honoured benefactors, who have claimed their ancient right to d what they would with their own, he is supplied with it in its leas crippling and hampering form. So 'Let us now praise famou men,' men, you remember, whom the Son of Sirach describes a 'Rich men furnished with ability, living peaceably in their habita tions.' No doubt their bequests were good for their own souls; bu how much more for the souls of many generations of men who because of their benefactions, have been enabled, untrammeled b financial need and official tyranny, so to tread the road which passe through things temporal as to gain possession of the things eterna

'WHAT IS MAN?'

By T. Wigley, author of *The Necessity of Christian Modernism*, etc.

WHATEVER the subject with which we deal, we cannot avoid the problem of Man. In him we must find the key to reality, or we shall find it nowhere. Man is involved in moral systems, in national and racial philosophies, in questions concerning education, industry and economics. To-day, with the swift progress of the sciences and their application to human affairs, the need is urgent for new wisdom to match new acquisitions of knowledge. While, of course, the idea of our forefathers that man sprang from the dust through special creation at the hand of God, some 6,000 years ago, must be frankly and finally abandoned in the light of what we know to be true, such a change of view does not mean that man is reduced to the level of the bacillus. It is as foolish to despise man because of his gradual development through the ages from simple beginnings, as it would be to despise Shakespeare or Einstein because they were once babies with no language but a cry. Biologically regarded, the possibility of growth in joy and sympathy advances with the possibility of pain and suffering, and both these possibilities increase proportionately with the growth in nerve structure and in mind. It is impossible to have the one without the other. The life of the *amoeba* is less risky than that of man, but it is also incredibly duller.

The really important question is whether the essence of life reveals itself at the points where human values appear, or whether these values. goodness, truth and beauty, are merely accidental. It is not, I suggest, fanciful to assume that man's restlessness is a symptom of a creative power at work throughout nature which comes to self-consciousness in him. Where there is no travail, there is no creation and no growth. We are thus led to the idea of God as immanent and energizing in and through man, which in its turn influences our estimate of man. Our ideas of God and man are indissolubly bound up together, each reacts on the other. Man cannot be considered a 'poor worm' if he has a capacity for God. Nor can we, in view of such a possible relationship, speak of a natural depravity of man. Much that goes by the name of Christian Theology would be less poisonous and more Christian if it abandoned once and for all the Babylonian-Hebrew myth of 'the Fall' and so-called 'original Sin.' In spite of recent Barthian and Neo-Calvinist pronouncements, the products of the spirit of defeatism

in a time of stress, I would point out that it is no mark of piety to imagine that we honour God by dishonouring or belittling ourselves. It is no encouragement to man to strive upwards to be told that, in spite of his outstretching, God is 'wholly other.'

Adversity makes strange bed-fellows, and the Neo-Calvinist finds himself on familiar terms with the Behaviourists, who psychologically speaking tell us that man is but a machine, whose every thought and action — if we can indeed speak of such, holding such an opinion — is determined and inevitable. Such an idea banishes not only religion but science as well from the life of man, including the science of psychology on which they base their claims that man is not a person but a thing. As against these anti-Christian and perverted Christian estimates of man I claim that there is something of God in every man, what the Quakers called 'The Divine Seed,' in protest against the Calvinistic idea that man had inherited seeds of sin implanted in the soul. As early as the seventeenth century the Quakers grasped the notion that every new-born child comes to his great experiment in this strange, mixed world equipped with something spiritual in him, something capable of vital response to the environing presence of the living spirit which is able to pour itself through a life which is sensitive, receptive, and willing to be an organ of spiritual manifestation. Supremely such a life of divine incarnation was seen in Jesus. Man is always, at his best, himself plus a more-than-himself. Kant (1724-1804) stressed this idea of man as a self-conscious being, a creative centre, co-operating in the making of the world, acting in such a way as to treat every person always as an end, never as a means, *i.e.* to treat every person always so that personality is enlarged and not destroyed, never to use man as a thing or a tool. Most of our modern problems arise through ignoring this rightful demand.

This may seem rather up in the air, but our estimate of man has very definite practical results. If, for instance, we take such a statement as that of J. W. Krutch seriously,

> 'life is a physiological process and has no other meaning,'

then Robert Sherwood in his play, *The Petrified Forest*, gives us the conclusion in a sentence,

> 'They are taking the world away from the intellectuals and giving it to the apes.'

The present world situation is a grim illustration of what such an exchange means. Its personal meaning is put quite clearly by Ossorgin in his novel, *Quiet Street*:

> 'Life is entering by a narrow gate, stumbling like a lunatic as we go, and then making our exit at another narrow gate, where the turnstile clicks and the keeper lets us out with a ghastly grin as if to mock us.'

here is no need to illustrate further an attitude which has had ch disastrous results in the making of the modern situation. If I ay quote Krutch once more, as one who has contributed so much its creation,

> 'A colour has faded from our palette, a whole range of effects has dropped out of a symphony. We are carried nearer to that state in which existence is a vast emptiness. We have grown used to a Godless universe.'

ut we have not grown so used to it that we are incapable of turn- g to reconsider the facts which must be taken into account in any timate of man, his nature and possibilities. To close the eyes gainst the high and holy, no less than against the difficult and sagreeable, is as much a sign of defeat as if we had been laid low the enemy. It is a refusal to think and to act, which is another ame for defeat, and it is our last movement when we blink the ct in any realm.

The fact is that the questions life raises, and which religion tempts to answer, are these: 'What is the ultimate destiny of an? What is the meaning of life and relations between men and en and man and the universe? What is the sense of men's joys nd fears, sufferings and disappointments?' Man's speculation on ese problems is as old as knowledge and as old as language. At e outset of our investigation we must beware of the popular error hich confuses origins and values and even identifies them.

> 'To-day,' writes a medical psychologist, 'we are little more than clever adolescents toying with the intelligence of men yet stirred by the emotions of childhood.'

would stress the word 'toying,' because I am sure that many dults have not outgrown the nursery stage, and it does not look as nough our educationalists will be out of work in any foreseeable uture. Whether we think or refuse to think is quite as important s what we believe or don't believe: the two are intimately related, ust as both of them cannot be separated from doing, if the mind s to be healthy. It is a sociologist, not a minister of religion, who ells us,

> 'If we believe the whole course of evolution to be without significance . . . we shall place a lower estimate on all that makes for the control of natural conditions by the human mind, and a high one on all that leads to resignation and submission' (L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*).

The snort of the person who exclaims that religion must be kept in ts place does nothing to enlighten us as to what exactly is the place which religion must occupy. From his angry, inarticulate cries I get the distinct impression that he is dimly aware that with religion it is all or nothing, and he is afraid of it.

Some religion or philosophy of life—call it what you like—nan must have; that is why I have urged the importance of regard- ng man in social and spiritual relationships as one with an essen-

tial being-for-self which can be depressed or exalted by the way in which he regards himself and by the way in which others regard him. It is not only in the totalitarian countries that the private person is no longer wanted. In an age of mass opinion, mass production, and mass observation, the individual needs to fight for his life and to beware lest his mental and spiritual shape is being produced by a universal biscuit cutter. We eliminate the word 'I' from our vocabulary at our peril. If we regard the individual as a knot formed in the web of life, it is the knot which gives significance to the web. It is here, as it were, that the web comes to self-consciousness. Without the knots there would be no pattern, and without the pattern no meaning. Intelligent co-operation is called for, and it is the opposite of absorption, whether the absorbing system be the family, the church, or the nation. The simple truth that society has been, and always will be, what its members make it has often been forgotten, especially by those who, equating the individual with zero, imagine that a million zeros make a real figure. On the one hand, it is possible to become so preoccupied with social issues that we are unconscious of the fact that our overactivity is a symptom of a mind which is unready to face its own difficulties; the cry is 'don't be personal.' On the other hand, the history of the Church can provide abundant evidence of the way in which those who have urged the need for an individual gospel do so simply as a means of escape from any application of it to the life of society; the name for a rather sanctimonious spirituality, with religion carefully cut off from life, is very easily earned. I repeat, therefore, the knots have no existence apart from the web, and the web has no meaning apart from the knots. There is constant interaction between them, now the one is important, now the other, but neither can at any time be ignored. It is this tension which is life, and it constitutes both asset and liability. Our contribution can be individual only within the limits within which we are set. We should, of course, strive to enlarge those limits, but when we have come to the end of our individual best, let us learn to be content.

I hope I have made clear that, in warning the individual against the menace of the mass-formed mind, I am not unaware of the essential and indeed inevitable, growth of collectivism in the world. To protest against such inevitability would be as foolish as Mrs. Partington beating back the waves with her broom. All I am urging is that we shall maintain ourselves as human beings, for there are quite definite limits to what society can do. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch once made the pleasant and illuminating suggestion,

> 'If you think a ballad can be composed by public meeting, just call a public meeting and try.'

There are other things we can substitute for 'ballad,' and it would be interesting to hear from any gathering of people what their substitutes would be. Social machinery looms so large to-day that the purpose for which it is created may be forgotten. That purpose is not to produce totalitarian nonentities, but individual human achievement without which man loses his quality and distinction.

> 'Men are so prone to mistake the means for the end,' said Emerson, 'that even natural history has its pedants who mistake classification for knowledge.'

When government, religion, education, science, and art make this mistake, the life of man becomes nasty, brutish, and short. Frank Pakenham in the *Observer* (2.viii.42) asks concerning any future educational ladder:

> 'Where does it lead to? What kind of men and women are we aspiring or hoping to produce?'

The totalitarians have given one answer and have implemented it with vigour and efficiency. What is our answer? Have we considered the question at all? If culture, like art, is a spark springing between two poles, the individual and society, then the community must be loose enough to admit and encourage individual variability, yet sufficiently compact to provide a social setting and security. A many-sided tolerance can alone ensure

> 'a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection.'

Without this we shall die in our shells.

This problem of adjustment has puzzled every age, and by its attempted answer every age is to be judged: it dominates to-day and will shape to-morrow. Dr. Ernest Barker is fully aware of its importance and deals with it in his recent book, *Reflections on Government* (O.U.P., 21*s*.). He shows how the visible conflict to-day is not only between various kinds of liberty — political, economic, religious — but between divers kinds of elements. Liberty is claimed for the State or the Nation, for social groups, professions and occupations, for a class economically defined, or for a party with an exclusive doctrine. Dr. Barker asks, how can these different kinds of liberty be measured and compared by a single standard of measurement? He answers that there is only one possible standard, the measure of a man. I would underline his own words:

> 'We may make an assumption, and we shall find an answer. The assumption is that in our human world and under God, the personality of man alone has intrinsic and ultimate worth, and having also the capacity of development has also an intrinsic and ultimate claim to the essential condition of its development. Liberty will then be that essential condition; and the essence of liberty will be that it is a condition, or

> status, or quality, which individual personality must possess in order that it may translate itself from what it is to what it has the capacity of becoming.'

Those are great words from a great book, and if you ask 'what is individual personality capable of becoming?' Dr. Barker will tell you that it can become the inheritor of the whole cultural achievement of the ages, a creative participator in forming the whole culture of the future. The State, aiding and harmonizing every other organization in its service to the individual, finds its ultimate authority in the aggregate of individuals, discussing and agreeing upon the means to their total ends. Democracy thus expresses itself in a gradual assimilation of divergent points of view to which minority as well as majority has made its contribution; it is a high ideal,

> 'it has no end and no final achievement, but a continuous life of effort and a continuous struggle of readjustment to the demands of time.'

But is it only to the demands of time that we seek adjustment? Is not the implication clear that such a person as man, who expresses himself in so many different ways and lives in so many different worlds, presupposes a spiritual realm in which the whole co-operates and works through each? Man in his quest for truth, beauty, and goodness is according to his nature responding to a spiritual environment which is as real as the physical environment to which his body is related. We are engaged in the making of a spiritual world, and upon our reactions, or lack of them, the emergence of that world depends. In both mind and body we may find vestiges of other days in racial history, but we are also conscious of the lure of the quest and of achievement. To speak of 'mere human nature' is to delude ourselves, for it has no existence; it is to mistake a part for the whole. Man can, of course, drift downward or strive upward according to the object to which he gives himself, and his progress is not inevitable. Slowly we progress towards self-harmony and self-attainment. As the late Sir J. Arthur Thomson well said,

> 'Some people never get past talking of man as no more than a bipedal mammal with an unusually large brain and a strong herd instinct. Of course that is true, but how far from the whole truth. For man at his best discovers the secret motions of things, and uses his knowledge to bind nature to his purposes. He sends his tendrils to the stars.'

We find ourselves and that more-than-ourselves we call God in every creation of beauty, in every discovery of truth, in all those moments when we love with a love which rises above self and gives itself for another; when we agonize and triumph, there God is, and there man is as well.

MY REASONS FOR ENTERING THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

By the Rev. C. J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D., ex-President of the Free Church Federal Council for Manchester, Salford and District.

IT is obvious now to all who have taken part in the movements towards Church Unity during the last twenty-five years that the Episcopal Order is the only practical foundation on which ecclesiastical understanding and healing can be built. Some non-Anglican Churches—such as Methodism—have clearly proclaimed their acceptance of an Episcopal polity for the South Indian Church of the future. Plainly, this proclamation involves their own position at home, implying their acceptance of 'The Historic Episcopate'—in one of its many theories—as belonging to the Church of the future in this land.

It is my hope and faith that my own decision to enter the Church of England will assist many to see the implications of the steps already taken, and to press on, without further hesitation and delay, to the goal whose immediate outlines have been already envisaged, accepted, and indeed welcomed. My step, so far from being a break, is a bond: so far from being a cause of division, is a method of healing: so far from being a barrier to Unity, is a making straight the path that leads thereto. I am confident that, when the issues are pondered in the light of the whole ecclesiastical situation as it has developed during recent years, this view will be generally accepted. And, if difficulties remain, they will only be due to the slowness of the popular mind to understand what has been happening, and to the reluctance of ecclesiastical administrators to seem to surrender their prized and darling responsibilities. The goal, however, is sure!

The Editor has asked me to give in the *Modern Churchman* an account of my 'reasons' for becoming, after these many years as a minister and theological tutor in the Methodist Church, a member of the Church of England. In responding to this request I am compelled to say at the outset that 'reasons' which I can give in words can never, to me, by their very nature, be adequate. The history of any man's spiritual growth is an indissoluble unity, so I must give here a brief, but necessary, sentence or two about early thoughts. When first as a youth I read Pascal, he spoke to me in the depths of my spirit when he said, 'The heart has its reasons which the reason knoweth not.' This was also taught me when, as a boy, I first began in Scotland—where for the first fourteen years

of my life I had breathed the strong bracing air of Presbyterian thought and ecclesiastical life — to feel dimly but certainly the essential spirit of Methodism. For that spirit seemed to me then, as it does now, to have a more profound source and to make a more profound appeal than does Presbyterianism. At least, it was in a small Methodist Church in Paisley that I felt a little of the 'warmed heart' which John Wesley experienced in so persuasive and dynamic a way on May 24, 1738, in the room in Aldersgate Street. Not that I have ever belittled the essential contribution which the Presbyterian form of the Christian faith, spirit and outlook has to make to the Church of the future. Indeed I have in later years learned to value it as I did not then value it. But Methodism taught me what no other form of Christianity did, or indeed has done, for me. What it did was *to make alive* the truth which Pascal had expressed in his unforgettable words. It was indeed the religion of the heart. I came to see, though much later, that in its often forgotten or misunderstood *objective* approach to the tasks of our Christian faith and life, Methodism in its quintessence means two things: first, a deep compassion for the souls of men, and second, an ardent zeal for the Gospel of Christ. Where it has seemed to me to require essential additions or supplementations, was along three main lines: first, in the full and enrichening sense of a rootedness in the whole Christian and, I would add, the whole Hebraic past; second, in the claims of intellectual integrity and comprehensiveness; and third, in the urgent mission to find a modern integration of the whole Gospel of Christ which could be applied to the Church's main task to-day. That task I regard as that which inspires the whole 'Religion and Life' Campaign—the mission, controlled by the full Christian Catholic faith in its dynamic and developing quality, to the whole life of the whole man in the whole society.

What I have written in these last sentences is, as it seems to me now, the final clue to my decisive act in entering the Church of England — this *ecclesia gentis Anglorum* of the Venerable Bede. For we are entering upon a New Age: at least, God is urgently calling us to enter. Our hearts, our minds and our wills all tell us this: separately, so far as they can be separated, and unitedly, so far as they are and can be integrated fully. Such a call cannot, however, be completely obeyed unless our Christian and ecclesiastical life is able to achieve and manifest the comprehensive harmony represented, most truly and deeply as I am convinced, in the Mother Church of this dear land. Nor could my own mind tolerate the plans and proposals of some to sunder summarily this comprehensive Church into its frequently warring and mutually unsympathetic elements. For I have long been convinced that

there is no necessary opposition between the quest for Unity and the fidelity to Difference. Indeed, it is only as each individual, each church, each nation, is entirely true to its own essential insight, emphasis and basic feeling and spirit, that the world as a whole will emerge into the New Age now insistently beckoning, and that the Church in its Divinely-appointed Unity will inspire and direct the awakening spirit of man that will be necessary for such emergence. England is not Russia, nor is India China, nor is France Germany, nor is the British Commonwealth of Nations the United States of America, nor are the islands of the Pacific Ocean the lands of the frigid north. The many and uncharted factors which have made these peoples and these lands have given to them moral and spiritual needs, insights and duties peculiar to themselves, yet all necessary to the whole. Thus, as I am convinced, the Christianity of our English-speaking peoples is called to give an expression of Christian Faith, Creed and Worship which rises out of and meets the needs of the whole spiritual constitution of God's world. There is one Father and one Christ and one Holy Spirit: there is but one God, inherently One in His essential Being Nature and Will: the diversity of the divine functions of the three persons issue out of that Single and Inseparable Being, Nature and Will: so that no true doctrine of the 'Trinity' can ever contradict the abiding Truth of the whole Biblical teaching that God is, and can only be, One. . . . And there is One Christ, the same yesterday, to-day and forever; so that no humanly-rational divisions of His Nature can ever sunder His indissoluble Person, or make of none effect the one continuous history of Christian many-sided emphasis and aspiration among all the churches which call themselves after His Name. So there is 'the Christ of the English road,' and 'the Christ of the African road,' and 'the Christ of the Chinese road,' and 'the Christ of the American road,' and 'the Christ of the Russian road,' and 'the Christ of the Indian road'—and the Christ of *every other* national, linguistic or racial road. And there is One Spirit of the ever operative God.

> His Spirit floweth free,
> High surging where It will,
> In prophet's word He spake of old,
> He speaketh still.
> Established is His Law,
> And changeless it shall stand,
> Deep writ upon the human heart,
> On sea, on land.

And did not the father of medicine say: 'Your food should be your remedy'? That is, as applied to our religious needs to-day, the healing of our troubles in the Church is found to our hand in its very qualities by which we Christians in this island are what we

are. Our differences, which have been revealed in our denominational histories, belong to a larger and deeper history. And if we would cure our divisions aright we must learn to understand the *vis medicatrix naturae* which God has placed within.

From these lofty thoughts and aspirations I now turn to the issues as they presented themselves to one single human consciousness as it was confronted by the whole environing situation as God had over-ruled it for His own glory and future deep and wide mission to the world.

My Christian life experience was begotten of Methodist parents, and of a grandmother whose maiden name was Watts, and who on a certain unforgettable day when I was four years old took me on her knee and said: 'Never forget, my boy, that you come from the family of Isaac Watts the hymn-writer.' Oh the difficulty of seeming, even, to cut myself off from the heritage of the Puritans and the Methodists.

My Christian awakening came to a boy of 14 in a small Baptist chapel which had been loaned to a few Methodists from England in that town of Scotland. Oh the difficulty of even seeming to forget that place and that day! Is such 'disloyalty' tolerable in a Christian mind?

My call to preach the Gospel came also when I met Methodist ministers, and especially when I listened to a great Methodist missionary from India who spoke to me in the very depths of the mind. The first books on theology I read were put into my hands when still a boy by a Methodist minister, since when I have found many relaxations in other books, much quickening of the imagination, much broadening of the sympathies, but nothing to take the place of that 'Queen of the Sciences,' as I still regard Theology. For three years I lived in a Wesleyan Methodist College, and there owed more to my respected theological tutor, Dr. W. T. Davison, for mental stimulus than to any other man.

For eighteen years I was a circuit minister of the Wesleyan Church, and in that time found many true friends from London to Penzance. Oh the difficulty of even seeming to forget those friendships, the difficulty residing in the very danger that these friends would not understand and that I should lose something that to me was deeply precious. (Many of these fears have been wondrously removed by the letters of real though partial and perplexed understanding I have received.)

In 1930 I was appointed tutor in Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Religion at Didsbury College, Manchester, the oldest Methodist Theological College in the world, a Wesleyan College which has always seemed to me to embody the quintessence of the simplicity, the strength, the friendliness, the warmth, the

vangelical zeal of John Wesley himself. During ten years there taught many hundreds of students for the Methodist ministry. Since Methodist Union I have been able to enrich my fellowship in this teaching service at Hartley Victoria College—this College representing the other two branches of United Methodism—also in Manchester. Thus I was, at the very consummation of Methodist Union, able to understand from the very centre its inwardness and contribute to its deepening and fulfilment through its now single unified ministry.

This brings me to the war. When first I heard the voice of Hitler on the radio—it was, I think, in 1937, or perhaps a little later—I *knew* that he intended at all costs to finish with, once and for all, the things dearest to my spirit—our English ways of thought, and morals and religion, the most precious heritage of humanity. That night in my College house at Didsbury constitutes the second great moral and spiritual experience of my life, and one very much more pervasive and controlling than that which came to me as a boy. It was a 'demoniac'—as the New Testament would call him—who was the instrument of this awakening. Certain things which followed that experience I cannot here write about, as they would reveal intimacies which must be buried or locked up, at least for the present. But this I must say. A strange deep feeling came over me from that moment every time I looked at an old Parish Church of this dear land. I *loved* their towers and their spires. I *saw* the men, the women, the boys, the girls who in centuries gone by had worshipped there: I *heard* the parson pray and preach and the people sing. I *felt* that they belonged to me and I to them. And I *knew*, with every fibre of my being, that I would be to the utmost with everyone who was determined to say 'Nay' to Hitler and his gang of international murderers from the jungle past of humanity.

But where, you ask, was the 'difficulty' for my decision here? Was not this experience the final incentive to joining this Church of the English people? It was, indeed, one of the final 'occasions'; but it also revealed, as by a lightning flash, the sorry state of divided Christendom in this land, its anaemic vitality, its confused mind, its sundered spirit, its uncertain message. And, as the obverse of this, it seemed to *compel* me to do nothing that would even have the semblance of creating further division or disunity in the whole Church of God here among this people of my fathers.

Now it had happened that in the Methodist Church there had been for years a very strongly 'pacifist' movement, chiefly among the ministers and students. I had, with my heart, though not yet with my mind, sympathized in a measure with the truth, at least, which lay at the heart of this 'pacifism': for I *knew* that it was the

result of an intense longing for the Kingdom of God in the world. But I also *knew* that the Kingdom of God would never come by our longings alone. We must be firmly based on the rock constitution of the universe itself in which God has placed us. And I *knew* that this constitution involved the enthronement of *righteousness* in the sanctuary of the mind and heart and will—*righteousness before peace*—and that God does not work out His plans by our inertia, or by our despairings, or by our so-called 'prayers' alone or by our fond wishes: but only as we have His Mind of Truth Justice and Unity, and as, therefore, we co-operate with Him to the—if necessary—sacrifice of every material possession and every physical heritage. Suffering in itself, so far from being an 'evil,' is the road to our final good, both for each man and for all men collectively. For that reason I felt that I must on no account even seem to sever myself from this dear Methodism which had been led astray by its own splendid qualities: but that I must do what I could to correct this misunderstanding which, I knew, would stultify the whole evangelistic mission and enfeeble still further its essential life. Oh what a difficulty had to be overcome here! The memory of hours I had spent with my students, the wrestling at their request with the problems, theological and religious, of this 'pacifism,' were a veritable brake on my spirit as it moved irresistibly towards full fellowship with the Church of England. What a tension was here! and what a tension, indeed, in a situation where I *knew* that the heritage of the whole nation was bound up with this Church of the English people; that this heritage could, as a matter of sheer brute history, be temporarily destroyed by the barbarians from the East of the Rhine; that my own Church had no complete understanding of these poignant possibilities, and that to seem to sever myself from her might well make confusion worse confounded.

But my final and greatest 'difficulty,' I must repeat and emphasize, was lest I should do anything to retard the growing unity of the whole Church of God. I must not write now of my deep interest in the 'ecumenical' movement, and of my many years of service on the Methodist Commission on Faith and Order, and of my own small contribution to our whole and devoted Methodist effort to promote Unity in South India. To write of my interest and concern for Unity would be to write a large book. Perhaps, however, I may be pardoned if, in the pages of the *Modern Churchman*, I write of my visit to the Modern Churchmen's Conference held at Girton, August-September, 1939. For this was a decisive step on the road I was travelling, though unknowingly at that time.

Girton, 1939, speaks to me, not chiefly of our theological discussions directed to an elucidation and full understanding of

he implications, applications and perplexities of the recently published *Report on Doctrine* — discussions which to me are memorable; for now, for the first time in my life, I was with Christians who fearlessly and with faith confronted the whole intellectual situation as they were able to understand it. No, Girton speaks to me *chiefly* of a prophetic act of the Modern Churchmen's Union in inviting me, a Methodist minister, at one of their morning Sacramental Services, to 'celebrate' Holy Communion according to the form of the Methodists — an invitation which had the blessing and full concurrence of an English Diocesan Bishop.[1] The Thursday, therefore, before Germany launched on that terrible Friday morning her murderous attack on Poland, is for ever memorable to me. As I hurried back prematurely that Friday with a Headmaster of one of our great schools, along the roads of England, and saw in villages and towns the children already evacuated from London, the call to Unity inherent in the Thursday morning service was insistent, persistent, and in the end irresistible.

I discussed this question of Unity with Dr. Temple more than two years ago when he preached the sermon in Manchester Cathedral at the opening of our Religion and Life Campaign in 1942. With an intimacy, possible only when none other is present, I told him my views, recalling Girton in September, 1939, and also suggesting that we might most fittingly conclude our Campaign in Manchester with a united Holy Communion in Manchester Cathedral.

> 'For,' said I, 'we have just been discussing intimately and frankly our difficulties in co-operating with the "Sword of the Spirit" movement, difficulties arising solely from the fact that the Romans will not customarily *pray* with us. Yet we believe God calls us to this co-operation in spite of this barrier to full fellowship and witness. And, you see, the Free Churches feel that a similar barrier exists between them and the Church of England, a barrier to full fellowship at that Table of the Lord which means, and must continue to mean, more than any other service of the Church can ever mean. Yet, in spite of this barrier, the Free Churches engage with full heart and mind in Manchester in this Religion and Life Campaign of common witness for Christ and common devotion to His Lordship and Leadership in the common tasks He has given us to accomplish: and they are not dissuaded from this co-operation by the violent words of their own inside critics or by the intransigent refusals of some members of the Church of England. But surely (I went on to add) the time has come for a decisive strategic act such as I am suggesting, when we can tell the whole community that we are truly and essentially at one in our service, indeed truly and essentially one in Christ, to the glory of God the Father.'

That is what I pleaded, though the exact words might have been, as is probable, more direct. Well, in this discussion I found that the Archbishop still had his hesitations at this point, hesitations which I respected, but which I ardently wished to be swept aside.

[1] The late Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich.—Ed., *M.C.*

It happens — sad and sombre memory — that the day before Dr Temple died I posted a letter to him in which I raised again some of these divisive issues which had been troubling us for twenty-five years in the Faith and Order Movement; but I have heard since from his chaplain in Canterbury that he did not see my letter.

This issue of Unity was, I can now see clearly, fundamental. I had taken a deeply-held position in Methodism on the methods of approach in South India and at home, and had expressed that position frequently in articles and in speech, as my friends and others constantly remind me. What a tension was here. Friends — those who did not know me very deeply — would conclude that I was denying what I had been saying for years. Others would probably say things that would destroy the peace of the Methodist Jerusalem, and throw back the day of full and free Unity.

This difficulty was increased by the very service to Unity we had been able to give in the Manchester area during the previous three and a half years. With the most helpful understanding and full co-operation on the part of the present Bishop of Manchester, and with the deeply sympathetic insight and encouragement of the Dean of Manchester, we had been able to make witness for Christ in a way which, some tell us, is unique in the history of Church Unity.

> 'At the Induction Service of the newly appointed first President of the Manchester, Salford and District Free Church Federal Council, the formal act of Induction was performed in an essentially Free Church way and according to Free Church traditions. Chiefly, the right hand of fellowship was given to the new President by ministers and laity (both men and women) representing all the constituent churches; and a Bible, not a chalice, was handed to him. The unique feature of this Act of Induction was the fact that the Bishop of Manchester joined the ministers and laity of the Free Churches in giving the right hand of fellowship, and then the Bishop himself prayed for the Divine Blessing on the participants and on the work for Unity and Common Witness then inaugurated.'

During the subsequent years of war this Unity has been yet further manifested, until now there is an understanding between the Church of England and the Free Churches — Moravian, Congregational, Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, and sections of the Welsh denominations in the area — such as had not been possible before. In this, all Christians, and others as well, have unfeignedly rejoiced.

It was at this point that a combination of reasons forced me to take a step which, although some might interpret it otherwise, the call of a greater and deeper Christian Unity seemed to demand from me *imperatively*.

My reasons for this step are, as I see them now, on three levels — spiritual, theological and ecclesiastical. In the depths of my spirit I had never *felt* that the separation of the Churches really

existed for me. I felt at home among all the followers of Jesus Christ—no matter what their ecclesiastical and theological allegiances—and I never felt excommunicated from anyone who did not *in his heart* excommunicate me. I do not claim any merit for this feeling. Some, indeed, will see in it a demerit. I am content to state it. Nor did I ever *feel* the denominational loyalties which mean so much that is precious to many of my friends. My loyalties have always been to ideas, to a spirit, to the truth of the heart, to the decisions of the will. This has been in part, also, true of my contacts with peoples other than our own English people, and with other forms of faith and worship. I suppose I must feel that it is the essentially *human* in us all which binds us to each other—not nation or race, or speech or skin, or even religion in its cultual and intellectual expressions. Surely it is this essentially *human* reality which is the highest work of God made known to us, and is, therefore, our clue to His own Being and Nature, without which clue we are doomed to a vacuum of agnostic negation. It is, indeed, this essentially *human* quality which is the presage of the goal of true Unity which He who is the ground and inspirer of all has purposed for His whole creation. For God is the God of all, the God not of the dead but of all the living.

I must take it that this is the deepest thing in my mind. It makes me feel the truth of St. Paul's great passage on Unity in *I Cor.* iii, or in St. John's many passages on the same lofty theme. It has always made me see and feel that all things are one.

When first I came to *feel* the Church of England, in the study of the Editor of this journal in the old Ripon Hall, Oxford, and went with him round the old walls and to the top of the Sheldonian, I *knew* that this was my real home. And there I must leave it, saying nothing at all here of the many other factors and impulses derived from my theological reading, and from my friends, and from architecture, and music, and drama, and literature, and the very soil of the English fields, and the woods, and the meadows, and the streams, and the inns, and the people. Here in this *ecclesia gentis Anglorum*, I must have dimly felt, is the English people in their variety, in their moral sincerity, in their commonsense practicality, in their wistful and uncertain spirituality, in their distrust of the Frenchman's logicality and of the German's diseasedly-romantic sentimentality, and in their native humour.

So I felt entirely at one with my own denominational founder, John Wesley, the Great Itinerant of the Church of England, and her greatest evangelist, when he wrote to Sir Harry Trelawney, the descendant of one of the seven bishops who were committed to the Tower in the reign of James II. Sir Harry had recently, after some theological and ecclesiastical vagaries, been ordained

in the national Church and become established in Oxford afte being a dissenting minister in West Looe, Cornwall.

> 'You have need to be thankful on another account likewise; that i that your prejudices against the Church of England are removing Having had an opportunity of seeing several of the churches abroad, an having deeply considered the several sorts of Dissenters at home, I ar fully convinced that our own Church, with all her blemishes, is nearer th scriptural plan than any other in Europe. I sincerely wish you may retai your former zeal for God, only, that it may be a zeal according to know ledge. But there certainly will be danger of your sinking into a careless lukewarm state, without any zeal or spirit at all. As you were surfeite with an irrational, unscriptural religion, you may easily slide into n religion at all, or into a dead form, that will never make you happy eithe in this world, or in that which is to come.'

Wesley wrote this in 1780, when he was 77 years of age and most of his great itinerary labours were behind him, and also behind him and around him the opposition of his own Mother Church to his unwonted and unfettered zeal for the Kingdom of God.

All this and much more I felt when I wrote to the President of the Methodist Conference on Wednesday, October 25, of this year. In my letter I said among other things:

> 'I know now that I can best serve the Kingdom of God in the Church from which John Wesley *had* to come out (at least, as many others, though not himself, maintain he *came out* to undertake his evangelistic, reviving, itinerant work) as I believe providentially. . . . And whatever I may be called to do I trust and believe that I shall be true to the essential spirit and emphasis of Methodism. I deeply hope that the bonds of affection and esteem between myself and many of my brethren in the Methodist ministry will endure. At least there is no severance in *my* heart.'

Some of the same things I said also to Dr. Temple in the letter already mentioned.

> On October 31, the day of the Archbishop's funeral, a ministerial Congregational friend — venturing half-humorously and half sadly to associate my 'passing' from the Free Church with the physical passing of William Temple — greeted me with the words: 'So there have been *two* ecclesiastical deaths since last we met!' My spontaneous reply was: 'No, in neither case a death: in each case a translation, one to the higher service of Heaven, the other to fuller service upon earth.'

In my letter to the President of the Methodist Conference, stating my intention to enter the Church of England, I did not go into my many 'reasons.' But he naturally raised the question in his reply, enquiring whether I had 'any doctrinal or ecclesiastical dissatisfaction with the principles of the Methodist Church.' I may not quote his letter, though a reference to the issue thus raised is essential to an understanding of my own mind and to the tasks of the future, as I perceive them.

My reply showed unmistakably that the step I was taking had nothing to do with any change or dissatisfaction about the 'principles' of Methodism. They are indeed the same 'principles' as

those of the Church of England. Nor will I stay to cite here passages from Wesley or from later Methodists. It is sufficient for those who, outside Methodism, would understand its essential position on doctrine to note the following crucial statement from the Deed of Union of the recently united Methodist Church:

> 'The doctrines of the Evangelical Faith which Methodism has held from the beginning and still holds are based upon the Divine revelation recorded in Holy Scripture. The Methodist Church acknowledges this revelation as the supreme rule of faith and practice.'

It is interesting and important to note that the last Lambeth Conference maintained a similar position:

> 'We affirm the supreme and unshaken authority of the Holy Scriptures as presenting the truth concerning God and the spiritual life in its historical setting and in its historical revelation. It is no part of the purpose of the Scriptures to give information on those themes which are the proper subject of scientific enquiry. The doctrine of God is the centre of its teaching, set forth in its Books by diverse portions in diverse manners. As Jesus Christ is the crown, so also is He the criterion of all revelation.'

Thus I can see no difference whatever theologically between Methodism and the Mother Church of England. There is another important matter of agreement between Methodism and the Church of England, and that is on the right relation of the Church to the State in this country. It is common knowledge that throughout her history Methodism, especially, of course, Mother Methodism, the Wesleyan Methodist Church, never adopted the decided independent attitude which has characterized the 'Dissenting' Churches. That attitude was rendered impossible both by her history through Wesley himself and through her essentially English genius for practical compromise — a genius she derives, of course, from her own Mother the Church of England. Sufficient, however, to say that most Methodists still are unable to see any necessary incompatibility between the State recognition of the Christian Religion — which ought, in my own judgement, at all costs to be preserved, in the interests of Unity—and between the task and mission of the Church to the English people.

I see no necessary incompatibility between such recognition and that freedom in Christ of the whole Church in this island as regards its own special spiritual and theological concerns. Neither State nor Church, I hope, will ever acquiesce in such a doctrine of binding incompatibility between these two equally essential principles. Nor can I contemplate any such future acquiescence, save as this people and Church ceases from the high mission for humanity at large to which God has called them. *Noblesse oblige*: which, being interpreted, means the inner compulsion of a noble heritage. Let this people and this Church ever dare — as in the present unprecedented world conflict — to be her own true self. It will not then be false to any man, to any nation, or to the whole human family of God upon earth.

BOOK REVIEWS

G.K.C.: ARTIST, AUTHOR AND APOLOGIST *

The Roman Church knows well how to make the best use of her converts. After G. K. Chesterton became a Roman Catholic in 1926 Miss Ward tells us that there followed a hectic period of lionising. 'Requests poured in, for lectures, for articles, for introductions to books.' 'Are there no Catholics to do things?' Mrs. Chesterton asked. Chesterton was being exploited and Miss Ward's biography continues the process of exploitation, as the biography of a distinguished convert written by a devout Roman Catholic must do in duty bound. Chesterton is presented to us not only as a brilliant writer and gifted artist, but as a thinker, theologian, and sociologist of the first order. Miss Ward traces his voyage from the agnosticism fashionable at the beginning of the century to his conversion to Rome and naively leaves her readers to draw the obvious conclusion that if such a genius embraced the Roman faith as the truth, lesser mortals should be ready to follow the example set for them.

That Chesterton was a writer and artist of the first rank no one would dispute. Except for the sexual urge which played little or no part in his life, the primitive joys and desires of men, the love of song, wine, soil, children and countryside dominated his personality and his writing. Life was for him a matter of instinct, intuition, and feeling. In the day to day business of living he was like a child, his amusements were those of children, the child and the common man he preferred as neighbours and playmates to the sophisticated society of the literary world.

Miss Ward gives us many examples of his inability to keep engagements, and of his complete indifference to money, while his greatest amusement was provided by a toy-theatre. He preferred Beaconsfield to Bloomsbury; the most famous hero of his stories was Napoleon of Notting Hill; his best beloved hero in history was Nelson, because

> 'he remains the incarnation of a spirit in the English that is purely poetic, so poetic that it fancies itself a thousand things and sometimes even fancies itself prosaic' (p. 356).

His dependence upon his instincts enabled him to penetrate beneath words to the unconscious mind of writers for whom he had a natural sympathy and with whom he was spiritually akin. 'The function of criticism,' he wrote (p. 156),

> 'if it has a legitimate function at all, can only be one function — that of dealing with the subconscious part of the author's mind which only the critic can express, not with the conscious part of the author's mind which the author himself can express.'

He carried out this principle in his books on Dickens and Browning, both of which are generally acknowledged to be masterpieces. Dickens' facility for discovering the comic and the grotesque in the apparently commonplace and Browning's robust optimism found a response in the mind of Chesterton.

With an impulsive nature went a powerful imagination and an equable temperament. His stories with their fantastic twists and turns: the immortal Father Brown: his poems (some of which, such as 'The White Horse,' achieve greatness) show the wealth and power of his imagination. Miss Ward reveals to us a man whom no accident ever upset and who never transferred his hatreds from the causes which created them to those who championed them. Even his invective against the first Lord Reading was directed against

* *Gilbert Keith Chesterton*, by Maisie Ward. (Sheed and Ward. 1944. 21/-.)

what Chesterton believed he represented, not against him personally. As Mr. Swinnerton wrote of him (p. 516 and 517) :

> 'One reason for the love of Chesterton was that while he fought he sang songs of chivalry, and in spite of all his seriousness warred against wickedness rather than a fleshly opponent.'

Out of that balanced temperment sprang his abundant humour. He enchanted the most sophisticated assemblies into roars of spontaneous laughter.

Chesterton was brought up in the atmosphere of optimistic agnosticism prevalent at the end of the last century. His father is described as a liberal Christian who sometimes went to hear sermons by Stopford Brooke. He was not, however, given any specific Christian training in his youth, but was left to listen to the popular doctrine of inevitable progress and a mechanical universe. To Chesterton, in whom instinct and imagination demanded free satisfaction, such doctrine was detestable.

> 'I felt in my bones, first, that this world does not explain itself . . . There was something personal in the world, as in a work of art. Whatever it meant, it meant violently. Thirdly, I thought this purpose beautiful in its old design in spite of its defects, such as dragons. Fourth, that the proper form of thanks to it is in some form of humility and restraint. . . . All this I felt and the age gave me no encouragement to feel it' (pp. 183 and 184).

His even temperament rejected the fashionable superstitions of his youth. *Heretics*, published in 1905, pricked the bubbles of atheism, pessimism, materialism, and progress. 'As enunciated to-day progress is simply a comparative of which we have not settled the superlative' (*Heretics*, p. 27). Chesterton himself stated that his acceptance of orthodox Christian theology grew 'out of his feelings about the men of his youth who labelled themselves Optimists and Pessimists.' Both he felt were wrong.

> 'It must be possible at once to love and hate the world . . . And the Church solved this difficulty by her doctrine of original sin' (p. 184).

Chesterton possessed the *anima naturaliter Christiana*. In Catholicism he found what his rich, warm nature demanded. 'Instinct after instinct was answered by doctrine after doctrine' (*Orthodoxy*, pp. 142-4, quoted p. 185). Outward circumstance made Chesterton's conversion to Catholicism certain. By his marriage he was brought into touch with the Anglo-Catholic circle of which Scott Holland was the centre. To judge from Miss Ward's biography this connection did not lead Chesterton to any attachment to the established Church or to any acquaintance with its worship and historic position. The Anglo-Catholics were for him not a party within the Church of England, but the exponents of a religious and social doctrine which he found congenial and accepted as true. At the same time he became a close friend of Hilaire Belloc, whose interpretation of English history and continental intransigeance in politics found a warm rsponse in Chesterton's rich imagination. Henceforth for him mediaeval Europe had been heaven on earth and the Reformation the greatest blunder in English history. The ground had thus been long prepared for his submission to Rome in 1923, when Chesterton addressed an Anglo-Catholic meeting and found that all his references to the Pope were cheered while those to the Archbishop of Canterbury were ignored. He thereupon decided to follow the example of his brother and his wife. Chesterton's conversion in itself is not surprising; it is surprising that it was so long delayed and that such a trifle proved the occasion for it. Chesterton's needs, however, were spiritual without being specifically religious. He wanted a world in which his warm nature could be at home rather than the help of a church in which he could pray. He was never a regular worshipper in the Church of England

and was an infrequent communicant after he became a Roman Catholic. The faith, which Chesterton's instincts led him to adopt, he brilliantly defended within the limits of verbal argumentation. As he was by nature incapable of analysis, Chesterton, like a former distinguished convert to Rome, Wilfred Ward, had no understanding of scientific and historical methods. The logical implications of the biological sciences, contemporary biblical and ecclesiastical studies were unperceived by him. An American psychologist, Dr. Horace T. Bridges, with whom once Chesterton debated while he was on a tour in America, discovered in Chesterton's subconscious

> 'a certain intellectual recklessness that made him indifferent to truth and reality . . . fundamentally — perhaps I should say subconsciously — he he was a thorough-going sceptic and acted upon the principle that, since we cannot really be positive about anything, we had better believe what it pleases us to believe' (p. 498).

Chesterton, because he was at heart a sceptic, abhorred the scientific conception of truth as probable and provisional. Once he accepted a proposition he defended it by all the devices open to the formal logician, and because he was not inhibited by the necessity of weighing evidence or considering context and relevance, his reasoning possessed a superficial brilliance and often appeared to carry the day. Chesterton found the weak spots in the fashionable philosophies of his time by drawing from their premisses conclusions opposite to those generally inferred and yet verbally just as justifiable. Thus Mr. Blatchford might argue that because there are many myths parallel to the Christian story, therefore it is also a myth. Chesterton replies that a multitude of myths parallel to the Christian story bears witness to its truth, since men would naturally dream of what God had planned for them (p. 173). Chesterton's brilliant use of paradox only showed the inconclusiveness of *a priori* argument. Its employment led him to sophistry, the child of that ambiguity which lurks in all metaphors, analogies and abstractions. Thus Chesterton could argue, 'People say that you can never put the clock back; but they can and often do.' We know of course that actual clocks can be put back, but the saying, 'you cannot put the clock back,' means that there is a direction in history which cannot be reversed. It is only sophistry to argue that because actual clocks can be put back, the past can be recreated. Chesterton fully deserved the title 'defender of the faith.' He brilliantly defended scholastic theology in the only way in which it can be defended, *i.e.* by the *a priori* method, literary brilliance, and formal argument.

As we read Miss Ward's well-documented biography the portrait which it draws reminds us of Aristophanes. In a similar age of criticism, he upheld the apparent sanity of ancient ways and ancient faiths contrasted with new fads and superstitions; he admired the threatened independence of the peasant farmer and small tradesman; he saw the past clothed in gold and the future in black; his intuitions often hit the target and often missed. He will be remembered not as the defender of an ancient creed, but as the embodiment in prose and verse of the English spirit in an age which afforded little encouragement to its expression in the life of the common man.

H. C. Snape.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE GOSPELS*

The gospels, Prof. Tasker holds, are neither history nor biography, although they contain both. They are based ultimately on the oral teaching given by early Christian missionaries, the main purpose of which was doctrinal. The core of this teaching was what we find in I *Cor.* xv, 18, 'that

* *The Nature and Purpose of the Gospels,* by R. V. G. Tasker, B.D. (S.C.M. Press. 1944. 5/-.)

Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures and rose again the third day.' In this oral teaching special prominence would be given to sayings of Jesus which would be of help to Christians in meeting the practical problems with which they were faced, *e.g.* how far was the Jewish law binding on them as Christians? Were they expected to pay taxes to Caesar? Generally speaking, Prof. Tasker accepts the results of modern historical and literary criticism, but not everyone will agree with him that a single document lies behind the passages in Matthew and Luke which have a greater or less degree of verbal resemblance, and are not found in Mark, nor in thinking that Papias's account of the origin of the second gospel is wholly satisfactory. He deals with each gospel separately, stating its nature and purpose. In Matthew the dominating note is that Jesus has fulfilled Jewish prophecy and that in Jesus Judaism found the final fulfilment of its hopes. This naturally raises the question of the argument from prophecy. Mr. Tasker admits that Matthew's 'use of the Old Testament has not that penetrating insight which characterized Jesus' use of it,' but that like other Christians he felt that the Old Testament must foretell details in the life of the Messiah. This adequately accounts for the fact that Matthew introduces his quotations from the Old Testament with the formula 'that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet,' but it does not prove that the argument from prophecy is a valid one, for, pressed to its logical conclusion, it lands us in determinism. The least satisfactory chapter in the book is that on Luke.

Of this gospel he writes, 'it is a self-conscious literary creation,' and its peculiar subject matter 'comes from a later period of Church history when an attempt was being made to produce work of conscious literary merit which would appeal to the Greek world.' I am at a loss to understand what this means. *Prima facie* it would seem to mean either that the sayings and incidents therein recorded are more or less fictitious, or that they are a genuine tradition whose value was not perceived till a later date in Church history than the traditions preserved in *Matthew* and *Mark*. If the latter be the meaning, it would enhance rather than diminish the value of the Lucan tradition. Mr. Tasker thinks that the desire for a religion 'which stresses the love of God at the expense of his severity led many eagerly to accept the proto-Luke theory'—a charge which appears to me as unfair as it is untrue.

Again he says:

> 'it is misleading to say that the parable of the prodigal son contains "the Gospel within the Gospels" and to deduce from it that no doctrine of atonement is vital to Christianity.'

But what Christian does? Surely those who hold that the parable of the prodigal son is 'the Gospel within the Gospels' can and do hold Abelard's doctrine of the Atonement.

There is an excellent chapter, perhaps the best in the book, on 'The Kingdom of God in Jewish expectation.' The book as a whole is well arranged, well written, well thought out and worth reading even if on several points, *e.g.* the value of Luke's presentation of the gospel, or the argument from prophecy, the reader has reached conclusions which differ widely from the author's. It would I think have made the book more valuable had the author stated categorically what theory of the Atonement he holds and whether he considers nature miracles such as the walking on the water and the turning of water into wine to be historical facts or not. True, he says that stories of miracles were told because they were 'effective signs that in Jesus God had broken through into human history,' but in another place Mr. Tasker asserts of the *Gospel of Mark* it

'is not a purely objective and disinterested account of the life of Jesus

but a setting forth in narrative form of the Gospel as it was preached by the Christian Church'; and again, 'if by some miracle a modern reporter had been in Palestine and had witnessed the things that Jesus said and did and had at once written up the story, the result would have been something very different from the Gospel of Mark and from one point of view more true.'

But Mr. Tasker does not tell us in what respect it would have been more true.

Unless I have misunderstood the passages I have just quoted, Mr. Tasker has not faced the dilemma which every historical critic must face, *viz.* as Bishop Strong once said

'on a particular day at a particular hour in a particular place, an alleged event either did or did not happen.'

E. R. Buckley.

THE MEANING OF THE CROSS*

There is nothing in literature more moving than the Gospel stories of the Cross. But the temperature of emotion falls headlong when one passes from the story to attempts at its interpretation. The fifteen contributors to the symposium, *What the Cross means to me*, would be the first to agree. They have all given much study to the question, for the Cross stands at the heart of the Christian message. Also, some of them are trained theologians. But when one has followed the meaning as far as one is able, when one has used the best language at one's command to express what one believes, it is still too little and too weak. The Cross remains a mystery undiscovered.

Some of the contributors have given a personal answer. 'What does the Cross mean *to me?*' All who have written sermons for Good Friday know how difficult this question is. One's knowledge of various theories of the Atonement is apt to get in one's way, blurring the outlines of the Gospel story. Famous phrases in which the saints have tried to describe their experiences tempt one to seize on their words when one ought to choose one's own. For it is quite likely that one has not penetrated their meaning, or one's experience may have been different from their's. Insincerity about the Cross is intolerable. It is like treachery. But suppose one has a real experience and decides to describe it; again, great difficulties face one. For experiences are personal and individual. It is hard to explain to others what one has felt in one's heart.

Personal answers, if they are sincere, are likely to be one-sided, and so to be condemned by theologians as inadequate. Dr. Major, who gives a personal answer, has had the courage to ignore this charge; his contribution is noteworthy for its simplicity, directness, and honesty. The Symposium reaches its highest point in the contribution of Dr. R. Roberts, a Presbyterian. A strong framework of doctrine underlies his work; but like the bones of the human body, they give support, while remaining themselves unseen. His eloquence is his own, not a mosaic of scraps from the eloquence of others. His statement is personal, in the way that a first-class sermon is personal; he makes it quite clear that the Cross is a part of universal history; but, as he writes for contemporary readers, he illustrates its meaning from the needs of to-day.

Dr. Roberts gives us a theology of the Cross, which is convincing, moving and complete. He shows clearly the two sides of the doctrine, first, the objective; this is an act of God in history, God intervening in the temporal order to redeem mankind. And secondly, the subjective; man's redemption remains unfulfilled unless he responds to the revelation of the Cross. The Atonement is God reconciling man to Himself.

* *What the Cross means to me*: A Theological Symposium. James Clarke & Co. 1944. 7/6.)

'And now we know that we have to do with a *forgiving* God. But what is forgiveness? It is many things; it is cleaning the slate and giving the offender another chance. It is to free the sinner and to write off his guilt. It is to obliterate the past with its contumacy and disobedience. But all this is negative; and the divine forgiveness is positive. We are also *reconciled*. The enemy is made friend. The prodigal is found and restored. It is Atonement, in the original sense of that noble word. The act of forgiveness is from beginning to end a direct affair between persons. Its source is the free, unmediated Grace of God; its destination is the penitent sinner' (p. 138).

Dr. Roberts also insists that man is not saved unless he responds to the offer of God's forgiveness. God respects man's freedom. He does not save him against his will. The Atonement is the parable of the Prodigal Son in history. This is the general line of interpretation followed by the contributors to this symposium. Many of them have chosen to give a general and theological rather than a personal answer. Among these, the best come from Dr. C. J. Cadoux and Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson, whose writings are well-known. Dr. Cadoux summarises his theory as follows:

'The redemptive virtue of Jesus' suffering on the Cross lies in the fact that, being the natural and inevitable outcome of His love for those who hated Him, it embodied in itself and expresses to us the suffering which God, because He loves us, feels at all our sin; that if this self-revelation of God's costly love is responded to by us with due docility and seriousness, its effect is to humble and convince us, that our eyes are opened to our own sinfulness and to the goodness and pardoning love of God; that, thus convinced, we trust, repent, are reconciled to Him, and empowered to live thereafter in fellowship with Him and free from the sins that had parted us from Him' (p. 35).

Three points in the meaning of the Cross receive general emphasis in this symposium. First, the Cross reveals the universality and the wickedness of sin. In the drama of the Cross we see pure white resisting black. Jesus was innocent and entirely good. And yet those who were responsible for His death were not worse than other men; their sins are the same as those of men and women to-day and at all periods of history. Secondly, the Cross proves to us what is the cost to God of our redemption, and how He suffers with and for us. Thirdly, the Cross has established a new rule of living, a new standard of greatness. It embodies the principle of the Christian life, that the greatest is he who gives most service to God and to his fellowmen. 'I am among you as he that serveth.' These last two principles give some difficulty to two contributors whose standpoint is rather different from the others; Mr. Bede Frost of the Benedictine Order (Anglican) and Father V. White, a Dominican. Early Christian theology, through the unfortunate influence of Greek Philosophy, was convinced that human nature and divine nature were essentially different; and therefore in order to be orthodox Mr. Frost and Father White cannot allow that God suffers in any simple and direct way. Father White also is convinced that human love and divine love are totally different. Therefore man's love for his fellowmen cannot have the redeeming quality of the divine love.

'St. Thomas had shown that divine love must differ not only in degree but in kind from all created love. One creature loves another because of the good he perceives in him. The Uncaused does not love us "because" we are good; on the contrary, we are good because He loves us. His grace and love are creative of any good or love we can have. Thus St. John's "We love Him, because He first loved us," implies something much more profound than the arousing of a purely human love of which we are the authors and disposers' (p. 159).

Theory has here misled St. Thomas into saying what is simply not true. Human love has the same redeeming power as divine love, though of course in a much less degree. To quote Dr. Wright:

> 'The redemptive activity of the living God in all history, uniquely incarnate when Perfect Morality was wedded to Perfect Spirituality in Jesus Christ, has been revealed in every disinterested search for truth, in every thought of holiness, in every sacrificial deed. It has been expressed in words by artist and thinker, by prophet and martyr . . . It has been nobly uttered in the old poem:
>
> Many man for Christes love
> Was martyred in Romayne,
> Er any Christendom was knowe there,
> Or any cros honoured' (p. 188).

St. Paul rejoiced that he could fill up in part that which was lacking in the sufferings of Christ. It is possible for all who love to do the same, whether they acknowledge Christ or not.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

A LAYMAN SPEAKS *

It would certainly be surprising if the minds of the general public were not to-day in a state of unrest, not only with regard to religion, but with regard to other matters too. The present unrest in religion is not likely to be banished by the conspiracy of silence which blankets it. The newspapers are afraid of the subject, and the B.B.C. puts us off with discussions in which crucial issues are studiously ignored. As an acute yet sympathetic critic of their programmes has remarked,

> 'A discussion which rules out first principles is not the kind to attract the millions of young citizens-in-arms who are willing to think about religion so long as they are not required, so to speak, to pass a spiritual Means Test.'

Earnest pleas are made by our 'religious leaders' to the young to rally to religion, but so long as the suspicion prevails that the bottom has fallen out of church and chapel religion, those pleas will not be heeded. The young are attracted by what is manifestly alive, and not by what is moribund or dead.

The anonymous author of *The Unrest in Religion** is not one of that young generation, but 'brought up in a Victorian home in which the piety was real and Church observances were natural and regular.' He belongs, in other words, to a cultured generation endowed with 'a certain genius for the past and for the continuities of religious expression,' enabling it 'to fill a traditional ceremonial with contemporary meaning.' But our young people to-day, educated on scientific and technological lines, are less able, and less willing, to stretch compromise to breaking point. They ask bluntly whether a doctrine is true and what is the evidence for it.

The author is aware that it is not so much Natural Science as the New Learning that has created problems for traditional orthodoxy. He speaks of

> 'the profound changes brought about in Biblical knowledge and ancient ecclesiastical assumptions by the immense advance in scholarship and study which has marked the last seventy, and more particularly the last fifty, years. In many respects this amounts to little less than a revolution in thought.'

He suggests that the time is ripe for the clergy to make it quite plain what is their attitude in these matters, by answering questions such as the following:

* *The Unrest in Religion.* By 'Erasmian.' (G. Allen & Unwin. 6/-. 1944.)

'What is the real history and meaning of certain difficult though familiar formulas repeated in our churches every week? How did they arise? What gives them their peculiar sanction? What to modern minds do they convey? How far can they bind the congregations which repeat them? How far do our bishops and clergy now regard them as strictly binding on themselves? What in fact is the Church's message to the rising generation, and will she under present conditions help us to solve the troubles which lie ahead?'

That 'Erasmian' himself is not afraid of biblical criticism is made clear by his two chapters, 'Our Knowledge of Jesus' and 'The Story of the Gospels'; nor of historical inquiry by his chapter on 'The Making of the Creeds.' One could not wish for a clearer, more candid, or more straightforward and readable account of the results of modern scholarship than is contained in these hundred pages. The author does not mince matters; his authorities are not those scholars who mix the water of edification with the ink of truth, but men like Kirsopp Lake, F. C. Burkitt, Bethune-Baker, Montefiore, Streeter, Loisy, Guignebert.

'Erasmian' is optimistic enough to attach considerable importance to the Report on *Doctrine in the Church of England*. Granted that this document contains some useful admissions and concessions, the fact remains that the great body of the clergy, many of whom have never read it, have no sympathy with it and regard it, not without reason, as a dead letter, a temporary bowing in the temple of Rimmon, a politic concession to 'liberalism,' soon to be forgotten, and by no means a foretaste of good things to come.

'There are those,' writes the author, '—their number must be steadily increasing — to whom it seems that the numbing influence of ancient dogmas has contributed more than anything else to the decay of religion in English life, and that, unless we can escape from that obsession, no religion worth the name will long survive.'

'Is it not the spirit of discipleship,' he asks, 'to what Jesus taught His followers that we all need to return? Is it not from the unnatural superstructure built upon it, described in the *Doctrinal Report* as "systematic speculation," but including baffling combinations of theology and metaphysics, elements of miracle, of legend, of ancient and perplexing cults, that we are groping our way, not quite unhopefully, towards a larger freedom now?'

'Erasmian' puts forward a plea for an official statement by the ecclesiastical authorities

'acknowledging that certain formulas now used in our services are archaic and unacceptable to many, that some of them would be better dispensed with altogether, and that on others much liberty of interpretation ought to be allowed.

'For it is the impossibility of continuing to affirm our blind belief in theories and assertions which we must admit to be largely founded on error, that is the main cause of the unrest in religion and the main obstacle to its revival to-day.'

The trouble would seem to be that dogma, of which the proper function is to be a means to the spiritual life by giving the mind a foothold, has been turned into an end in itself, thus crushing creative freedom. The cause of this perversion is that religious institutions and corporations have a spiritual vested interest in certain dogmas which must not be disturbed. 'Erasmian' has made a timely appeal which we trust may not pass altogether unheeded. We regret that he has allowed it to lose some of its force through being anonymous.

J.C.H.

BRUNNER'S DIVINE-HUMAN ENCOUNTER*

English readers are indebted to Professor Brunner's notable books for their understanding of the dialectical movement and the new Biblical theology. It is to Brunner, perhaps even more than to Barth, that our knowledge of the theological revolt is due. His contribution to the Biblical understanding of truth is generally unpalatable to Liberal Churchmen who would question the pre-suppositions upon which it rests. But the scholarly and weighty character of his books demands patient and appreciative consideration. His recent work, *The Divine-Human Encounter*,* originally a course of lectures at the University of Upsala, provides a useful introduction to his thought. Much of what Brunner has said before is here said again. The compression of thought and the rather cumbrous translation make the book concentrated reading.

Brunner's thesis is that the object-subject antithesis which has dominated western thought throughout the Christian era has been applied to the understanding of the Bible with disastrous results.

> 'The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped by the object-subject antithesis, on the contrary it is falsified through it.'

Objectivism and subjectivism have been the snares of Christianity from the earliest times. They are both false; they preclude the Biblical understanding of truth.

> 'Where the heart of faith is concerned — the relation between God's word and faith, between Christ and faith — the objective-subjective correlation must be replaced by one of an entirely different kind.'

By objectivism Brunner means the elemental tendency, arising from man's anxious sinful nature, to construct a system of ecclesiastical assurances, of dogmas, institutions, and *ex opere operato* sacraments by which man can dispose of God's Word, God's grace, and God's sacraments. Man secures for his own administration and disposal that which in essence cannot be disposed. By subjectivism he means the equally elemental tendency to freedom and spontaneity which relies on the assurances of individual religious experience. This individualistic enthusiasm, which is as old as the Church itself, is seen, for example, in German pietism, which, in spite of its tokens of the spirit, brings the individual into the centre of the picture. Protestantism in the nineteenth century, especially in some of its trans-atlantic manifestations, became more and more subjective until the Great War swept away what Brunner calls 'this hollowed-out, this empty theology.'

The solution Brunner holds does not lie midway between objectivism and subjectivism. This hallowed tradition must be swept away so that Biblical truth may arise to a new splendour. What is this Biblical truth? It is the Divine-Human encounter, not an object-subject relation, but an I-Thou relation, a personal correspondence.

> 'That God in His Word does not speak "something" but Himself also changes the way of "speaking." God Himself speaks to myself: that is to say, His speaking is address. Previously we expressed it in this way: God delivers to us no course of lectures in dogmatic theology; He submits and explains to us no confession of faith. He does not say to me, "I am the Lord, thy God." His word is claim and promise, gift and demand. Likewise "knowing" also acquires a new meaning. No longer is it a question of the insertion of something into the knowledge I possess, the expansion of the intellectual riches at my disposal; but it is answering personally when personally addressed, and hence obedient,

* *The Divine-Human Encounter*, by Emil Brunner. (S.C.M. Press. 1944. 8/6.)

thankful confession and prayer. Here as above the third person is replaced by the second person. "I am the Lord, thy God," bespeaks the answer, "Yes, I am Thy obedient servant and Thy child." The true form of faith is hence not the so-called declaration of faith, the formulated Credo which has been learned, but prayer; even as the word of God is not a formulated "to the believer," but challenging, freely given address. The antithesis between Object and Subject, between "something truthful" and "knowledge of this truth," has disappeared and has been replaced by the purely personal meeting between the accosting God and the answering man.'

This, argues Brunner, was Luther's understanding of Biblical truth. Luther freed himself from the spell of the false Object-Subject antithesis and re-discovered the original Biblical understanding of truth. It is for this same re-discovery that Brunner pleads, and he proceeds to examine the meaning of justifying faith, doctrine and the Church in the light of this Biblical understanding of truth.

So far so good. If the dialectical theology helps to make the Christian religion vital and theocentric, it will prove a good dose of medicine. But it is not a balanced diet. It is significant that in a book on the Biblical understanding of truth there are so few Bible references, and what few there are are mainly Pauline. The revelation of the Word in the Bible is not so uniform or so 'singular' as Brunner's thesis demands. In spite of his repeated assertions about the total revelation of the Bible, he is himself guilty of that kind of selection from the Scriptures which he so much deplores in liberal theologians.

For Brunner critical questions do not cease to exist, they cease to matter. God addresses us and what He says is Himself. The Bible is certainly concerned with the Divine-Human encounter, with the action of God, rather than with His Being, with a God who confronts man. But, unless the Divine truth apprehended in the encounter is to remain static and to become stagnant, the reflective, the critical, the selective must follow on the encounter. Then at once we are back to religious experience, and to the snare of subjectivism, from which Brunner would escape. We are back to the object-subject correlation of the word of God and faith which Brunner finds so false and misleading. It is premature to assess the fate of the Dialectical Theology; but it may well be that the wheel will again turn full circle and that that from which Brunner and his followers revolt will be that to which willy-nilly they return.

W. G. Fallows.

A MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

The high aim and life-endeavour of Dr. H. W. Clark is to bring Christian mysticism within the reach of the understanding and practice of the ordinary man and woman. This he has done in three notable volumes*: *The Philosophy of Christian Experience, The Christian Method of Ethics,* and *The Cross and the Eternal Order.* He has nothing in common with those who regard reason and mysticism as incompatible. This is most clearly demonstrated in his *Christian Method of Ethics,* where he shows how ethics and mysticism may act and re-act on one another. His mysticism is rational; in fact, the title of his article in *The Harvard Theological Review,* Volume IV, July 1911, is 'Rational Mysticism and New Testament Christianity.' An objector may be tempted to interpose, 'Surely Dr. Clark has confused the moral and the

* *The Cross and the Eternal Order,* by Henry W. Clark. (Lutterworth Press. 1943. 14/-.)
The Philosophy of Christian Experience. Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier. 1906.
The Christian Method of Ethics. Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier. 1908.

metaphysical, the spiritual and the pneumatic.' Doubtless there is a perennial difference in human nature between the mystical and the non-mystical types and it would be hopeless to try to effect a reconciliation in the space of a brief review. We would, however, suggest that the difference is more fundamental still; it is between two conceptions of communion with God, one according to which Divine communion is something real, and the other in which it is regarded as merely *gedankenmässig* — in fact not a communion with God at all, but preoccupation with thought about God.

Christ, writes Dr. Clark in both books, is far more than a revelation of God. He is the divine life setting itself into channels of self-communication to man. Not only does Christ as it were contain God, but He passes God into man. If Christ be actually and literally the Life-giver — the One who, possessing God's life within Himself, transmits God's life into man — then there remains but one thing for us to do. For receiving Christ, we receive life, and receiving life, we receive all. Although Dr. Clark does not give an explanation of the Christian sacraments, his leading idea of Christ as the Life-giver is most conducive to a fruitful interpretation of them. Indeed, this is the background which true sacramentalism implies, the foundation on which it is built.

One of the finest passages in *The Philosophy of Christian Experience* is that in which he finds the Incarnation established on philosophic grounds:

> 'If the end of the evolutionary process, so far as it has been worked up to in man, is to be turned back to, and to be once more connected with, the Source and Beginning out of which it came, it is in the natural line of things that the Source, which is God Himself, should step down, as it were, to complete the final junction which man has failed to complete. Once a theistic view of the universe as a whole is reached, a descent of God to the world, where man in his arrested development stands waiting, is the most strictly philosophic doctrine that can be conceived.'

The reader is tempted to put a marginal note, like that which the monks of old used to insert, 'Let Plato hearken! Let the author of the *Corpus Hermeticum* give ear!' In spite of Dr. Clark's modest disclaimer, it is hard to see how words like these can be regarded otherwise than as the best piece of Christian apologetic that was ever written. Certainly *The Philosophy of Christian Experience* is the best modern re-statement of religion on its practical side.

The Cross and the Eternal Order is an attempt to understand the place and function of Christ within the divine plan of restoring the development of the world-process to the right lines—of securing the voluntary immersion of the life of man in the life of God. The idea of Christ as Life-giver is made fundamental. The conception of redemption as consisting solely in the death of Christ or solely in faith in that death — the great heresy of Western Christendom — is refuted, and the writer has done a good work for Christian unity in teaching that the Cross and the Resurrection are two sides of the same precious jewel, thus bringing Western thought into line with the teaching of the Christian East. He regards the Cross as having been necessary in order that the local Christ might become the universal Christ and that He might be the giver of life to all men at all times. If we accept Dr. Clark's teachings, as in essentials I think we must, we shall have to see that certain tenets of Reformation theology are given up or completely transformed. According to this theology, man is justified in the forensic sense of being declared righteous by faith in Christ's death and in that alone, which is conceived as a payment by a substitute of the penalty due from man. After this act of faith, man is regarded by God as innocent and as a fit recipient of divine favour, although he has not altered his habits at all but continues to

cherish the same evil passions which he indulged before. Justification is simply a matter of changed status; it has nothing whatever to do, according to the spokesmen of Reformation teaching, with any inner change of life and character. Sanctification is a subsequent process, by which grace conceived Calvinistically as overpowering or else as working with the co-operation of the will, effects in man a work of moral and spiritual correction and progress. There is no proper connection between the first event and the second. The latter is a fresh and independent outpouring of grace. The view certainly seems crude to the modern mind, but we should be wrong if we attributed that appearance of crudity to modern prejudices. It called forth protests as early as the time of Osiander, who was silenced by authority. Dr. Clark's view is certainly more profound. According to Orthodox Protestantism, the sinner's chief concern is to escape punishment. According to Dr. Clark, it is not what God will do to the sinner, but what he has done to God, which causes him concern. He puts his faith in Christ, who in His Cross-and-Resurrection has made His life — the life of God — available for all mankind: the divine Life-force which communicates itself in its richness to us and which transforms us into its own likeness. This faith gives rise to justification and sanctification, like two branches on a single stem. Faith is no mere belief, but rather the soul's submission to a living force able to sweep away in its overwhelming rush all baser forces which have had their home within us, leaving no trace of them to spoil the beauty it brings in. This is teaching which modern man can accept, because it is authentic and genuine. Let grammarians dispute about the meaning of the termination of Greek verbs in -όω. This transformation of the believer into the nature of God in Christ is the real Gospel. Some may think that *The Cross and the Eternal Order* supersedes the earlier book. To be sure, *The Philosophy of Christian Experience* was really a sort of preparation (for the author as well as for readers) for fuller work. He had not at the time seen his way as far or as clearly as later. Of course he knew what he wanted, but the complete synthesis had not yet shaped itself. *The Cross and the Eternal Order* is the best modern exposition of redemption from an ontological point of view: it is Dr. Clark's *chef d'oeuvre* and marks him out as the greatest living English theologian. Its outstanding feature, apart from the ground which it shares with *The Philosophy of Christian Experience,* is the remarkable attempt to illumine and vivify St. Paul's thought concerning the cosmic significance of Christ. His penetrating study of the great apostle's Christological utterances rises with wings that travel through infinitudes of space and time to the grand conception of a Christ who is not only the saviour of men, but also creator of the world and immanent in it — or, to use his own language, *Christus Creator, Christus immanens* and *Christus Redemptor.* He seems to be thoroughly at home on these speculative heights, which might make a less experienced mountaineer feel giddy. He maintains that St. Paul's genius struck out the first thoughts and provided the framework for a Christian philosophy. He laments that it has never been worked out. Surveying the history of thought in Christendom, he notes that the opportunity has always been missed — sometimes the *Christus immanens* being stressed to the exclusion of the *Christus Creator,* sometimes the *Christus Creator* emphasized at the expense of the *Christus immanens,* sometimes both ignored, but never the three properly united in one comprehensive view. Dr. Clark has himself gone a considerable way towards the construction of such a philosophy on Pauline lines. Only on one point will the critical reader hesitate to follow him. He maintains that the immanence of Christ spoken of speculatively on pages 150 *ff.* — not of course the primary immanence of the Logos as sustainer of all things — was withdrawn when Christ offered a new immanence made possible by His Incarnation, Death and Resurrection. This theory is inspired by a worthy

evangelistic motive, but does it not fall into error in the service of a 'theolog of crisis'? That no other matter for serious ciriticism presents itself is a indication to the extent to which Dr. Clark carries the reader with him. It ardently to be desired that Dr. Clark will find a capable successor who wi carry on the work which he has so brilliantly begun.

G. L. MARRIOTT.

PRIEST AND PROPHET IN THE CHURCH*

This book has two parts. The first is an interesting memoir of the autho the second a course of his lectures on Church Life and Order in the first fou centuries. Dr. Bartlett spent his life on the teaching staff of Mansfiel College, Oxford. Solemn, austere, and somewhat eccentric, he was in man ways the model of a Christian scholar; sincere in controversy, patient wit opponents, eager to co-operate with Christians of other denominations t serve the interests of practical Christianity; he was devoted to the cause o truth, to which he sacrificed many cherished convictions. He owed much t his early upbringing and to his parents. They belonged to the strictest sec of Scottish Calvinists; it was a great grief to them when their son, unde the influence of Fairbairn, Sanday and Hatch at Oxford accepted the nev methods of Historical Theology, which undermined their whole system o belief. Bartlet adopted a method in theology totally different from theirs leading him to many conclusions which they repudiated. But he never forgo the spiritual debt he owed to his parents. He dedicated his first book 'T my parents, my first teachers in religion; to Drs. A. M. Fairbairn and W Sanday, my earliest masters in theology.' The tree of new discoveries grew from the roots of boyhood's piety. This was the key to his spiritual powe and intellectual sincerity.

Bartlet's subject in this volume is *Church Life and Church Order in the First Four Centuries*. This is a technical and very specialized subject. Materials are scarce; the authorship and date of many of the original documents, from the *Didache* in the first century to *The Apostolic Constitutions* in the fourth, are in dispute; and many of them are compilations of earlier and later matter. It is hard, therefore, to trace the causes which turned the ill-organized, enthusiastic Christian societies of the first century into the centralized, highly organized Church of the fourth. Comparing this book with Streeter's *The Primitive Church*, it is worth noting that Bartlett makes a valuable contribution to the subject, by treating Church Order as the expression of Church Life. He emphasizes the prevailing temper of the Church in each period, and shows how changes in Church Order reflect it. In the Apostolic Age, for instance, the Church was revivalist, enthusiastic, experimental. Direct experience of the Spirit was the essential reality of Church life. The consequence was that Christian prophets took a chief part in the corporate life of the Church, side by side with Peter, Paul and those who had seen the Lord. But as the centuries passed, enthusiasm and the sense of personal inspiration weakened. Prophets first received less honour, then became objects of suspicion, and at last lost all official share in the conduct of public worship. An official ministry of men ordained for this function took their place, so that there was nothing for the inspired but unordained layman to do. Bartlet traces the stages of this great change. There are gaps in the story, owing to the failure of first-hand evidence; and in places his handling of the evidence is incomplete. For Bartlet did not prepare his manuscript for the press. Dr. Cadoux has edited it with the greatest care and labour, but Bartlet left his treatment of certain topics unfinished. These few gaps

* *Church-Life and Church-Order during the First Four Centuries.* By J. Vernon Bartlet, M.A., Hon. D.D. Edited by C. J. Cadoux. (Blackwell. 1944. 15/-.)

will fill scholars with regret. But they do not affect the value of the book for the general reader. The main outlines of Bartlet's thesis and his conclusions are clear. They shed new light on the history of the Church in the first four centuries, and they make most valuable suggestions for a new approach to the problems of the Church of to-day. Here they are in his own words:

'As one looks back on the whole development of the ministry of the Divine Spirit in and to the Church, from its widely-different and spontaneous forms in the Apostolic Age to its highly-concentrated and regulated forms in the persons of a specialized clergy — forming a sacred class marked off from the general body of Christians by the sharp dividing line of ordination — one cannot but be struck by the greatness of the contrast in form and order. To all outward appearance there is a shrinkage in the relative numbers of those exercising, or feeling any call to exercise, Spirit-gifts for the good of the whole brotherhood. In a word, the conception of Church-life and ministry implied in St. Paul's words in *Romans* xii (to say nothing of I *Cor.* xii, 14) had become well-nigh unintelligible, so great was the change, not only in practise, but also in thought and standpoint . . . ' (p. 166).

'The element of fixity in the modes under which Church-life had come to express itself corporately, as compared with the striking freedom and variety of the ways of doing this in the Apostolic Age, must be our first and dominant impression, as we look back from the end of the fourth century. The element of 'order' is not only more in evidence, but is also more rigid and dominant. In fact it now leaves little or no room for the liberty of the Spirit, as directly related to personal (in distinction from official) inspiration in such a way as to be available for the common good in worship, teaching or counsel. Prophecy — in the original Christian sense of fresh insight vouchsafed to individuals by God's free action, to which it was the Church's part to give recognition and opportunity of utterance — was practically a thing of the past. In so far as it entered into the Church's mind at all, it was assumed to have been confined to certain official channels, those of the primary order of formally and ritually consecrated priests, *i.e.* the presbyterate and its official head the bishop. It was no longer recognizable in any normal or practical way, outside those humanly-imposed limits.

'Further, "the holy Church" is no longer spoken of, possibly not even conceived of, as itself "a royal priesthood," "kings and priests unto God": and herein we feel already one of those changes, at first of emphasis, but later of more than emphasis, which, when taken together, mark off pretty sharply the genius of Catholic Christianity in the fourth century from that of primitive or Apostolic Christianity, and even of the so-called Apostolic Fathers as a whole' (p. 168).

'. . . A primary element of organization in the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic Church consisted in that part of its order which expressed the consciousness of its being animated throughout by the grace of "holy Spirit" for the common profit, including informal prayer and thanksgiving and exposition of the Word. That all scope for Church-exercise of such diffused "prophetic" functions of the Spirit, beyond the specialized ministries recognized and authorized by ordination, should be ruled out as unallowable, even in the absence of the more qualified ministers in question, was a development of Church-order, which implied a less-perfect organization of the Church's total spiritual life. For to restrict the pre-existing larger liberty of utilizing all the actual Grace-gifts of the community must surely have meant the atrophy of those gifts through lack of the educative effect of their exercise, and a diminution of the

sense of co-operation on the part of the rank and file in the whole vocation of the Church.

'Thus, under normal conditions of developing Church-life, there existed at first no necessary antithesis between the prophet and the pastor, and men of the greatest prophetic gifts frequently became presbyters and overseers of the Church. There were bishops, who like Ignatius and Polycarp were felt to be prophetic in the quality of their personal insight into the inner meaning or soul of Apostolic and other traditional truth. It was only when all prophetic grace came to be treated in practice as confined to the official ministers of the Word, in particular the bishops, that the decisive step was taken; and prophecy outside the regular ministry was virtually regarded as a thing of the past — much as it was in the Jewish Church for centuries prior to the coming of John the Baptist.

'But whatever the precise cause and manner of the change may have been, the upshot was that St. Paul's ideal that all Christians as such might prophesy (I *Cor.* xiv, 1, 3, 5) and that some at least, apart from representative or elective Church-office should exercise this *charisma* (I *Cor.* xi, 4; xiv, 26; *Rom.* xii, 6ff) would at the end of the fourth century have ranked as heresy and lawless disorder. That there was gain as well as loss in the development which led to this result need not be denied, even by those who hold it to have been an impoverishment that this gain should have been at the cost of the liberty of the Spirit' (p. 171).

From these notable conclusions certain practical consequences follow, for necessary reform in our Church-life to-day. A visitor from abroad recently remarked that in England the worship and affairs of each parish church seemed to be the exclusive concern of the parson and a few like-minded laymen. This illustrates the indifference of the average Englishman to his national Church, though not necessarily to Christianity. But if there is going to be a revival of religion in this country, then all this must be changed, unless that revival should by-pass the Church of England. Parsons, like other people, want to have their own way, and to run things according to their notions. But if a religious revival is going to bring fresh life to the Church, they will have not only to tolerate interference from lay people but to encourage it. 'The Spirit bloweth where it listeth.' If lay-people are forbidden to exercise their spiritual gifts inside the Church, they will make opportunities for exercising them outside it.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

THE ESSENTIALS AND THE UNESSENTIALS OF THE CHURCH

Fr. Hebert's new book* is another attempt to distinguish the essential characterstics of the Church from the unessential, the divine ordinances from the human. His argument is linked with a philosophy of form which helps it to clarity but is not, I think, its foundation, since the particular 'essential forms' are not really deduced from 'Christ, *the* Form of the Church.' Rather, starting from two familiar sets of essentials — the Bible, Creed, Sacraments and Episcopate of Lambeth and the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic of the Creed — he would demonstrate how and why these are all necessary to the being of a Church which shall indeed be the Body of Christ, the community formed by His redeeming work. This is fair enough, though in danger of concealed assumptions; but the initial 'Contents' makes the argument appear rather more syllogistic than it is.

* *The Form of the Church*, by A. G. Hebert. (Faber & Faber. 1944. 126 pp. 8/6.)

The conception of the Church here portrayed is frequently so truly Christian in depth and breadth as to disarm criticism. For example, the heading Catholicity covers its social, economic and missionary functions. Nevertheless, the conclusions towards which the book is working are those of a narrower 'Catholicism,' so that, although Fr. Hebert, recognizing the value of much Protestant teaching, continually proclaims that all forms, even those divinely ordained, need the perpetual quickening of the Spirit, and that they exist only that we may come to Christ, yet he seems most concerned to prove the *indispensability of the apostolic episcopate* — a sad anticlimax to those who disagree. Moreover, when he reaches this crucial point, the discussion is too brief.

On what, then does he base his conviction that apostolic episcopacy is necessary to the being of the Church? First, the Apostles were necessary. Granted; but why, precisely? (And whom does the term cover?) Functions necessary at first are not therefore unalterable. Once (p. 42) we read that 'the Apostolic commission is the same always,' but later (p. 111) it is allowed that 'there remains an element in the Apostolic commission which must continue; and that this permanent element constitutes the essential form of the Ministry.' Much turns on distinguishing that element precisely.

Next, 'there must necessarily be an office in the Church to perpetuate the Apostolic functions' (p. 109). But to say *an office* may beg the question. And again, *what* functions? Here I rejoice to find most stress laid, as in Irenaeus' teaching on succession, upon the preservation of the Gospel. But while in its teaching the Church must be substantially apostolic, it does not follow that *this* apostolicity can only, or best, be secured by apostolic succession. 'The guardianship of Christian doctrine . . . has always been recognized as belonging primarily to the episcopate' (p. 111). Always? Only if you possess bishops. Non-episcopal churches care for truth as much as episcopal. Nor within episcopal bodies have bishops always guaranteed it. Did the Anglican bishops preach the Gospel better than Wesley? Must history bow to *a priori* logic? Calvin's claim to possess an apostolic succession better than the episcopal cannot be refuted merely by pointing to his lack of bishops. Indeed, Fr. Hebert might work out the implications of the welcome he extends to neo-Calvinists (p. 100). For Protestants claim not that apostolicity does not matter, but that its organ (*cf.* p. 44) is not an office (p. 10) but the Bible. That of course needs interpretation, but one can hardly believe episcopalians as such the best interpreters. It is good to see that Fr. Hebert rejects the view that the Bible derives its authority from the Church which formed the Canon (p. 108).

On one usual reason for episcopal succession he is silent. Though pleading the necessity of priesthood (p. 116), he does not connect valid orders and sacraments with apostolicity, unless it is implied in the unsupported statement, 'the Apostolic Commission, which the Bishop alone holds in its fulness, and is empowered to hand on' (p. 113). Does Fr. Hebert reject the common 'Catholic' view?

If then the arguments for the indispensability of an office in apostolic succession are unconvincing, those for episcopacy in particular are very slight. I cannot but suspect that Fr. Hebert, who frankly admits that monarchical bishops were not appointed by Jesus and that 'we do not know whether the Apostles regularly left one man in responsible charge' (p. 112), is clear about his own reasons. He says we must not quarrel about names, that what matters is the essential Ministry holding the Apostolic Commission; but jumps to monepiscopacy.

These points are familiar enough. In the end, one always reaches the same position. Christian truth, rooted in history, must be maintained within a living church. If the ordinance of a permanent 'succession' ministry is not

historically proved (as is here admitted), it can only be necessary if it is part of the Gospel or indispensable for its preservation. Fr. Hebert only tries to prove the latter point, and does not convince. The alternative is to believe that the Church has the right to say, from time to time, what forms of ministry it needs, that the apostolic authority devolves upon the whole Church, not upon a caste within it.

Fr. Hebert is troubled about Reunion, fearing superficial compromises and the mere establishment of unity of organization (p. 100). But the oecumenical movement and the acceptance of comprehensiveness are something more. Surely he knows how many long for union because we *are* united in essentials, and believe the dividing factors often unessential. Admit the difficulty of drawing the line. Must we then wait for an absolute agreement, as impossible on earth as the absolute holiness which Catholicism rightly does not demand as a test of membership? Both are goals, not starting-points. Partly because it would enforce uniformity, Rome is not 'the greatest fact in Christendom' (p. 101), even though it is the largest body. There must therefore be toleration of opinion within a united Church; and, with all the risk, this must cover the clergy, since they normally are the students of theology. Finally there must be liberalism, even if it errs. (But what is it? Fr. Hebert's idea is far too sweeping, pp. 41, 96). God gives us revelation, but no infallibility; faith, but also the enquiring mind. He can use both conservative and liberal in one Body. Sincerity is often costly; if the liberal's pride is of the devil, not so his pain. Let liberalism be purged according to its need; if it be humble, its day of service will never be past.

S. L. GREENSLADE.

OFLAG LECTURES*

Prisoners' Quest, a book consisting of eleven talks on religious topics delivered by a Chaplain at an Officer Prisoner of War Camp, could hardly fail to be of interest; one has no doubt that these lectures would be very gratefully listened to.

They follow the lines of conventional apologetic, beginning with a demonstration of the reasonableness of theism. They then examine the Gospels, and find in Jesus 'something quite different from an ordinary man' (p. 47). There follows the corollary that here 'God acted in such a direct and intimate way that I am forced to make the final identification and confess with Thomas, "My Lord and my God."' We then get an examination of St. Paul's unsuccessful attempt to live entirely 'in terms of a moral code,' and the resultant need of a Saviour for men who, knowing the good, choose the bad. There follows the now inevitable criticism of 'Humanism.' It is all very well done, and we can imagine that the lectures were appreciated. But somehow they do not convince. Partly this is because the New Testament does not really get justice done to it; the great variety of its contents, and the different stages of development they exemplify, are not sufficiently brought out. The relation of the Fourth Gospel to the others, for example, is not described. There is no serious attempt to answer the question what Jesus taught about Himself and His mission.

This type of apologetic always forces into the mind a reflection to which Bishop Hensley Henson gave expression:

> 'The inadequacy of the practical effect of Christianity in view of the orthodox theory as to its origin and character has always seemed to me the most formidable difficulty in the way of discipleship.'

Might it not be possible to scrap this conventional approach and begin by asking what is meant by the term 'God'? 'We know not what man is, how

* *Prisoners' Quest.* By D. H. C. Read, C.F. (S.C.M. 6/-. 1944.)

then can we know what God is?' asked Pascal. As a matter of fact, what with psychology, history and anthropology, we do know a little more than Pascal did about man, but no more, perhaps less, about God. Why, then, start out by proving and defining God, and proceeding to present Jesus as an 'incarnation' of that Being, as we have proved and defined Him? It is not, and can never be, convincing, and is not even scriptural.

What *kind* of a God can you reasonably imagine to have been 'incarnate' in Jesus? is a better opening question. It is not irrelevant to note that the inventor of the doctrine of 'the incarnation' was also the author of the saying 'God is love.' And what does that saying mean?

In a short course of lectures one cannot hope to see every subject tackled, but one misses a chapter on the crucial topic of Immortality, which was central in every book of the New Testament. One would have welcomed also a chapter on Spirit, and another on Prayer. People badly want to know about these things.

J.C.H.

THE TRANSFIGURATION AND ITS INTERPRETATION *

This book is a really good contribution to the scientific study of the New Testament, and all students owe a debt of gratitude to the publishers, and to the University of London Publication Fund, whose generosity made it possible for the book to appear.

There is a wide divergence of views as to the nature of the Transfiguration, and the author first examines the various conclusions arrived at by prominent scholars—a piece of symbolic writing to affirm the Messiahship of Jesus; an historical experience of a visionary nature; originally a Resurrection story. There is an interesting chapter on the interpretations of the Transfiguration story in the Early Church, and the treatment of the *Apocalypse of Peter* and the *Pistis Sophia* is well-done. Then the author makes a searching examination of St. Mark's narrative, and comes to the conclusion that it was a prediction of the *Parousia*. Some strong arguments are adduced for this conclusion, though they may not appear conclusive to all students: still this view certainly gives an admirable explanation of the appearance of Moses and Elias in the story. But whether we agree or not with the author, we are grateful for the freshness and vigour with which he states his case.

Dr. Booyber gives a very suggestive exegesis of 'glory' (*doxa*), and says (p. 69): 'Both in Judaism and the New Testament, then, transformation into a glistening body of *doxa* has outstanding reference to the events of the last days. It was a current apocalyptic hope, which in the New Testament focuses strongly upon the fashion of Jesus at his second coming.'

We shall look forward with interest to Dr. Boobyer's next book.

S. H. N. Pilcher.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORY

It is obvious that the great majority of people who are alienated from or indifferent to organized religion will not, as in previous ages, accept beliefs out of deference to any external authority. It is beliefs that can be shown to be true which will claim the future. The approach must be empirical, not authoritarian.

Two recent books, therefore, are welcome and timely. Their purpose is to deduce from the facts a philosophy of history and to indicate the theological

* *St. Mark and the Transfiguration Story*, by G. H. Boobyer, B.A., B.D., D.Th. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1942.)

implications of the philosophy that is deduced. They differ in scope and method but agree largely in their conclusions.

The first is *Divine Providence and Human Destiny*,[1] by Dr. L. E. Elliott-Binns. He was prompted to write this study by the prevalent confusion among ordinary people concerning 'providence' and the chaos of war. 'What I have written,' says Dr. Elliott-Binns, 'is the result of many years of pondering over the whole course of man's life on this planet.' He might have added that it is enriched by an immense scholarship which ranges from ancient Arabic poetry to the latest mathematical theories. His knowledge of comparative religion alone would make the book important to the student.

The first of the three chapters deals with Providence in the Bible. Its contents will be familiar to most readers of this journal. With an excellent clarity the idea of Providence in the Old Testament is traced from the 'tribal god' stage. The prophetic outlook is fully discussed, and the influence of Zoroastrianism on post-Exilic theories is illustrated. To this influence is traced the conception of God's Providence in terms of battle between good and evil powers.

Throughout the Bible the growth of belief in God's interest in and purpose for man is reviewed. 'Man is made to seek after God and find Him, and the Father is ever seeking those who will offer Him their worship in spirit and in truth.' The unique position of the Jews leads to the deduction that 'God's method . . . is to make use of chosen instruments' who offer him willing co-operation. It is in *Ephesians* that Dr. Elliott-Binns sees the zenith of the Biblical view of Providence. 'With the coming of Christ . . . a new start had been made in history, and the purpose of God is seen to be the summing up of all things in Him.'

The only important criticism which can be made of this chapter is that if Dr. Duhm's analysis of *Job* is accurate, Dr. Elliott-Binns does *Job* less than justice. His habit of referring to 'The Fall' as if some historic event is implied would make welcome a definition of his meaning.

The second chapter, 'Providence in History,' is really concerned with *theories* of 'Providence in History.' It begins with Heraclitus' dictum, 'All things flow' and traces the idea of Providence through Homer to the widespread ancient belief in the 'epic cycle.' Professor Verrall's nightmare after reading an illuminated sign, 'Epic Cycle Works,' is properly recorded. There is a fine discussion of Augustine's theory of Providence. To the saint 'History was a sermon, an exercise in Christian evidences, not a distinterested attempt to understand . . . the course of civilization.'

Dr. Elliott-Binns' review of modern theories is admirable. For example, in dealing with the ideas of Eucken and Croce, who 'represent God as realizing Himself in the Historical process,' he says: 'They regard Him as purely immanent, and as such bound up with the fate of the universe, whose dissolution He must one day share. . . . This over-emphasis on the divine immanence finds its antidote in the equal over-emphasis on the divine transcendence characteristic . . . of Barth and of Reinhold Niebuhr.'

This chapter concludes with Matthew Arnold's words, 'There is sufficient evidence in History to justify the conclusion that it reveals a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness.' This power is, as it were, 'the current' of the universe, and individuals, nations and causes are effectual in accordance with their relationship to the current. 'Selfishness in nations . . . in individuals, brings at long last its inevitable punishment.'

Following naturally, the third chapter deals with the human task of co-operating with the divine purpose. The popular fallacy that God is a sort of strategic secret weapon to expedite human schemes is faithfully dealt with. Dr. Elliott-Binns believes that there is no cause for despair in the chaos of

[1] 82 pp. S.P.C.K. 4/-. 1944.

war. He finds progress in History, but it is composed of ebb and flow, with flow outdistancing ebb. He illustrates that events apparently insignificant, if in harmony with the divine plan, have an effect for good far greater than more terrifying but less significant events.

In discussing the Church's opportunity Dr. Elliott-Binns closes the book with a quotation from Dr. Oldham. 'A sense of futility falls on all work which is directed to merely finite ends. As we become absorbed in a ceaseless round of activity life becomes meaningless. . . . It can find renewal only as it regains touch with the eternal in worship. Worship is the source of rebirth and of all creative activities.' The Church, in fact, can co-operate with secular bodies in the practical application of God's purpose, but the Church alone, being in contact with Him, has the secret of creative action.

R. V. Holt's Essex Hall Lecture for 1943, *Religion and History*,[2] is a philosophical essay on the same subject. The argument is swiftly and emphatically built on the obvious fact that Religion varies and changes. Change, an aspect of the problem of time, is the subject matter of the historian, and 'The particular and changing have no meaning unless somehow related to the universal and the timeless.' To find this relationship is a task often regarded with suspicion. Yet it is important to the moralist—'if all life is . . . change how can there be . . . absolute standards?'—and to religious men it is a matter of life and death, for they seek to rise above the changing into the eternal.

The implications of this problem, claims Mr. Holt, are usually evaded. Religion is limited to one event in time which is regarded as an absolute and final revelation. (Mr. Holt does scant justice, here, to the 'Realized Eschatology' school—perhaps it is for lack of space.) Sometimes a highest common factor is sought for, which 'has proved to be a lifeless abstraction.' Sometimes religion is isolated from life, as in some forms of sacramentalism. It is curious that Mr. T. S. Eliot's poetry is not used here for illustration, for surely this problem is his theme.

The result has been the distrust and dislike of religion, and, what is worse, the half-amused tolerance common to-day. That religion is, in a bad sense, anthropomorphic is a usual accusation. But experience shows that some form of religion is essential. 'When men cease to believe in spiritual religion they create secular religions.' That which is so essential to life 'cannot be merely an illusion.' The reasons for the inadequacy of 'secular religion' are examined.

Mr. Holt then tackles the question which has been 'evaded' with such dire results. He has, of course, exaggerated, but excusably. He asserts 'Religion has a history because religion is relevant to history. Religion is relevant to history because history has a meaning.'

The accusation of anthropomorphism is next examined, and the truth underlying the much-abused word is well stated. 'No theory of life can be adequate which asserts that that which lies at the heart of life is less than any of its manifestations.

Evolution in religion and history is summarized, and here Mr. Holt asserts 'Man discovers purpose in history because purpose is there, and when man takes charge of his destiny he is making himself one with that purpose. Man progresses in knowledge of God, and the progress comes in 'creative periods' from 'creative lives.' Progress is followed by a danger-period of near-stagnation when the great creative experience is preserved in forms, which lose life but to which men cling 'until the letter becomes more precious than the spirit, and the institution than the life.' 'The time comes when, if religion is not to die, a new mould must be created.' The choice, says Mr. Holt, is between creation and catastrophe. The present chaos is the result of the wrong choice. The purpose of God moves on, and man must move with it.

[2] *Religion and History.* (Lindsey Press. 1/-. 30 pp. 1944.)

This movement, concludes Mr. Holt, is towards a new synthesis of faith, a new world religion, made up of the

'. . . dim fragments
meant in some wondrous whole to be combined.'

Mr. Holt overstates his case. Christianity is more than a 'dim fragment.' But the main argument is well sustained and his essay is full of excellencies, not least among them the arrangement and fluent style.

It is evident that both authors have gleaned in a fruitful and little-visited field. When it is thoroughly explored, the whole of history re-examined and the significance of *triceratops* and *eohippus*, of Genglin Khan and Erasmus is fully realized, a new era in Christian apologetics may begin.

N. S. Power.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

Sir,

HELEN ALEXANDRINA DALLAS

Helen Alexandrina Dallas, who passed to higher service on May 18th, at the advanced age of nearly 88, was, I suppose, one of the earliest members of the Modern Churchmen's Union. With a finely trained and disciplined mind, she made a study of Comparative Religion. I possess some of the notes of her study of Eastern cults made in her earlier days in the British Museum Reading Room. They are a witness to the care and thoroughness she brought to bear on all she undertook. A close study of the Gospel records produced a valuable book by her, published forty-one years ago, *Gospel Records interpreted by Human Experience*. The title is indicative of the fact that her interest in Christian origins was not merely that of the historical student but of one who brought a human spirit and a loving heart to bear upon the elucidation of the documents. A lifelong friend of hers, writing from South Africa, says:

> 'Deep spirituality, a deeply religious mode of mind, was one side of her outlook, but it was not that of creeds, dogmas, and 'isms; nor was it "orthodox," though the Anglican was her Church and its Communion Service one of her greatest joys. Jesus the Christ was intensely real to her, as a living Presence; Leader, Inspiration, Guide, and above all Friend and Comrade. The English-speaking world is left the poorer by by the passing from it of a rare spirit. She will be missed by a large circle of friends of the kind who are such because of what they owe to one of an incomparable sweetness of nature and of unfailing sympathy, tireless service and that profound capacity for understanding which is born of intuition, cradled in spirituality, bred in selflessness, matured in wisdom, and throughout fed by an all-embracing love of one's fellow-men.'

This testimony is itself a witness to her wide influence, since it is the testimony of one who is not what is usually described as a 'professing Christian.'

One of Miss Dallas's lifelong interests was Psychic Research. It was through her brother-in-law, Dr. Colles, an investigator during the closing years of the last century, that she became interested and began to search for first-hand evidence. Like so many others who later on became its most brilliant exponents, she started with an initial bias against some aspects of the subject. Her interest was mainly with the mental phenomena. It was derived from wide reading, deep study, and an abundance of practical experience and experiment, assessed with careful judgment. She had an even-minded sanity

of outlook which had as little use for emotionalism, credulity and wishful thinking on the spiritistic side, as it had for scepticism on the scientific side.

The result of this was that she was able to build the fortress of Truth upon the foundation of unassailable Proof; not for herself only but for a very large number of others. First and chiefly, perhaps, for her host of correspondents in many parts of the world who in the agony of bereavement and uncertainty approached her for help, and to each of whom she gave of her best. To a wider circle she spoke through her many books, all of which bore the hall-mark of her scientific outlook and deeply religious instincts, a combination which gave her considerable influence with the more thoughtful and open-minded of the clergy.

Among her many friends were Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir William Barrett and Mr. Stanley De Brath, who held her in the highest esteem. She was for a number of years an honorary member of the Society for Psychical Research.

I am conscious that this bare enumeration of some of the facts about my dear old friend can convey to those who did not know her only a very imperfect idea of what she was to us who were honoured by her friendship.

Risby Rectory, Bury St. Edmund's. ARCHIE F. WEBLING.
Oct. 12, 1944.

JUST CAUSES AND IMPEDIMENTS

SIR,

It may interest your readers to know something about the diriment impediments, or the grounds on which the Roman Church can declare a marriage to be null and void. The facts can be found in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, New York, Vol. VII, pp. 695-698 (s.v. Impediments). I have appended a few comments in brackets. There are thirteen diriment impediments, which are as follows: (1) Impuberty, (2) Impotence, (3) Religious vow, *e.g.* of one taking Holy Orders, (4) Abduction, (5) Disparity of worship (this brings in the question of mixed marriages and the compulsory education of children in the R.C. faith), (6) previous engagement to another person, (7) natural relationship (*cf.* table of prohibited degrees), (8) spiritual affinity, *e.g.* sponsor and god-child, (9) legal relationship, *e.g.* adoption, (10) clandestinity, (11) lack of consent through insanity, (12) through total ignorance of the meaning of marriage, not presumed to exist after puberty, (13) moral or physical constraint, so that there was no free consent (*e.g.* Duchess of Marlborough case).

All these natural or artificial objections would create the impression that marriage is not so much a divinely ordained institution as the happy hunting-ground of clerical casuists. It is needless to say that these cases can only be decided by the Papal Curia for the financial benefit of the Vatican.

L. PATTERSON.

'THE LOGIC OF REAL KNOWING'

SIR,

Modern Churchmen will be grateful to the Rev. H. C. Snape for his article on the Logic of Real Knowing. If theology is to give us real knowledge it must abandon the methods of Formal Logic and follow those of the sciences. In the sciences there are no rigid demonstrations of laws which can never be broken. They offer us instead generalized statements which are highly probable, and an open road to new truths. Theology must do the same.

Where I disagree with Mr. Snape is in his definition of the sort of proofs which theology must offer for the truth of its assertions. He says: 'the principle must be, by their fruits ye shall know them.' And again: 'it (theology) will ask the world to accept Christianity as the true and final religion . . . because it satisfies men's deepest needs.' Unfortunately this is not

enough. Beliefs held and acted upon may have most fruitful effects, and yet be untrue. There is an unresolvable difference between what is and what ought to be. The chief problem before theology is to answer the question whether the world is in fact such as 'to satisfy men's deepest needs.'

The sciences verify their generalizations through experiment. One does not argue as to whether the tree in the garden is an apple or pear; one goes out to see. Theology cannot prove its object by such simple sense-impressions. God is not the object of scientific experiment. But theology can offer verification for its theories, although its verification is indirect. The basis of religious truth is Natural Theology, the general conclusions as to the nature and structure of the world and man as they are made known to us by the sciences. These are supplemented and enlarged by Revealed Theology, the study of God's action in history, together with the revelations of His will and nature given to individual men and women.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

Bitterley Rectory, Ludlow, Salop.
2nd October, 1944.

MR. SNAPE'S REPLY.

If space had permitted me to elaborate my definition of the kind of verification which a humanistic theology would offer for the truth of its assertions, I think that Mr. Nettlefold would have found that we are much closer in agreement than I have led him to believe. To the statement that theology cannot prove its object by such simple sense-impressions as those of common sense (*cf. Modern Churchman*, p. 123, my quotation from Schiller's 'Studies in Humanism'), but indirectly, I would heartily concur. Both however the atheist and the theist may claim that their assertions derive support from the general conclusions as to the nature and structure of the world and man as they are made known to us by the sciences, while history yields a possible interpretation to either. These conclusions limit the nature of their assertions without decisively verifying those of one party or the other. Only by ignoring the conclusions of the sciences could an atheist maintain that the world was completely anarchic or the theist that God governs the world by random interference *ab extra*. The conclusions of the sciences decide what assertions are superstitious, *i.e.* obsolete survivals, and what are tenable. But the final verification lies in the moral and spiritual field. We judge scientific truth by the extent to which it enables us to control our environment and to be at home with what comes from without; we judge religious truth by the extent to which it enables us to be master of ourselves and augment our spiritual strength. In the last resort the verification is personal. No one knows whether prayer works unless he has prayed and put himself in the trustful attitude of a praying man. As Illingworth said, 'Religion refuses to be proved first and practised afterwards; its practice and its proof go hand in hand'; or as Berdyaev has written (*The Destiny of Man*, p. 18), 'Knowledge of truth is communion with truth and life in it; knowledge of righteousness is communion with righteousness and life in it.'

H. C. SNAPE.

SIR,

The statement which Mr. Snape makes about Hegelians, on p. 120 of the *Modern Churchman* for September, seems to me fantastically wrong. He says that 'Theologians who had passed through the Oxford School of Philosophy were Hegelians and trained to be formal logicians. They were unused to the scientific method and hostile to the new Humanism.' The very essence of the Hegelian logic is the dialectical method, by which no judgment is held to be final, but to pass into its opposite through the formation of a more com-

prehensive synthesis. What else does Mr. Snape mean when he says that affirmations are shown not to be unalterable formulae but hypotheses verified by experience and subject to revision and expansion as knowledge progresses.' In practice we who were trained in philosophy at Oxford in the 'nineties and came largely under the influence of such neo-Hegelians as T. H. Green, Wallace, Caird, Bosanquet, Bradley and Cook-Wilson (some of them already dead, some living) made a very slight acquaintance with formal logic — just enough to enable us to understand what was meant by syllogism. In my first long vacation I was asked to study *The Origin of Species,* for which I have since been grateful, and Mill's Logic, which is illustrated everywhere by scientific method. As to 'hostility to the new Humanism,' if that means to be unconvinced of the validity of pragmatism in general, I plead guilty. While admitting an insufficient knowledge of Dr. Schiller's writings, may I suggest at the same time that Mr. Snape should make the acquaintance of the Logic of Hegel.

GUY KENDALL.

Churchfield End, Witley, Surrey.
Sept. 23, 1944.

MR. SNAPE'S REPLY.

Mr. Kendall's account of his own philosophic training at Oxford in the 'nineties appears to me to support rather than refute my contention. It was a time when Mill was being supplanted by Hegel. But both were fundamentally formal logicians and threw no light on the principles and results of scientific research. Mill's canons presumed that 'facts' and 'laws' were already discovered. They yielded no criterion on what were the *relevant* facts to a particular field of research. They were rather empty forms under which facts and laws already discovered could be classified. Hegel's dialectical method is an epistemological not a scientific instrument. It was to be applied to the concrete universal. But the 'universals' of science only live in their application to concrete cases. Darwin's *Origin of Species* described and formulated a theory of evolution; it did not of course reveal the bearings of the theory on the functions and methods of knowledge. Such books as Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science* and Poincaré's *Science et Methode,* which were written in the following decade by men who were working scientists, described the actual procedure of the scientific mind in the laboratory. Professor Raven's statement (*Science, Religion, and the Future,* p. 62), 'By the end of the century theology was represented by the Oxford "greats" tradition, Plato and Aristotle, christianized and liberalized, but almost wholly untouched by the influence of the sciences,' gives a true representation of the relationship between philosophy, science, and theology at this time.

I must leave it to Mr. Kendall himself to judge whether the new humanism is to be equated with what he calls 'pragmatism in general.' It is not, however, the view that truth is to be judged by a mere utilitarian or survival-value, as has often been mistakenly thought.

H. C. SNAPE.

SIR, 'THE PRIMATE, THE CONVOCATIONS, THE DIVORCED'

Your editorial entitled 'The Primate, the Convocations, the Divorced' in your September issue needs to be supplemented in one important particular. By the Herbert Act, the decision to permit or forbid the marriage of a divorced parishioner in his or her parish church rests solely with the Incumbent of the Parish — not with the Bishop of the Diocese. Clause 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, runs thus:—

'12. The following subsection shall be substituted for subsections (2) and (3) of section one hundred and eighty-four of the principal Act:

'(2) No clergyman of the Church of England or of the Church in Wales shall be compelled to solemnize the marriage of any person whose former marriage has been dissolved on any ground and whose former husband or wife is still living or to permit the marriage of any such person to be solemnized in the Church or Chapel of which he is minister.'

The Principal Act referred to is the 'Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925.'

By protecting in this way the parochial incumbent's conscientious scruples the right of the parishioner to the use of his parish church has been grievously and wrongfully restricted. If the parishioner can secure a qualified Church of England clergyman to marry him in the parish church, the incumbent of the parish ought to be compelled legally to permit the marriage service to take place. This is the law in the case of a marriage to a deceased wife's sister, and it should also be the rule in the case of all parishioners who desire to contract legal marriages even though such marriages may not be in accordance with the conscientious scruples of the parochial incumbent.

It is of urgent importance that our English marriage law should be amended so as to secure the removal of this injustice to parishioners. I feel very strongly on this matter as I have suffered this injustice.

37 Broadhurst, Ashtead, Surrey. C. N. SWAYNE.

SIR, CHRISTIANIZING THE LORD'S PRAYER

Indeed it is well to uphold the retention of the Doxology in the Lord's Prayer. It would be a very grave loss were it rescinded. It is an affirmation of the Christian faith in the revelation of the Trinity — the Creator-King of the heavenly Kingdom; the Power of the Holy Spirit by which He moves and has His presence in ourselves; and in the Glory of the character of God as revealed in Christ.

KATHLEEN PRYNNE.

Basset Garth, Penn, Bucks.
3rd October, 1944.

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN'S UNION
CO-OPTION TO COUNCIL

SIR,

May I inform members of the Union that at its meeting held in London on November 17th the Council chose the following to fill its vacant seats until next summer: Miss M. K. Body, Rev. G. W. Butterworth, M.A., Litt.D., Miss W. M. Fayerman, M.A., Rev. Canon Marcus Knight, B.D., Rev. A. L. Luckcraft, B.A., B.D., Rev. F. I. L. Rees, M.A., Rev. A. F. Robson, M.A., Rev. Professor N. Sykes, D.Phil., Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A.

These co-options would normally have been made during the summer, but no meeting has been held since February.

R. GLADSTONE GRIFFITH,
Hon. Secretary, Modern Churchmen's Union.

Steeple Claydon Vicarage, Bletchley, Bucks.
November 18th, 1944.

SIR, MODERN CHURCHMEN'S CONFERENCE, 1945.

The next Modern Churchmen's Conference will be held August 13—18, 1945, in Somerville College and Regent's Park College, Oxford. Particulars may be obtained from the Honorary Secretary, Miss Irene Walker, Twemlow Hall, Holmes Chapel, Cheshire.

H. D. A. MAJOR.